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war end

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WHAT MAKES A WAR END?

W H A T M A K E S
K A N S A S
A W A R E N D ?

by

Lt. Commander H. A. Calahan

U. S. N. R.

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Designed by Stefan Salter

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To those earnest and perspicacious
Students of War,
my classmates and the Staff
of the U. S. Naval War College

The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large

Foreword

When you write a book like this in a fluid and changing world like this, you must freeze the situation, if we may use the term, as of the time of writing. The actual time in which the collected and digested data were turned into a manuscript were the months of April and May, 1944. The manuscript was delivered to the publisher on June first. It takes a long time these days to turn a manuscript into a printed book.

It is realized that by the date of publication the situation of the belligerents in the present war will probably have changed dramatically. Yet it is felt confidently that the only adjustment the reader will have to make is one of tense. The past or the present may have to be substituted for the present or the future. Think back to April and May. The much-heralded invasion of Europe has not yet taken place. There are few outward signs of revolution in Germany and Japan. No peace offerings have yet been made by the Axis powers, or, at any rate, the public is not informed of any. If these things come to pass before publication, as sooner or later they must, confusion is bound to result unless the reader generously turns back his mental calendar to the time when this book is written.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Ruth Brindze for her invaluable spade work in the immense amount of research involved.

H. A. C.

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O N E

"How Will It End?"

"WHEN WILL IT END? How will it end?" These are the two questions the whole world is asking today. And every man is his own best prophet.

The professional prophets find prophecy lucrative, for some of their readers and listeners like to have a convenient professional do their thinking for them. And others read and listen for the pleasure of disagreeing. This book is not a work of prophecy. Rather, it is a book of data for the man who draws his own conclusions.

The question, "*When* will it end?" depends for its solution on its twin, "*How* will it end?" There is no simple answer. The world has had a vast experience with war. In the last four thousand years there have been fewer than three hundred years of peace. That statement is conservative. It depends upon the definition of peace. Out of this great welter and surfeit of war it would seem easy to select and chart the course that leads to a war's end. But there are so many factors of such varying values and such complicated interplay of cause and effect, that factors of tremendous import in one war may have slight significance in the next. The tempering of a nation's soul changes. Sometimes it is soft and malleable, sometimes hard and brittle, sometimes tough and resilient. The same Italians who cracked

so miserably at Caporetto came back to beat Austria into a separate peace. The French who gave up Metz to save 200,000 men defended Verdun at a cost of 600,000 and surrendered France when they lost 50,000. Which figure shall we take as the cost of French surrender?

There is no yardstick to measure national guts.

What causes a warring people to take the bitter pill of capitulation? What are the military, social, and economic factors that make an entire nation embrace the humiliation, punishment, and tragedy of defeat as preferable to a continuation of their losses and sufferings in war? Their behavior is a study of mass psychology. Defeat is a spiritual matter. Capitulation is moral, not just material.

They resist, we say, to the last man. They resist until resistance is no longer possible. On very rare occasions those expressions may properly apply to a battle, but, in their literal sense, they never apply to a war. Literally, as long as any belligerents survive, further resistance is always possible. And in every war, defeated belligerents survive. Where such expressions are used in this book, they are not intended in the literal sense but in the practical sense of meaning that further resistance could end only in a later capitulation or in complete attrition of the defeated party.

The most casual study of war, however, reveals that many wars are ended long before the defeated belligerent has been reduced to such an extremity. Sometimes, indeed, war seems like a game in which a score is kept or a goal line established. When the score adds up to ten or the goal line is crossed, the game is over.

In between the war that is played like a game and the war that is fought to a finish are all shades and degrees of

variation. Is there somewhere a common denominator? Can we ever say that such an action combined with such a situation inevitably brings a war to a close? If so, it would be well to understand such actions and such situations as a guide to our strategy. Unfortunately, there are discoverable no easily measured factors that inevitably end a war. But certain similarities occur so often, even in widely dissimilar wars, that we may well expect them to recur in the present war or in any war of the future. We can say, "If this war is like most wars, such-and-such will occur."

Thus far we are on the reasonably safe ground of the past, and thus far and no farther will we venture in prophecy. Even here our basis is controversial, for historical facts have almost as many interpretations as they have interpreters. But clearly the best way to learn how a war is ended is to study how other wars were ended. Certainly the prophet, amateur or professional, who ventures a prediction on the ending of the current war, should be well informed on the wars of the past.

It is not easy to glean this information. Our knowledge of how wars begin is well organized. But, strange to say, most historical writers avoid exploring the intricate paths that lead to the end. Not many are competent to do so. For war, the most difficult of all the sciences, and the one now engaging the entire world, is not taught in our country as a subject for academic study except to the few fortunate senior officers who are ordered to the War Colleges of the Navy and Army. The average man who has lacked the opportunities for studying war cannot judge the capacity of the few historians who write about the endings.

The wars reviewed in this book were approached with-

out any preconceived theory. It is recommended that they be studied in the same mood. Any other approach is fatal to honest research. It is so easy to twist facts to fit a theory, so hard to evolve a theory to fit complicated facts.

These wars were selected because, even to the most casual student, they present such a bewildering variety of characteristics. Also, each war shows something of the war-into-peace thinking of some of the current belligerents. They are familiar to us all, not too remote in time, and most of them reflect some light on the present conflict.

In deference to the traditional methods of historians, these wars are arranged in chronological order. But there is no necessity for reading them that way. In fact, if the reader were to pounce at will on any war, then select another without regard to the order of its occurrence or arrangement, the common denominators might the more easily emerge.

It is hoped the reader will draw his own conclusions and not accept blindly the deductions that follow the histories. We believe our own deductions are sound, but not that they are complete. Time, space, and our own limited capacity prevent that.

You should undertake your study of these wars with three fundamental concepts. First, war is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished. Therefore, to determine the causes of peace, it is always necessary to take the vanquished's point of view. Until the vanquished quits, the war goes on.

Second, the one indispensable factor is successful military pressure. Other factors such as starvation, exhaustion, lack of the materials of war, propaganda, revolution, recur

so often that they, too, would seem indispensable. But these factors would rarely be present in the absence of the military pressure. Though they may cause the peace, they in turn are caused by the fighting forces of the enemy. This concept cannot be emphasized too strongly.

Third, each war must be seen in its relation to the rest of the world's affairs before and during the hostilities. Pressure brought by neutral nations, threats of alliances and intervention, triumphs and disasters halfway around the world, ambitions and fears that seemingly have nothing to do with the conflict often make peace with defeat more desirable than a continuation of war with possible ultimate victory.

With this preliminary, let us commence the study of the wars.

T W O

" . . . are, and of Right ought to be . . ."

ON THE NINETEENTH OF OCTOBER, 1781, Lord Cornwallis surrendered his sword and his army to Washington, and his ships to De Grasse. In the strange perspective which the passage of time imparts, that victory marked the end of the American Revolution, the assurance of independence, and the commencement of peace. All too frequently, that is the way the history of the close of one of the most momentous and remarkable wars in history is taught in our schools. As a matter of fact, the final, definitive treaty of peace was

not signed until September 3, 1783, nearly two years after the surrender. It took more than a year for the first provisional treaty of peace to be signed—November 30, 1782—and inasmuch as that treaty was not to take effect until France and Britain could come to terms, in no sense of the word was there peace until those nations concluded their treaty on January 20, 1783, and news of that event reached America on March 23, 1783.

Admittedly, the defeat and surrender of Cornwallis was one of the important factors in the peace that followed so long afterward. But it did not mark the end of Britain's ability to carry on the fight; it was anything but decisive; and if it had come a little earlier or a little later, it would have been a mere incident in a long rebellion. For there seems to be but little doubt that the American patriots had reached the end of their resistance, and after Yorktown they were unable to wage further battle on the scale they had maintained—a scale that had proved insufficient for final military victory.

Thus we see the vanquished winning the war, gaining in the peace all that they had started to fight for, and many other important considerations that had been added to their objectives after the war had commenced. The vanquished won the peace magnificently against an enemy that was well able to continue the war. But the defeat at Yorktown was certainly not enough to make such a conclusion inevitable.

Let us look for a moment into that famous action. Washington, Lafayette, Rochambeau, and De Grasse planned and fought a perfect fight. It was well-conceived, properly executed, thoroughly orthodox. There was nothing brilliant about it, but it is unnecessary to be brilliant when you have

the means to carry out your intentions. The flashes of sheer genius which Washington showed on occasion all appeared when he was inferior in fighting strength or had seemingly lost all freedom of action. Cornwallis, thought to be one of the greatest of England's generals, made all the standard mistakes. They had been made many times before, but generals are not always good students of history. We have seen the same mistakes made in the present war. We shall see them again.

Cornwallis surrendered 7,247 troops and 840 sailors. This total included the sick and wounded, and there were only about 3,800 effectives. After the surrender, Great Britain had 48,000 regular troops and about 20,000 armed loyalists in the field, while Washington could muster in his army only 8,800. Take these figures as approximations. The best information is none too reliable, and it is difficult to estimate other scattered patriot forces. But, no matter how you discount them, they show pretty clearly that the loss of Cornwallis and his army did not finish England's fighting power. The American fighting power, on the other hand, was practically at an end when, shortly after Yorktown, De Grasse sailed for the West Indies. It would be restored when he came back—but he never came back.

Certainly the loss of Cornwallis's army was not enough to compel the tough-minded English to sign the most ignominious and humiliating treaty in the entire history of that proud nation. But it must be admitted that the news of the defeat had a profound psychological effect. Apparently Cornwallis had been making progress in his war in the south. The news, trickling back to England, gave hope that victory was in sight. Then word of the surrender came as a

staggering blow. England might lick these rebellious colonists, but they simply would not stay licked. There seemed no possible chance of retaking and holding a country so far across the ocean against the determined, unrelenting, and amazingly resurgent resistance that these people showed. The reaction to the surrender was more emotional than reasoned; but that is not unusual in the termination of a war.

To explain the Treaty of Paris on any wholly logical ground is impossible. To explain it emotionally to a modern American mind seems almost equally difficult; for the American war was a political football, and no modern American can understand or evaluate the politics of England of that date. Most of us have heard about the Whigs and the Tories. The erudite, who pretend to understand the footnotes which try to explain the texts of Addison, Steele, and Swift, cannot capture the emotional and petty aspects of that all absorbing internal struggle between two parties whose fundamental *raison d'être* is lost in obscurity. Stedman, the most lucid and perspicacious of the contemporary British historians, states flatly that a primary cause of Britain's defeat was loyalty to party instead of to country. One cannot escape the conviction that British action favorable to America was usually inspired solely because it was rooted in opposition to the rival party. At the outset of the revolution, the Whigs were our friends, the Tories our bitter enemies. When, toward the end, the Tories stood for the very measures the Whigs had been urging for fifteen years, the Whigs vehemently opposed them. Even Chatham and Fox changed sides. It would seem that they had no real interest in the philosophy of freedom which gave them such oppor-

tunities for parliamentary eloquence. Their real motive was to score a political triumph against their rivals for power.

It is unnecessary to recount the causes of the revolution so dinned into the ears of every schoolchild. But it might be well to recall the fact that independence was not an initial objective. It was not until July 4, 1776, that the gradually dawning conception was given formal utterance that “these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, free and independent states.” The Declaration of Independence changed the objective of the war. Grant independence, and all the other issues ceased to exist. Yet when the time for peace negotiations arrived, the recognition of independence became, in a way, a minor issue, for the American commissioners took the position that the States were independent, no matter what the British thought about it.

Independence was a *fait accompli*—not a gift or concession to be granted by the crown. This insistence upon the views expressed in the Declaration was a tower of strength in all the peace negotiations. But it was the stumbling block in the path of England’s first attempt at peace which followed close upon the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777.

At this distance it is difficult to tell whether the victory at Saratoga was the reason or the excuse for the offer of peace terms. It would seem that the real reason was the American alliance with France; but that, in turn, was not concluded until the Saratoga battle showed the possibility of defeating England. The alliance with France was signed on February 6, 1778. Eleven days later, the first of the Conciliation Acts was introduced in Parliament. The ministry did not wait for their passage, but rushed printed copies to

Washington and to Congress, hoping that the offer of peace might reach them before the news of the French alliance.

France had been helping the American cause in a rather roundabout way. The government gave money to Beaumarchais and persuaded Spain to do likewise. Through a fictitious trading company named Hotalez and Company, Beaumarchais sent arms, ammunition, and supplies to America. When the British Embassy objected, Beaumarchais was ordered to cease and desist. His ships were held in harbor, but there seemed to be no objection to his transferring his cargoes to other ships which were not stopped. His captains were arrested on charges but released on technicalities and recompensed by public funds. They sailed on time and were well satisfied with their treatment. Beaumarchais, as a private trading company, was the front behind which the French government hid its aid to America, remained neutral, and avoided belligerent offense to England. He bought arms from the government and used government money to pay for them. In return, he tried to bring in tobacco and other American produce. But if no cargo could be had in payment for his contraband, it did not prevent further shipments.

The American alliance with France brought this *sub rosa* trade out into the open. Not only that, but France promised definite military and naval aid, and thereby declared war on England. In return, the United States made two solemn promises: It would accept no terms short of complete independence. It would sign no treaty of peace unless England at the same time made peace with France.

The chronology of these events shows pretty clearly the influence of the battle of Saratoga on France and the influence of the French alliance on England:

December 4, 1777—News of Saratoga reaches France
January 17, 1778—First Treaty of Alliance
February 6, 1778—Final Treaty of Alliance
February 17, 1778—Conciliatory Bills introduced in
Parliament

The terms of these bills were generous in the extreme. If they had been enacted in 1775, there would have been no revolution and America might have been a dominion of the British Empire to this day. But it is profitless to speculate on what might have been. At any rate, these bills—there were three of them—granted everything the revolutionists had asked for prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1775.

There was to be no taxation other than for regulation of commerce, and all such taxation was to be earmarked for the use and benefit of the colony where it was collected. The colonies might make voluntary contributions instead. The odious tax on tea was repealed. So, also, was the Act changing the government of Massachusetts. A commission of five was appointed to make tentative peace terms, and it was granted a most amazing and sovereign power: it could suspend any objectionable Act of Parliament that had been passed since February 10, 1763.

The instructions to the commissioners went much further than these extraordinary bills. Above all, they were to admit the American claim to independence *during the negotiations*, treating the United States as a recognized foreign power and not like colonies in rebellion. They could deal with and recognize any organized body. That meant that they could recognize Congress—an amazing concession—or that they could deal individually with the thirteen not-

too-United States. Congress could be continued as long as it did not infringe on the sovereignty of the British crown. Each colony could have a representative in the House of Commons. There was to be no standing army in time of peace, but the colonies could maintain their own army and navy. To obtain all this, the commissioners could agree that no colonial government or charter would ever be changed except with the consent of the people.

About the only sovereign power retained by the crown was the right to declare war and make peace with foreign powers. And, lest the cost of the rebellion had proved too crippling, the commissioners were empowered to validate the American money and to make whatever loans were necessary to restore credit and financial stability.

Only one thing was lacking—complete independence. And complete independence was now not only the avowed purpose of the rebellious colonies but the promise made to France.

Of course the French contribution to the struggle seemed rather nebulous and remote in 1778. It was not until two years later that the first French contingent arrived, only to be bottled up and immobilized in Newport. It was not until 1781 that French aid began to be effective. It was a strange alliance—a despotic king with a republic, His Most Catholic Majesty with Most Protestant America—fighting side by side, the bitter enemies of the recent French and Indian War.

The motives of the French were searchingly questioned by Congress. There was so little gain provided in the terms of the treaty that some sinister end must be served. To anyone with an understanding of European politics, the French

motive should have been perfectly clear. France desired the independence of America because she wanted to weaken England. That was all. America and England, combined, were too powerful a rival for France. America and England, separate and hostile, made France indisputably the most powerful nation in Europe. France gave us a navy, troops, guns, and supplies. France paid generously in blood, which cannot be evaluated, and in money, which can. It cost France 1,280,000,000 francs to buy the independence of America, and she deemed it worth the cost.

But the American, so extraordinarily far-sighted in his understanding of freedom and the rights of the individual, was singularly myopic in European power politics. Therefore the appeal of the generous British terms might have been expected to be warmly received.

Strange to say, they were vigorously refused. When the bills were read in Congress, they were stopped indignantly upon a slighting reference to our French allies. Washington saw in them an attempt to disunite America and gain needed time for Britain to recover from the blow of Saratoga. Particularly did this seem to be the case when it appeared that the commissioners were empowered only to prepare tentative peace terms and not to conclude a binding peace.

But the main obstruction was our recently enacted treaty with France. We had agreed to settle for nothing less than absolute and complete independence and we intended to live up to that agreement. Then one of the commissioners, Johnstone, made a serious mistake. He attempted bribery. The men who headed the American revolution were an exceptionally high-minded group, inspired by ideals and with no thought of personal gain. Their mass integrity has rarely

been equaled at any time in any country. Of course, this attempt discredited Johnstone and the rest of the commission as well, despite the fact that they disavowed all knowledge of Johnstone's action.

Thus failed the first approach to peace. But, as we shall see, it laid the groundwork for the final treaty four years later.

Meantime, our refusal of the British terms plunged England into a costly world war. France was an adversary worthy of her steel. Spain declared war in the summer of 1779 as an ally of France and the United States. Holland also declared war in 1780. But there was on our part no agreement with Holland, as there was with France, against the signing of a separate peace.

It must be stressed at this point that for both France and Spain the sole objective of the war was the independence of America. That may seem hard to believe, and it was not too generally believed at the time. But the eventual peace treaty proved it. Of course, Spain took advantage of the war to attack two physical objectives important to England and unusually attractive to Spain: Minorca and Gibraltar.

It is against the background of this great world war that we must view the affair of Yorktown. France, then Spain, then Holland had fallen on England in the wake of the battle of Saratoga. Russia and Prussia were extremely friendly to the American cause and might become actively belligerent as a result of this similarly impressive victory.

Then, suddenly, the whole war seemed to turn against the British arms. De Grasse left Yorktown and began a series of successful naval battles in the West Indies. It is doubtful if the British realized the crippling effect of this action on

Washington. The remaining British forces in America were concentrated at Charleston and New York. They had command of the sea. If Washington with his meager remaining force were to attack either place, it could be relieved by overwhelmingly strong seaborne forces from the other city. Washington had no ships. He dared not attempt a long march because he could not risk the attrition from desertion and sickness which he estimated would be fifty per cent. He could do nothing until the promised return of De Grasse. But De Grasse and the gallant Marquis de Bouille were scoring telling victories in the West Indies. They took Eustatius and St. Christopher. Nevis and Montserrat followed. A Spanish fleet and a powerful Spanish army were being mobilized in Cuba and Hispaniola. Together with De Grasse's fleet, they had more than enough relative fighting strength to take Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbados. The last vestige of England's West Indian colonies was doomed to vanish, and in the economy of those days West Indian possessions were most cherished sources of wealth.

Spain meantime had taken Minorca and was seriously threatening Gibraltar. England believed that Gibraltar was doomed; and it seemed as important in those days as it does today. Minorca occupied the same strategic position then that Malta does today. Not quite, perhaps, because the Mediterranean was then merely an inland sea. Today, with the Suez Canal, it is the road to India. Kempenfelt, sent to intercept a strong French convoy carrying supplies to De Grasse, succeeded only partially. This was a bitter disappointment and a reflection on the ministry that had provided Kempenfelt with a force too small to be effective.

So Yorktown was just one of a series of defeats, not in

itself crucial or decisive, but contributing its share to a rather discouraging picture.

Against this dark background was one shining light of victory. Madras had fallen to British arms. Sir Eyre Coote had administered a crushing defeat upon a vastly larger native army under Hyder Ali, and the final conquest of India seemed in sight. The French, however, had collected a considerable force in East Indian waters and, granted a few further successes in the West Indies, might be able to enter the war in India on a scale that would undo all British gains.

Thus the American war, the football in the great Whig and Tory game, became the means for overturning the government. The clamor for peace began. There were, apparently, four grounds for the movement, none particularly consistent with the others. Stop the war because we can never win against such determined resistance across such a big ocean. Stop the war with America because it will bring peace with France and Spain. Sacrifice America to save India. Stop the war with America and devote the forces and money to defeat France, Spain, and Holland.

Money was important. The taxation to support the war effort was deemed intolerable. Little did the eighteenth century know what tax burdens could become and still be borne.

In consequence of the clamor and the blame visited upon the ministry, Lord North, the Prime Minister, resigned before the customary vote of confidence could be called for. Perhaps the ministry was at fault. It seems more likely, however, that blame, if blame there was, should have fallen on the forces in the field, or credit ascribed to the enemy.

In the light of later events it is perfectly clear that to the Whigs the ousting of the Tory North was vastly more important than winning the war or holding America.

It meant power, preferment, pelf—all that a politician prizes.

This point cannot be stressed too strongly. Almost the first act of the new Rockingham ministry was to appoint a commission to negotiate peace with America. When, as presently happened, the military situation changed so as to bring victory more nearly within easy grasp than at any time in the long conflict, peace, and not victory, was the political aim. The motivation was not the welfare of England, but the satisfaction of those now in power and the discredit of those who had lost power.

In the life of our nation, we have paid a high price for the venality of politicians. It is consoling to offset against it the fact that we owe our very independence to that same ignoble cause.

For the military situation changed suddenly and very dramatically. In April, Sir George Rodney won the sea battle of Guadeloupe against the French fleet under Count De Grasse. Eight ships of the line and two frigates—the very flower of the French fleet—were sunk or captured. Three thousand men were killed. The remaining vessels of the fleet—twenty-four in all—were scattered and so damaged that they were put out of effective action for a long time. Furthermore, all the artillery for the proposed attack on Jamaica went down in the sunken ships, and an impressive amount of money—the pay for all the French forces in the West Indies—was taken. De Grasse was outmaneuvered and outfought, but he behaved gallantly. When he struck his

colors, he was one of but three men on his ship unwounded and alive.

Then good news for Britain came from India. The French forces, ably led and a serious threat, were beaten in four important battles, and the Mahratta states were turned from their alliance with Hyder Ali and joined forces with the British. Also, a huge French convoy, bound to India, was taken—a crippling blow to the forces dependent upon it. This removed all remaining hazard from the Indian campaign.

During the summer, Spain mustered her entire strength for an all-out assault on Gibraltar. A French and Spanish fleet, and a number of new-fangled “indestructible” floating batteries—which had the same effect we feel today at the mention of a new secret weapon—added to the land forces, made the fall of the rock fortress extremely likely. But the assault, delivered in September, failed. A subsequent relief by Lord Howe and another sea victory assured the safety of the gateway to the Mediterranean.

The Dutch fleet, a very potent enemy, suffered a purely strategic defeat. It was effectively kept from joining the French and Spanish fleets off Gibraltar.

See how these events changed the military situation. India, Gibraltar, and Jamaica were saved. Immense forces, scattered for this truly world war, were now available to finish the job in America. Even against the forces already available in the theater of action, Washington confessed himself impotent without a fleet. Britain’s command of the sea was equivalent to the all-important “interior lines.” Wherever Washington could move by land, the British could move faster and in greater force by sea. A French fleet could have

prevented that, as it had at Yorktown, but the French fleet was disabled, captured, or sunk in the Caribbean. For the only time in history, the French navy had been able to dispute British command of the sea, and that brief day had passed.

After Yorktown, Washington conceded that he would have to fight still another campaign; but it was difficult to see how he could do it. Congress had no money, other than what could be, and was, produced by a printing press. The "Continental currency," as it was called, was the best paper money ever printed with nothing back of it. In a remarkably short time after the Peace Treaty, every dollar of it was redeemed in freshly minted silver and gold. Yet until independence became a matter of fact, as well as of declaration, it was deemed very nearly worthless. "Not worth a Continental" became part of our colloquial language and has remained in use up to the present. People literally papered their walls with it, as the most blatant expression of their opinion of its value.

We have seen the question of money affect the fighting ability of Britain, France, and America. Yet today we see Germany, a bankrupt nation to start with, wage the most expensive war of all time, and no one suggests that the sheer cost of it in money will bring about an end. That is because we have somehow evolved a new idea about public money as distinguished from the few paltry dollars any individual can amass. Today we view public money as a bookkeeping device for utilizing the productive capacity and fighting ability of a nation. You can employ a printing press as readily as a mint for producing that kind of money, provided you can make people accept it.

Hitler can make them. His Gestapo and his Gauleiters and his concentration camps and his machine guns impart a magic to his printing presses that gives his worthless paper money value. The Continental Congress could not make values that way. It did not have that kind of power. And it would not have exercised that kind of power if it had possessed it.

After the battle of Yorktown, the hope of peace revived the flagging American spirit for resistance, but as the months wore on and peace seemed no nearer, the despair of victory made any terms acceptable to the revolutionists.

As has been stated, manpower was nearly exhausted. The need for labor on the farms had led to widespread desertion, and Washington could muster only 8,800 men. It was to a country ready to accept almost any terms that England sued for peace. The English negotiators were not the best that could be selected. No one wanted the job. Whatever peace was made would be ill received in England and would reflect neither honor nor glory on the negotiators. At that time there were two Foreign Secretaries: one, Lord Shelburne, who shortly afterward became Prime Minister upon the death of Rockingham; and Fox. Fox appointed Thomas Grenville, and Shelburne appointed a rather unknown negotiator named Oswald. They did not get along too well together and represented interests not too friendly at home.

Opposed to these rather mediocre commissioners was the best talent that America could summon: Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, John Adams, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson arrived in France too late to take part in the treaty. Adams was the chairman, but Franklin really ran things. The British commissioners were authorized to grant

independence, but the American commissioners did not know that and, with the defeated country behind them, they stood firmly, not for independence, but as a country already independent. Before the negotiations really started, Grenville made overtures to France, suggesting that France should be content with American independence, if that were granted, because that was the original object of France's entering the war. Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not seem to think that such an offer amounted to much and referred it to Franklin. "To be sure," said Franklin, "we do not consider ourselves as under any necessity of bargaining for a thing which is our own, which we have bought at the expense of much blood and treasure, and which we are in possession of."

Upon Jay's insistence, the American commission refused to deal with Oswald at all, because Oswald's commission entitled him to treat with the "colonies and plantations of Great Britain" and not with "the United States of America." Although it delayed proceedings very materially, our commission refused to treat with Oswald until he returned to England and came back with his commission in proper form.

So at the very outset of the negotiations, these tough, able American commissioners cleared the ground by obtaining an absolute admission of the independence of the United States, then began to settle such affairs as boundaries, fisheries, and the right to navigate the Mississippi River. American fishermen were permitted to fish on the Grand Banks and to dry their nets and cure their fish on uninhabited parts of British possessions. The Mississippi, down to the boundary line of Spanish territory, was given to the new country.

The northern boundary was established very much as it is today.

The most controversial part of the negotiations was the question of English protection of the loyalists. The Americans flatly refused to return any confiscated estates, but a clause was inserted in the treaty that Congress would recommend to the separate states that confiscated property of British subjects be restored. It was merely a matter of recommendation and meant nothing.

These negotiations took months of hard argument, and finally, on November 30, 1782, the provisional treaty of peace was signed, conditioned upon a further peace to be made between France and Britain. The new country lived up absolutely to its agreement with France that no treaty would be so much as discussed that did not acknowledge American independence and that peace should not be declared between Britain and America unless it were also signed between Britain and France. The treaty with France followed soon afterward.

France got nothing of note out of the war except the independence of America, but that independence had been her aim. A selfish aim, if you will, for by separating the colonies from the mother country, she had seriously weakened England. Spain got the whole of Florida, about which there had been some controversy, and also Minorca, which, as has been mentioned, she had taken by force of arms and now kept by virtue of the treaty.

Thus we see that the Declaration of Independence really laid down the fundamental upon which the peace treaty was founded. The commissioners really believed that "these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and inde-

pendent States." No more important peace treaty has ever been made. No more humiliating treaty has ever been signed by Great Britain. It was signed by a country war weary and poor, but really not defeated, and at a time when aggressive action would have resulted in victory and not just peace. The peace terms obtained for America everything for which she had fought, but, splendid though they were, they were not perfect. Our commissioners were so full of American dogma that they forgot that the British had dogma which they worshiped as vigorously, the chief of which was that "Britannia rules the waves." This did not mean merely that England was dominant on the sea. It meant literally Britain's claim to rule the ocean and everything thereon in the same manner in which the British ruled the little island set in one corner of the North Atlantic. With the wisdom of hindsight, we can blame our commissioners for not making terms in regard to the sea, but it seemed to be about the only thing they overlooked. Out of that failure came a new war, in 1812—in some respects a continuance of the old one.

T H R E E

"With him there is no security for Europe"

FOR TWENTY YEARS the shadow of Napoleon Bonaparte fell across Europe and across the world. Never before or since has history been so involved, the political and military situa-

tions so confusingly intertwined, relationship between cause and effect so difficult to trace. To attempt to do justice in one chapter to the Napoleonic campaigns and to the making of the numerous peaces involved would be beyond the scope of this book.

Yet Napoleon cannot be neglected, for his history so closely parallels that of Adolf Hitler that tremendous lessons may be read in his career and its eventual failure.

To say that Hitler and Napoleon are alike is a commonplace we hear on all sides, but the unthinking see the similarity in that they were both corporals,* that both conquered Europe, and that both met defeat in Russia. If the resemblance were to end there, we could find little significance in this chapter. As a matter of fact, their resemblance is so astounding that we might conclude that Hitler is merely imitating Napoleon just as Napoleon imitated Caesar. But even this would not be an adequate explanation, because the circumstances over which they had no control were alike in the history of the two men (despite the fact that Napoleon claimed he made circumstances), and if Hitler were merely imitating Napoleon, we would hardly expect him to imitate Napoleon's mistakes.

In 1795, when the whiff of grapeshot gave young Bonaparte his first big opportunity, France had signally failed to make the Republic function. When Hitler first began to attract attention in Germany, the Germans were similarly unable to make a republic work. Both countries' finances were in a deplorable state. Both countries were looking for a

* Why the rating of "corporal" should popularly be associated with Bonaparte is hard to determine. He served as such for only a brief period in his cadet training.

strong man. And both countries found poseurs with strange and distinctive mannerisms, a desire to strut, a strong love of uniforms, titles, salutes, and salaams. Both men were colorful, but they were ruthless, tyrannical, and utterly without conscience. Both made use of the same methods, but one called it a *coup d'état* and the other called it a *Putsch*. It is strange that both were from humble beginnings. Although there is some evidence that the Bonapartes were of a patrician line and were fairly important in Corsica, that island was most unimportant in the rest of the world.

It is strange, too, that both men were imported products. The ruler of France came from Corsica. The ruler of Germany came from Austria. It is hard to say which was the greater egotist. Told that his troops were outnumbered three to one, Napoleon answered: "We have 50,000 men, but I will be there and that makes 150,000." There is scarcely a letter he ever wrote in which he does not compare his own performance to that of the people he is criticizing. Both exploited their fallen enemies, pressed them into service, made them pay their captors' bills, conscripted them for labor and for military service. Both had dishonest followers in high places. Napoleon took care of his brothers; Hitler of his Nazis. After the sack of a city, the knapsacks of Napoleon's soldiers might be searched but his generals' wagons were not. Hitler's Nazis own all the wealth plundered from the Jews, own the controlling stock in every important company in France.

Both lied to their people and misrepresented the situations. When Napoleon ran away from Egypt, leaving his army behind to be captured, he made a great story out of the land battle at Aboukir but failed to mention the great naval

defeat of the Nile and his disastrous defeat at Acre. The French people never heard the story of Trafalgar. Examples of Hitler's lies to his people are too numerous to mention; but we find it impossible to persuade German prisoners that New York has not been bombed, that the *Ranger*, for the sinking of which Hitler gave a Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross to a submarine commander, is still afloat, active, and undamaged.

Perhaps Hitler tried something like Napoleon's "continental system" when he prohibited all money or means of exchange from entering or leaving Germany. The continental system was a blockade of England in reverse. As long as England had command of the sea, Napoleon could not blockade the little island, but he tried to blockade Europe from English goods. He prevented all importations from England into France and ordered neutral vessels to carry French consular certificates showing the origin of their cargoes. Then he prevented any vessel which had put in at an English port from docking in France, and finally prohibited all importations for fear British goods might be brought in disguised as neutral goods. All the other countries that were allied with France at various times were brought to support the continental system, and the essence of it was that no English goods could find continental markets.

By a similar roundabout method Hitler tried to restore a balance of trade to Germany by preventing the sending of any money across the German borders. If you sold goods to Germany you were paid in reichsmarks, but the reichsmarks had to be spent in Germany, and all you could take out of Germany were German products. That accounted for a great many of the Leica and Contax cameras that found their way

to America. Limitations upon a work of this nature compel this simplification of a most involved and complicated economic warfare. But Napoleon hurt France more than he hurt Britain, and Hitler hurt Germany more than he hurt the rest of the world. For in closing the European markets to Britain, Napoleon closed the British market to the French. In preventing imports he stopped the importations of raw materials which French industry desperately needed.

Like Germany, France tried to develop substitute materials, tried to grow her own cotton, tried, and at first unsuccessfully, to make a palatable sugar from beets. The trouble was that France needed her export trade. She could not drink the wine she had been accustomed to grow for all the world. Her silks and other luxury products were scaled to world markets. Meddling with the inexorable law of supply and demand is never very successful, and all the enemy countries reciprocated by taxing or prohibiting the importation of French goods. Similarly, when trade became difficult with Germany because of Hitler's limitations, business in general suffered there, and many other countries imitated Germany in prohibiting the importation or exportation of media of exchange. In passing, we might note how Hitler used his law for abusing his own subjects, principally the Jews. A mighty steamship line was seized for paying rent for a dock in New York. Of course, the steamers could not carry freight or passengers without using a dock, but under the law they were not allowed to pay for the dock, so the line was confiscated.

So many other things in the lives of both men present such exact parallels that we wonder if it is intention or fate. Take, for instance, the invasion of England. Both Hitler and Na-

napoleon made plans, collected barges, got to the very eve of crossing. Napoleon even had a giant balloon to carry a whole troop of cavalry across the Channel just as Hitler mobilized his paratroopers. Both were premature in their expectation of victory. Napoleon actually erected a monument celebrating the conquest of Britain before he was ready to start the invasion that never took place. Napoleon was diverted from his invasion by attacking Austria; Hitler by attacking Russia. It may be noted, too, that Napoleon was never able to resume the project; and it would seem that Hitler has lost his last chance. Had either one succeeded, the history of the world would have been changed.

Both Hitler and Napoleon were able men, and if we speak of Hitler in the past sense, put it down as prophecy, for it is clear that his days are numbered. In their grip upon their peoples we see the same doctrines, the same type of salesmanship. Both Hitler and Napoleon sold the idea of glory. In France the product was ready-made. The Revolution had given birth to wild ideas that somehow needed direction, and Napoleon was able to turn it against Europe after it had expended its first force against the Bourbons and the nobility. Hitler had a harder task. Germany, recovering from the first World War, had not the faith in its own might and invincibility the ragged legions of the French Republic enjoyed. But by careful indoctrination of German youth this deficiency was repaired. The love of glory, the desire to die on the battlefield, the faith in their own invincibility, was systematically preached to the legions of France and the divisions of Germany. In military methods both men were alike. Neither invented anything of importance, but both made masterful use of weapons and methods already per-

fected. Hitler's combination of tanks, motorized troops, and airplanes in vast numbers produced the Blitzkrieg, a thing new in warfare. Napoleon, master of artillery, supreme in mobility, and able above all others to concentrate his strength against enemy weakness, made a new kind of warfare out of old and tried materials.

Yet, try as they would, they could not escape the effects of a blockade. Try as they would, neither was ever able to dispute Britain's command of the sea. Neither seemed to have appreciated that without command of the sea, land successes are futile. And neither was able to avoid a war on two fronts. Most important of all, neither could be trusted. Said Metternich to Napoleon: "Europe and you, Sire, will never come to terms. When you have made peace, it has been nothing more than a truce. To you success and failure are equally strong motives for war. This time the whole of Europe will fight against you." Hitler's faithlessness has already borne fruit. "You cannot do business with Hitler" is the slogan of all the Allies. It is obvious that the present war must go on until some basis for peace is arrived at that will not depend on the word of any German.

How did Napoleon last? And how has Hitler lasted so long? The answer is to be found in a single word—success. "My power," said Napoleon, "will not outlast the day on which I cease to be strong, on which I cease to be feared." It is strange that neither knew when to stop. Hitler could have avoided war with Russia. Although war with the United States was perhaps inevitable, it must be remembered it was Hitler who declared war on the United States. Napoleon should not have tackled Russia, especially when the disastrous Peninsular War was still unfinished business.

Can there be any closer parallel than the story of both men's Russian campaigns! We see Hitler announcing triumphantly his pact with Stalin. It seems like an echo of the meeting on the raft at Tilsit when Czar Alexander I and the upstart Napoleon formed their mutual admiration society. "What is Europe?" asked Alexander. "*We* are Europe." Yet it was not long afterward that Napoleon started out for Moscow, prophesying a short, victorious campaign, just as Hitler prophesied a short, victorious campaign against Russia in 1941. With the example of Napoleon before him, it is difficult to understand how Hitler ever made this mistake, and it is equally difficult to understand how Napoleon made it in the first place. Caulaincourt, Master of Horse to Napoleon and one of his closest advisers, was sent to Russia to treat with the Czar, and to him Alexander outlined his campaign. Napoleon should have known exactly what he was up against, for this is what Alexander said:

"If the Emperor Napoleon makes war on me it is possible, even probable, that we shall be defeated, assuming that we fight. But that will not mean that he can dictate a peace. The Spaniards have often been defeated; and they are not beaten, nor have they submitted. But they are not so far away from Paris as we are, and have neither our climate nor our resources to help them. We shall take no risks. We have plenty of room; and our standing army is well organized, which means, as the Emperor Napoleon has admitted, that we need never accept a dictated peace, whatever reverses we may suffer. What is more, in such circumstances the victor is forced to accept the terms of the vanquished. The Emperor Napoleon made a remark to this effect to Tchernychev in Vienna after the battle of Wagram. He would not have made

peace then if Austria had not kept an army intact. Results have to keep pace with his thoughts, because, being often absent from France, he is always anxious to return there. This is the teaching of a Master. I shall not be the first to draw my sword, but I shall be the last to sheathe it. The Spaniards have proved that lack of perseverance has been the undoing of all the States on which your master has made war. The Emperor Napoleon's remark to Tchernychev, in the latest war with Austria, shows clearly enough that the Austrians could have obtained better terms if they had been more persevering. People don't know how to suffer. If the fighting went against me, I should retire to Kamchatka rather than cede provinces and sign, in my capital, treaties that were really only truces. Your Frenchman is brave; but long privations and a bad climate wear him down and discourage him. Our climate, our winter, will fight on our side. With you, marvels only take place where the Emperor is in personal attendance; and he cannot be everywhere, he cannot be absent from Paris year after year."

Von Clausewitz analyzed the situation perfectly, as Napoleon should have been able to analyze it for himself:

"When Bonaparte marched to Moscow in 1812, everything depended on whether, through the taking of the capital and the events preceding it, he would be able to force the Emperor Alexander to make peace as he had done after the battle of Friedland in 1807, and as he had forced the Emperor Francis to do in 1805 and 1809 after Austerlitz and Wagram. For if Bonaparte did not obtain a peace at Moscow, there was no alternative for him but to return—that is, nothing but a strategic defeat. We shall leave out of the question what Bonaparte had done to reach Moscow and

whether in his advance he had not missed many possible opportunities of inducing the Emperor Alexander to decide on peace. We shall also exclude all consideration of the disastrous circumstances that attended his retreat, and which, perhaps, had their origin in the general conduct of the campaign. The question will always remain the same, for however much more brilliant the result of the campaign up to Moscow might have been, still there always remained an uncertainty whether the Emperor Alexander would be frightened by it into making peace. And even if the retreat had contained within itself no such seeds of disaster, it could never have been anything else than a great strategic defeat. If the Emperor Alexander had agreed to a peace which was disadvantageous to him, the campaign would have ranked with those of Austerlitz, Friedland, and Wagram. But these campaigns also, if they had not led to peace, would in all probability have ended in similar catastrophes. Therefore, whatever of force, skill, and wisdom the conqueror of the world applied to the task, this last 'question addressed to fate' remained always the same." *

But the great egotist had misjudged his antagonist. He did not know Alexander, or the Russians or Russian weather. All he could ever do was to accept a strategic defeat. That was the most he could hope for from the campaign. But Napoleon, as if to make certain not merely of defeat but of disaster, failed to pay attention to the lesson he should have learned in Portugal the year before. It was always the French idea to live off the country. Strong foraging parties ranged far and wide,

* From *On War* by Karl von Clausewitz. Reprinted by courtesy of Modern Library, Inc., New York, N. Y.

robbing the peasantry of their stocks and grain. This was a definite part of Napoleon's policy. He believed war should be terrible, and in this he is so like Hitler. But not merely that; in living off the country his army could move quickly, unencumbered by a baggage train, with no great danger if his communications were cut. This mobility was Napoleon's strength; but living off the country was also his weakness, a weakness Wellington capitalized to the full.

Wellington, fighting rearguard actions, retreated through Portugal to his strongly fortified lines at Torres Vedras. For months beforehand he had employed a scorched earth policy on a scale never before attempted. Nothing was left—not a grain of corn, not a barnyard fowl—in all the territory in which Masséna pursued him. And Masséna, it must be remembered, could not subsist unless he lived off the country. His men were already starved and exhausted before Wellington came to a stand in the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras and there prepared to give battle. Masséna tried to storm the works for a solid month. How his army survived during all that time will never be known. Then, suddenly, decimated by famine and disaster, his army broke and fled, with Wellington after him. Sixty thousand was Masséna's loss. Wellington's loss was negligible. Napoleon had learned this lesson in March of 1811. It is strange that in his colossal egotism he should have made the same mistake in penetrating Russia, where the distances were vaster, the population more sparse, the chances for subsistence scarcer, and his army, and therefore his needs, much greater. Alexander depopulated the country as Wellington had done in Portugal. Napoleon's foraging parties had to roam far and wide. But Moscow—the "second capital" of Russia—was ahead.

Moscow, a city of 300,000, one of the most important metropolises in Europe, active, busy, populous, and astounding for its beauty, its architecture, and its modernity. It was likewise Russia's holy city, whose preservation was emotionally akin to the saving of Rome in the current war. Napoleon got there, eventually, after winning the battle of Borodino, but was almost immediately burned out by a series of fires which destroyed practically the whole city. It is not necessary for us to enter the long controversy as to whether those fires were accidental or intentional. If they were intentional, they certainly accorded with the rest of the Russian strategy. If they were accidental, they were equally effective in making it impossible for the French army to winter in the city.

Napoleon lingered at Moscow until October 21, lured by the long and exceptionally fine autumn weather, hoping against hope that Alexander would make peace. Then, too late, he began his retreat. He blamed his failure on the weather. He had waited too long; but the bitter winter cold and the perpetual snow were not the only causes of his disaster. He had to retreat through a country to which he had applied the last measures of devastation when he advanced. His army spread out into wandering small bands of men that fell an easy prey to the aroused peasantry. Napoleon left them, ranging ahead with his staff and a handful of guards, claiming he was needed in Paris, left them just as he had left his defeated army in Egypt many years before. Six hundred thousand men had started on the triumphal march to Moscow but only 450,000 ever arrived there. Of these 450,000 only a single thousand ever returned to France. It

was the most staggering annihilation of a big army the world had ever known.

And it was the end of Napoleon. In 1813 Austria turned against him. Prussia and Sweden joined in. Then Holland revolted. Napoleon's new levies won the battle of Dresden on August 27, but this last great victory was more than offset by the defeat of some of his marshals in smaller engagements. On October 15 came Leipzig, known in history as the Battle of the Nations. Napoleon was outnumbered 180,000 to 300,000. The battle lasted for three days, and Napoleon was defeated. He made a brilliant retreat, reached Mainz, and took a position on the west bank of the Rhine.

The Austrians and Russians did not see eye to eye. The Czar wanted to enter Paris and blow up the Tuileries in revenge for Moscow; but Metternich, who represented Austria, was still afraid of Napoleon. Accordingly, the Allies made what is known as the Frankfort proposal. France was to withdraw to her natural frontiers, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, give up her other possessions, forsake the dreams of empire. The terms were liberal, and a wise man would have accepted them. In fact, the acceptance was already drafted, when Napoleon changed his mind. It may be that he was angered by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies declaring that the only further armaments to be granted would be for defense. Napoleon's own country was forsaking him. His marshals were ready to desert. His troops had lost their enthusiasm for war and particularly their enthusiasm for him.

1814 came, and on the first of the year Blücher crossed the Rhine and entered France, where he was joined by the Austrian advance guard. There was a small engagement on February 2 at Bar-sur-Aube, but Napoleon retired. Mar-

mont and Augereau, his generals, deserted him. Then came the news that the English had landed in Bordeaux and that the Bourbon flag had been hoisted there. Wellington was coming up from the south. Paris, the precious city that is all to the Frenchman, was threatened; but Napoleon, sensing the changing condition, could not decide to fight for it. The capitulation of Paris was signed at 2 A.M., March 31. It is a strange coincidence that it was the same hour of the night when the negotiators of the armistice of 1918 sat down for their final session.

Napoleon flew into a rage at the cowardice of the surrender. If he had attacked four hours earlier, he could have saved France. He called for his carriage! He would put himself at the head of the National Guard and the troops! He ordered the troops to face about! Now he would make Paris the invaders' tomb! It would take him three days to gather his forces. But he did not realize that Paris was sick of him; that on the very day of the surrender an effort had been made to knock his statue from the top of the famous Austerlitz Column. Caulaincourt was sent into Paris to treat for a regency for Napoleon's son, the Prince of Rome. But France wanted no more Bonapartes. They were all for a restoration of the Bourbons. It is interesting to note that the Czar and Metternich, who represented Austria, had no interest whatsoever in what happened to France so long as they got rid of Napoleon.

"What," asked Caulaincourt of Metternich, "will you gain by prolonging the war now that you have reached your objective? Will you make 100,000 Austrians lose their lives for the sake of putting Bourbons on the throne of your daughter and son-in-law?"

"Our objective," answered Metternich (and he stated the simple issue of the whole war) "is to make sure that our children have years of peace and that the world has rest. The Emperor Napoleon has shown all too clearly of late that he wishes neither of those things. With him there is no security for Europe." The Czar put it this way:

"What have we to lose by treating for peace, stripping France of her power? Tie Napoleon's hands or evict him altogether, and what do we care who rules over the French? This is not our quarrel. Why bleed for it? With home so far away, why risk losing the success that already is ours?" Meanwhile Napoleon was blowing hot and cold, deciding he would not battle for a crown, then planning for a fight. Actually, his troops began to move toward Paris, but the capitulation of Marmont and his army took away the last possible means. As Caulaincourt described it:

"A state of rest had become the universal need. One thirsted for it. Citizen, private, general, all alike wanted peace. As I wrote to the Emperor from Paris on April 5, that word had acted like a spell. It had weaned away the most devoted."

On April 4, 1814, Napoleon abdicated. This was his letter of abdication:

"The Foreign Powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon was an obstacle to the re-establishment of peace and to the territorial integrity of France, and Whereas: being loyal to his principles, and to his promises to further the happiness and glory of the French people in all things, Therefore: the Emperor Napoleon declares that he is ready to abdicate in favor of his son, and to send that Act in due form as a message to the Senate, as soon as the Powers shall

have recognized Napoleon II together with the Constitutional Regency of the Empress. Upon this condition the Emperor will withdraw immediately to the place which shall be agreed. Given at our Palace of Fontainebleau, April 4, 1814. Signed: NAPOLEON."

It is on the night of April 12 that Napoleon attempted suicide. The story was hushed up for years, then related with circumstantial detail, and later again discredited. Certainly his recovery was suspiciously rapid.

It is a hard job to get rid of an Emperor. There are few places you can send him where he is safe, and other crowned heads dislike the idea of treating him too roughly. It might start a bad precedent. Thus, in 1918, the Kaiser was permitted to escape to Doorn. But Hitler's head wears no crown. He cannot hope to use a kingly privilege to escape punishment for his crimes. Upon the insistence of Czar Alexander, Napoleon was sent to the Island of Elba. His ride through Provence was dangerous in the extreme. Mobbed and hooted at, he resorted to various disguises, wearing the uniform of an English colonel, at other times placing in his hat the white cockade of the Bourbons, and even going so far as to desert his coach and exchange places with one of the out-riders.

Napoleon's defeat and the peace that followed can be summarized rather briefly. In a letter to his brother Joseph, dated January 7, 1814, he said: "The point can be put in a nutshell. France is invaded. All Europe is in arms against her but more particularly against me." He was right. He had become the sole issue of the war. All Europe, including France, was against Napoleon. The world had grown tired of him and rose up to get rid of him. France had had enough

of glory, enough of his strutting and boasting, enough of his ceaseless wars and endless bloodshed. France wanted the things he had promised but had never been able to deliver. France wanted to resume trade, to eat real sugar, to avoid taxes on salt and tobacco. France was sick of being bullied and browbeaten and scolded and—inspired. France had had enough glory, enough war, and all too much Napoleon.

But after they had deposed him, after he retired to Elba, France was saddled with a dull, unimaginative Bourbon, with the same bullying, the same annoyance, and no glory. When the prisoners of war were repatriated and there were the makings of an army again in France, Napoleon left Elba on the twenty-sixth of February, 1815. He landed at Antibes on the first of March and, with a thousand men, marched toward Paris. He was forty-five years old.

He avoided Provence where he had been so roughly treated a year before. He passed through Dauphine and went over the mountains to Grenoble. One of his mules, carrying part of his gold reserve, fell down a precipice and scattered forty thousand francs into a mountain stream. In the first three days he made three recruits. Masséna's troops met him and barred the road. He walked toward them alone, challenging whoever dared, to kill his Emperor. They responded with a wild cheer "*Vive l'Empereur!*" He marched into Grenoble in triumph, with Masséna's men at his back. It was a wild, triumphant march to Paris. Although he was excommunicated, although Talleyrand had drafted a declaration putting him outside of the law, he now had 14,000 men behind him. Ney joined him. Louis XVIII fled. And for one hundred days, *the One Hundred Days* as the period has

always been known, Napoleon was again master of France.

It is not our purpose to review the Battle of Waterloo, the battle that has been recounted in more tales, more histories, more military tracts, than any other battle in history. It suffices to say that it was one of the world's few decisive battles. Napoleon nearly won it, but Wellington had the results secure by the time Blücher's army arrived to turn defeat into rout. Incidentally, in reliable sources there is no authentication of Victor Hugo's story of the sunken road, the unknown piece of terrain that brought disaster in the last great cavalry charge. Yet somehow this picturesque piece of fiction is often popularly ascribed as the cause of Napoleon's downfall. After Waterloo, the Allies moved swiftly on Paris. The battle cost the French at least 26,000 casualties, but the rest of the hastily raised army simply melted. Some days later, Napoleon arrived at Rochefort, dethroned and outlawed from France. He was bound for America, but English vessels lay off the harbor and, unable to dodge them, he delivered himself as a political refugee aboard the *Bellerophon*. He called himself a refugee, but they treated him as a prisoner. This time there was no Elba for him. They packed him away to St. Helena. He was no longer called Emperor, but merely General. He wrote his memoirs and some military tracts and died there of cancer.

An examination of the first Peace of Paris shows that her conquerors had a rather generous attitude toward France. They set her boundaries as they existed on January 1, 1792. They dwelt particularly on a road connecting Geneva with other parts of Switzerland, on the free navigation of the Rhine, on territorial affairs of Holland, and the independence of Italy and the German States of Switzerland. A num-

ber of colonies were restored to France and others ceded to Great Britain. There were provisions between France and England about affairs in India, and French fishery rights in Newfoundland were restored. Individuals were secured against molestation for action during the war and the inhabitants of ceded territories were allowed to go to any other country within a period of six years. No pecuniary claims were made on France or by France on the Allies, but France undertook to pay all her debts in foreign countries.

The second Treaty of Paris dealt with further territorial carvings and guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland. These provisions seem astoundingly trivial as the outcome of twenty years of war, but the main objective had been won. Europe was rid of Napoleon.

And here the similarity between Napoleon and Hitler breaks off sharply. At the end of World War I, we believed the German will to war was inspired solely by the person of the Kaiser. Now, for all the similarity between Hitler and Napoleon, we cannot quite accept the belief that the nation in arms, which is Germany, is so tremendously concentrated in the person of the comic but terrible paper-hanger who has made himself Der Fuehrer. The removal of Hitler alone cannot be the objective of the present war. But the same problem of world security exists. In 1815 the world was made secure for a time, at least, by the removal of one man. The problem is more difficult today, but to gain security involves precisely what it involved when Napoleon did to Europe what the Germans have done since September, 1939.

F O U R

"Theirs not to reason why . . ."

TO THE MODERN AMERICAN MIND the Crimean War is a rather muddled jumble of heroism and heroics, without much plan or reason; an obscure page of history across which Florence Nightingale moved ethereally, bearing her lamp, and the Light Brigade charged in gory splendor. Sartorial monuments of Raglan and Cardigan remain, but the men who wear a raglan topcoat and the women who wear a cardigan jacket have failed to connect them with the heroes of that brilliant war so long ago and so far away.

There are fashions in war just as there are fashions in everything else, and we must judge this war in the light of the fashions of that day. The war was fought in the years 1854, '55, and '56, in the Crimean Peninsula, a part of Russia extending into the Black Sea, and, as this is being written, a very active theater on the Russo-German front of the current World War.

In many respects, the Crimean War was the first of the modern wars, with modern diplomacy causing it, with modern professional war correspondents reporting it. It was the first war in which communications were made by telegraph; the first war in which ironclads were engaged. Yet in many respects it was like the fifteenth-century wars in Italy, like the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough, and

the wars of Frederick the Great. Twenty-four years before its outbreak, Von Clausewitz's monumental work *On War* had been published, and in it he had defined war as a duel. There was much of the duel in the Crimean War, little of the present-day picture of "total war," in which whole nations are engaged as nations and not as armies.

To understand this war we must dig a bit into its geography. A branch of the Mediterranean Sea extending northward between Greece and Asia Minor is the Aegean Sea. Extending northeast from the Aegean Sea is the narrow strait, known as the Dardanelles, which connects the Aegean with the small Sea of Marmora. Another strait, the Bosphorus, joins the Sea of Marmora with the Black Sea. On the western side of the Bosphorus lies Constantinople, then and now the capital of Turkey, and on the eastern side is Scutari. To the north and east of Scutari is the large and important body of water known as the Black Sea. For many years Russia had owned a thousand miles of shorefront on the Black Sea. Downward from the northern shore of the Black Sea is a peninsula known as the Crimea, bounded on the south by the Black Sea, on the east by Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, and on the west by the Gulf of Perekop. Into the western shore of the Gulf of Perekop, the Dniester River flows, and not far south of the Dniester are the numerous mouths of one of the most important rivers of central Europe, the Danube.

Geography makes history, and a tremendous amount of history and warfare are directly traceable to the rivers and straits and seas we have just named. From the earliest times the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, then known as the Hellespont, have been of the utmost strategic importance to the

countries of eastern Europe and western Asia. Hellespont, as the name implies, means the bridge to Greece, and all the ancient countries fought for it. Xerxes once crossed it with his army on a bridge of boats, and, centuries later, Alexander did the same thing. Leander swam it to see his sweetheart, Hero. Lord Byron swam it to show he was as good a man as Leander. In our time Richard Halliburton swam it to show he was as good a man as Byron. And there have been others. In the later days of the Roman Empire the city of Byzantium, because of its strategic and commercial importance, overshadowed Rome itself, and the Emperor Constantine moved his capital to Byzantium and named it after himself, Constantinople. It is obvious from a glance at the map that even in the days when galleys were pulled by oars, the master of Constantinople could control all the traffic moving between the Black Sea and its tributaries and the Mediterranean and its tributaries. The master of Constantinople held an unparalleled position for waging offensive and defensive warfare. Thus this city has always been a primary physical objective in all the wars that have been waged in that part of the world and it will be in many wars to come.

When Islam invaded Christendom and snatched Constantinople in 1453, establishing the mighty Ottoman Empire, the possession of Constantinople became a religious objective as well as a strategic and commercial objective. By 1854, however, the crusading spirit had in reality disappeared from the world, but the long lingering antipathy between Christian and Mohammedan could always be trumped up as a *casus belli*. The great Ottoman Empire, now called Turkey, had dwindled in its might and power. The Russian Czar, Nicholas I, whispered that he believed there

was "a very sick man" in southern Europe. The term "sick man" had become a sort of diplomatic byword for the Ottoman Empire. Sir Thomas Roe, British Ambassador to Constantinople, had used the term in 1621. Montesquieu, approximately a century later, employed the same epithet. Then there is the rather apocryphal tale that the Sultan constantly denied access to foreign diplomats on the ground that he was ill, and was consequently referred to as "the sick man" because of his unvarying and obviously untrue excuse. The Czar's use of the term was neither original nor particularly humorous. (The Romanovs were not conspicuous for either characteristic.) But it caught on and was widely quoted. He meant that Turkey was dying, and he wanted to share in Turkey's estate after the demise. He thought he could grab it. What he wanted, of course, was the Bosphorus and Constantinople to control it, and the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the Dardanelles. For Turkey could close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Russian commerce and could make of the Black Sea an inland lake and not a broad path to world trade.

No one could blame Nicholas for wanting the most desirable and important spot on earth, desirable and important to anyone, but vital to Russia. But in the skepticism of the present day we lift our eyebrows at his declaration that he was fighting a holy war for the protection of Christians in Turkey and at his denunciations of Turkish cruelty, slavery, and inhumanity. It did not come well from the ruler of the land of the knout and the kingdom of serfs. But the protection of Christians by Holy Christian Russia and punishment for cruelty and evil-doing were the alleged causes of the war.

Opposed to Russia was a strange alliance—Turkey supported by Great Britain, France, and the Kingdom of Sardinia.

According to Trevelyan, England wanted a war—any war. England had enjoyed forty years of peace. The British army had been doing police duty in India, but had not tried out its weapons or its heroism in a war against any white nation. Forty years is a long time for a professional army to rusticate. The pacifists have long maintained that if you have a big standing army you are certain to have a war because the army needs it, wants it, and will get it; and to some extent this is true. England wanted war in 1854. Also, it seemed to be a rather unreasoning but nevertheless fundamental element of the British foreign policy to oppose Russia on any and every possible occasion. England has always feared Russia more than any other power. England has always seen in Russia a threat to her own security. England has feared Russia's designs on India and Russia's threat to her own inviolate isles. So when Russia proposed to grab off the straits, England's instinctive reaction was to prevent that very thing.

That is not to say that Russia's proposed move against Turkey was not a direct threat to England. It was. But even if it had not been, even if there had been nothing to worry about in Russia's action, England's instincts would have been to oppose any aggressive Russian move.

But there are two other fundamentals in British foreign policy: protection of the Life Line and Balance of Power.

With England's wealthiest possession, India, nearly half-way around the world, it is essential to England's welfare that the route to India be as short and as secure as possible.

To make that life line, England acquired Suez, and dug the Suez Canal. Later, to protect that life line, England extended its protectorate over Egypt, and also at various times acquired Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, and Crete. The life line was vitally cut in the present war, but Allied successes in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy have opened it up again. In World War I, the Gallipoli campaign was fought for the same purpose. It is obvious that Russia's possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be a threat to this life line. At this time the Suez Canal was little more than a glint in De Lesseps's eye. It did not become an actual canal with water in it until five years later, but its potentiality had existed as long as the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

The balance of power has been the keynote of British foreign policy as long as there has been a British foreign policy. This is its essence: If any other nation becomes stronger than Great Britain, the British seek an ally for offensive and defensive warfare that will make them just as strong as the stronger power, plus just a little bit more. The alliance must not be too obviously stronger because that would induce the strong nation to seek an alliance, too. Then the British would have to get another ally, then the nation they feared would add one, and so it would go until all the nations of the world would be used up.

At various times the British have allied themselves with strange playmates against the powers with which either earlier or later they formed an alliance. Against the powerful France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, the British allied themselves with the Germanic States. In the Crimean War, the British allied themselves with France, Turkey, and Sardinia against Russia. When Germany became powerful, Britain

was allied with France, Italy (the successor to the Kingdom of Sardinia), and Russia, against Germany; and so it goes. Russia was not a nation to be feared, but on paper was the greatest threat to England's security. Her vast resources, her tremendous manpower, the wealth and glitter of the Russian Court, the sprawling piece of real estate that so dominates the map of Europe and Asia, made Russia seem much more formidable than she was in fact. But Russia was an interior power largely remote from England, which was a definitely insular power. Russia had an outlet on the Baltic, an outlet on the Arctic, and an outlet on the Black Sea. But all of these were so choked by ice or so commanded by narrow straits that they raised no strategic threat against the mistress of the seas. Let Russia get a foothold on the Aegean, however, and the picture would be changed. Russia's power would then have a path by sea to England's door, to England's life line. Russia could cut England off from India.

In all this calculation, too, Turkey was the little nation astride the fulcrum of this seesaw which we call the balance of power. At various times in the history of the world, some small, weak nation has become tremendously important simply because the other nations were so nicely balanced. By throwing her weight one way or the other, she could upset the entire world. Turkey was in that position in 1854. Turkey's control of the straits was not a threat against England. Russia's control of the straits would be.

Now it was not necessary for the Czar to outline to his people the commercial and strategic importance of the straits. All he needed to do was to cry "Onward, Christian soldiers," or words to that effect, and shout about the cruelty and barbarism of the pagan Turks. The British had no need

to proclaim the necessity for the balance of power and the protection of the life line. All they had to do was to cry, "Here's a chance for a fight, boys, let's go!"

It is a little difficult to find out why France wanted to get into the war, but it must be remembered that Napoleon III was very anxious to prove he was as great a soldier as Napoleon I. He, too, was probably concerned with the balance of power and undoubtedly wanted to inflict a defeat upon the nation that had burned Moscow and brought an end to the triumphs of his great namesake.

Sardinia went along for the ride. Victor Emmanuel II, the King and head of the House of Savoy, was trying to unite Italy and had no interest in Russia, but he knew that if Sardinia were represented properly in the war it would be represented as well at the peace table, and out of it he might put together a union of the numerous Italian states. No one took Sardinia seriously. In order to persuade the real nations that it was worthy of consideration, an alliance in war was of the utmost value.

Turkey, of course, was forced into the war to defend her territory.

We must now consider Austria, which, though not a belligerent, exercised a predominant interest not only in the war but in the subsequent peace. Czar Nicholas III had materially helped Emperor Franz Joseph in putting down the Magyar rebellion in Hungary in 1849 and he relied upon that monarch's help, and also placed reliance on a secret memorandum which had been filed in the British foreign office as the result of a conversation, in 1844, with Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Aberdeen. The conversations recorded in this memorandum, and subsequently

approved by the British government, provided for "Anglo-Russian agreement" in the event of Turkish dissolution. So Nicholas thought he might at least rely upon the complacent acquiescence of England. When the British warned him that his proposed move would be regarded as a threat, he concluded that the British were bluffing. He had no respect for Napoleon III, and he thought the King of Sardinia was a joke. He was sure that all he had to contend with was the "sick man," Turkey, and he counted on Austrian help, and particularly on Austria's willingness to permit the movement of Russian troops across her territories into Turkey. Accordingly, on June 22, 1853, the Russians occupied the Moldavian Provinces north of the Danube and were ready to move across Austrian territory against the straits. Austria mobilized and occupied positions in the Transylvanian mountains to stop the Russians' crossing of the river. Therefore Nicholas pulled his troops out of Moldavia.

We have said that there are fashions in war. This war was clearly designed to be what Von Clausewitz calls a war of limited aim. Russia wanted the straits. That was her only aim. The Allies were determined that she should not have the straits. That was their only aim. They did not desire part of Russia, nor did they intend her complete and abject defeat. They wished to defeat only that one intention. The war became, therefore, a perfect example of the campaign war, waged in a definite theater of operations for the purpose of deciding whether or not Russia would get and hold the straits. At some time during the war the British sent a fleet into the Baltic, but it was an abortive effort and brought about no important results. The theater of operations was designed to be the straits. Action started with a naval vic-

tory which Russia won over Turkey at Sinope. It was an ordinary sea fight but was pictured to the Allies as a merciless massacre, and it served to stir up the war spirit.

Now, with the Russian armies retreating from Moldavia, and with an Allied fleet in the Black Sea, the straits looked reasonably safe. But Russia had her only important naval base on the Black Sea at Sebastopol (now usually rendered Sevastopol), at the tip of the Crimea. So the theater of operations moved northward, and the war was fought in the Crimea. Russia's aims were frustrated when she moved out of Moldavia, and the war should have stopped right there, but everyone seemed to want a good bloody war, so they had it, and by mutual consent the physical objective of the war became Sebastopol and not the straits.

Admittedly that does not seem to make sense. Compared to the all-out war efforts of the present day, the Crimean War would seem to have no justification, and the fall of Sebastopol should not have logically marked its end, but that was the fashion of the wars of the period.

It is not necessary to our purpose to review the brilliant and heroic actions of that war. The famous charge of the Light Brigade at the battle of Balaklava, immortalized by Tennyson, is known to every schoolboy.

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of death
Rode the six hundred."

Everyone remembers the bombardment and the famous assaults on the Redan and Malakoff. Everyone knows how

Florence Nightingale cleaned up the terrible conditions in the hospitals behind the lines.

When at length Sebastopol fell—and it was taken by assault—there was nothing to do but make peace. The war aims were clearly defined. The Czar had failed of his purpose. The Allies had gained their purpose. All that remained was to make a treaty of peace to secure the decision gained by the war. But it is doubtful if the fall of Sebastopol would have had that happy result if it had not been for two other events.

Austria prepared to enter the war. It threatened to join the Allies unless Russia immediately consented to peace. For a defeated nation, this was just too much. At the same time Czar Nicholas I died. There were mysterious circumstances surrounding his death and some evidence that he committed suicide, induced by his military failures. His son, Alexander II, was a very different person. He had not made the war and he could stop it without loss of face. He had never been in sympathy with it and he demanded peace at any price. With the absolute power of his Czardom he could do as he pleased, and he pleased to have peace. Alexander made many important reforms in Russia: he freed the serfs in 1861, and was a far more enlightened ruler than his father had been.

So we see peace brought about because the vanquished could no longer attain its objective, because of the threat of worse things to come, and because of a change in the ruler of the beaten country. These three causes frequently end wars. It does not necessarily take more than one such cause to do it, but in this case we had three. In a war of limited aims, where the aggressor is defeated and cannot achieve

those aims, he is usually willing to make peace. When peace and defeat, however humiliating, seem better and more acceptable than a continuation of the war, peace will come. The threat by Austria made any continuance of the Crimean War seem much more trouble than the price of defeat, and when the party that makes war loses its power, the succeeding party can usually bestow a benefit upon its country by bringing the war to an end, deriving great political gains therefrom, and disavowing the failure which defeat implies.

Although the present war is very different from the Crimean War of limited aim, there are present in it these same peace potentials. It is now obvious that neither Germany nor Japan can obtain their objectives. That possibility ceased to exist after the summer of 1942. Invasion of France may have an effect similar to the threat of Austria on Russia. In both Germany and Japan there is the possibility of the complete overthrow of the Nazi and the Japanese War Party by their opponents who have never wanted war and who strongly desire peace.

But there is something about the Crimean War that seems unreal and artificial today. It was very much like the formal duel of Von Clausewitz's definition. There seemed to be a tacit agreement that the Crimea was to be the theater of operations—a proper place to hold a perfectly proper war. Indeed, there is mention that it was selected by an editorial in the London Times and that Raglan, who had never heard of it, looked it up on a map and was delighted with it because his ships could bombard the narrow neck connecting it with the mainland and cut the Russian communications. It was a shock to him to learn that there were only three feet of water within gunshot range of that neck.

There also seemed a tacit agreement that the fall of Sebastopol would end the war. It is to be noted that the Allies did not want the Crimea for themselves, did not *take* it, in the sense of taking it away from Russia, did not ask for it in the peace treaty. The Crimea was just a good place to hold a war.

How like the formal duel it was! Each duellist to shoot two shots at ten paces upon the drop of a handkerchief, and honor would be satisfied. It was not the rough and tumble scrap of today where nations are destroyed, populations enslaved, and battles rage from Attu, Murmansk, and the Denmark Straits to Singapore, Guadalcanal, and Diego Suarez. The world is today's theater of operations. We fight bitterly for a coral atoll, a strip of African desert, or a barren island in the Arctic. Every place on earth is of some strategic importance.

Brodie tells the story of a British subaltern who, in an examination, was asked the function of cavalry in war. "To lend tone," was his answer, "to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl." The Crimean War had plenty of tone. Our present engagement is very much a vulgar brawl.

Peace was made in Paris in 1856. The independence of Turkey was guaranteed by Great Britain, France, and Austria. That was another way of saying that Russia gave up, apparently in perpetuity, her claims to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. And to protect Turkey, the Black Sea was "formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war." That meant that Russia could have no sea power on the Black Sea; not even armed vessels for fighting pirates were allowed. The Turks were permitted to maintain a strong naval base at the Bosphorus, and this naval base was to be

used against Russia by all the Allies and signatories to the treaty in the event Russia ever attempted to re-establish herself as a naval power on the Black Sea. It was not necessary to destroy Sebastopol. All the fortifications, all the facilities, and anything that would help serve as a naval base, had been completely demolished by the French after the city was taken.

Like so many things we declare in perpetuity, the Black Sea clauses lasted only a very few years. In 1870, just fourteen years after the treaty, Russia denounced it and repudiated it, and built herself a Black Sea fleet. The German repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles is thus not without precedent in this strange world of power politics and meaningless treaties. Needless to say, Russia got away with it.

F I V E

" . . . with malice toward none . . . "

ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 9, 1865, General Grant had a headache. It must have been a bad one, for he devoted in his memoirs almost as much space to his sufferings as to the details of Lee's surrender. The headache was cured immediately upon his receipt of a letter from Lee offering to discuss more fully the terms of surrender which Grant had outlined in a previous letter. The meeting in Mr. McLean's house in Appomattox Court House presented an interesting study in contrasts. Grant, probably showing the strains of

his headache, was not dressed for the rôle of a conquering general. He wore a cavalry trooper's jacket with the shoulder marks of a lieutenant general, and there is somewhat apocryphal evidence that he also wore a pair of sadly used civilian trousers and a battered straw hat. He had no sword. He had been spending the morning on horseback, and rarely carried a sword while mounted. Lee, on the other hand, wore a resplendent and brand-new uniform with brilliant gold lace. He carried a sword of ceremony, clearly not one to be used in the field, a weapon that excited Grant's wondering admiration.

They were a long time getting down to the business of the meeting, but on Lee's twice-iterated insistence, Grant wrote the following terms:

Appomattox C. H., Va.
Apl 9th, 1865

Gen. R. E. Lee,
Comd'g C. S. A.

Gen:

In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. This will

not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT
Lt. Gen.

Lee's only question was to ask if the provision as to horses applied to enlisted men, many of whom owned their own horses. When Grant informed him that it did not, he seemed willing to accept the terms. Then Grant relented. It was important for the South to recover from the war as rapidly as possible, and horses were needed to work the farms. Lee penned an immediate acceptance.

Indeed, he had but little choice in the matter. The muster rolls showed that he had only 28,356 officers and men to surrender. In the preceding eleven days he had lost, by capture alone, 19,132 officers and men and 689 cannon. His supply trains had been captured, one after another, and his first word after the surrender was to ask for food for his men and forage for his animals. Grant complied at once in the matter of food, but could offer no forage. The Union horses were living off the country. But Lee had suffered tremendous losses by desertion as well as by casualties. Entire regiments had disappeared. Grant had 162,000 * men left after the terrible attrition of the last year of the war—had them where Lee could not escape them. In fact, on the morning of the

* Other authorities place Grant's strength at 120,000 at the beginning of the final campaign. Deducting losses in killed, wounded, captured, or missing, his final strength would total about 109,500.

surrender, Sheridan, suspecting a ruse, wanted to continue hostilities, saying he could finish the Confederate army in five minutes.

Although it was not fully realized at the time, Lee's surrender really marked the end of the war. Johnston, facing Sherman near Raleigh, surrendered on April 26 on practically the same terms, a little better expressed. While Johnston could not have withdrawn his army, Sherman was very much afraid he could have dissipated it, and that wandering bands of guerrillas could have continued resistance until new armies had been formed. At any rate, that was Sherman's opinion, and Sherman was in an excellent position to know. Jefferson Davis, however, felt differently about it. He wrote:

"[General Lee] surrendered to overwhelming forces and insurmountable difficulties . . . the surrender of Johnston was a different affair . . . Johnston's line of retreat, as chosen by himself, through South Carolina, was open and had supplies placed upon it at various points. . . . We had other forces in the field and we were certainly in a position to make serious resistance. . . . General Johnston had these matters and the details of a plan for his proposed movement fully placed before him, with orders to execute it. He disobeyed the orders, surrendered his army and put everything at the mercy of the conquerors."

But Davis was an apologist for the Confederate defeat. In Sherman's whole career he never made a mistake in what military people call his Estimate of the Situation. Davis's opinion sounds like wishful thinking and is not consistent with his known orders to Johnston. Johnston was not the kind of general to surrender if there were any hope left. Sherman

had tried very intelligently to obtain from Johnston the capitulation of the entire Confederacy rather than just his army, but Sherman's tentative offer was repudiated by Secretary of War Stanton and President Johnson, and Johnston surrendered no more than the men under his command.

The end of the Civil War was marked by a purely military victory. But the country as well as the army was defeated. The South had resisted until resistance was no longer possible. After the fall of Vicksburg, the Mississippi was in Union hands and the Confederacy was cut in two. Also, Sherman had sliced down from Tennessee to Atlanta, captured the "arsenal of the Confederacy," marched to the sea, laid waste the only remaining source of food, marched north from Savannah as far as Raleigh, and threatened Johnston's front and Lee's rear. Sheridan had completely ravaged all the country from which Lee was able to draw a meager but nearby subsistence. Grant's bloody and unrelenting battles in Virginia had caused an attrition of Lee's army that left it helpless and hopeless. The Union Navy had blockaded all the Confederate ports. The South was thoroughly licked. To paraphrase an old poem,

"He is not licked, who from the floor
Can rise again to fight some more;
But he is licked who prostrate lies
Without the power to fight or rise."

That was the condition of the South when Lee surrendered. The two main kernels of resistance were in Lee's and Johnston's armies. When they were cracked, there was but little left. But Union forces were on the march in all directions. Grant, in a letter to Sherman, dated March 22, 1865, had given the picture in one vivid paragraph:

"Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, from Eastport. Stoneman started on the same day from East Tennessee toward Lynchburg. Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior of Alabama. I ordered Gillmore as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to hold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send to Wilmington all surplus forces."

The South was being hit from all directions.

It is often stated by the experts that the decisive battle of the Civil War was Gettysburg. But it had little effect upon the ending of the war. If you feel with Lee that a deep penetration of the North or the capture of Washington would have ended the war with victory for the South, then a Confederate victory at Gettysburg might conceivably have been decisive. The Union victory converted Lee's campaign into an unimportant raid. So-called "decisive battles" are unilateral affairs, decisive if one side wins, but not necessarily decisive if the other side wins. Lee's defeat at Gettysburg did not result in the final defeat of the Confederacy. When Lee and Johnston surrendered, the South had no more men to fight, no more food to feed them, no more supplies to back them up, no more money with which to pay them.

Both the North and the South should have been well able to supply their armies with food. They both produced an abundance, even though the South devoted too much acreage to cotton. But food was a principal item of export for the North. It had to ship out food in order to bring in other vitally needed commodities. That caused a food shortage, never very acute in the North. When the manpower of the South went into the army, food there became scarce. But the

principal difference between the North and the South was that the war was fought in the South. In the invaded parts, food was destroyed ruthlessly. Particularly in Sherman's march to the sea and Sheridan's many raids, the destruction of crops and means for growing new ones worked terrible havoc in a country already hungry.

Toward the end the South was starving. Corn pone seemed to be the staple article of diet. Dried peas were used for coffee. There was little meat, little white flour, no tea. Small gardens, the equivalent of our present Victory Gardens, sprang up all over the South, but with Southern manpower at the front and even Negroes conscripted toward the last, any large-scale or adequate cultivation was impossible. Yet if you had money and lived in Richmond, you could still eat. Here is the Bill of Fare of the Oriental Restaurant in Richmond, for January 17, 1864, as printed in the *Diary of a Southern Refugee*, published in February, 1865:

Soup	\$1.50
Turkey	3.50
Chicken	3.50
Rock fish	5.00
Roast beef	3.00
Beefsteak	3.50
Ham and eggs	3.50
Boiled eggs	2.00
Fried oysters	5.00
Raw oysters	3.00
Cabbage	1.00
Potatoes	1.00
Pure coffee, per cup	3.00
Pure tea, per cup	2.00
Fresh milk	2.00
Bread and butter	1.50

You could get luxuries, too, if you could pay for them. Champagne was \$50.00 a bottle and fine Havana cigars cost \$1.00 apiece. It must be remembered that prices in restaurants were normally vastly cheaper in those days than they are today, but never, outside of Civil War days, have we paid \$3.00 for a cup of coffee. Here are some more prices:

Flour	\$1,500.00 a barrel
Bacon	20.00 per pound
Beef	15.00 per pound
Butter	20.00 per pound
Chickens	50.00 each

The South was not an industrial country. It had few factories, foundries, shipbuilding yards. It lacked nearly all the means for producing the things that are so lavishly expended in war—arms, powder, saddlery, cannon, tents, clothing. These they took from the North by stocking the Southern arsenals before the commencement of hostilities. Southern sympathizers in high Federal positions, and later rebels, saw to it that the South was adequately armed with Union rifles, cannon, and ammunition. They confidently expected to import replacements as the initial supplies were expended. The closing of the Southern ports by the blockade left the armies without the means to fight, and the lack of weapons, food, powder, clothing, undoubtedly led to the many desertions that undermined Lee in the end.

The blockade was very stupid duty for the men and ships engaged in it but, as in so many other cases, the stupid, boring routine of an unexciting duty played a large part in winning the war. The first blockade was declared on April 19, 1861, and covered all of the Southern coast south of North Carolina. Lincoln adhered very carefully to the Inter-

national Laws of Blockade, which require that means for enforcing the blockade must be available. The means were there, and no part of the coast was declared blockaded unless there were ships to carry it out. The Union's navy had been pretty well scattered over the seven seas prior to the war, sent on long-distance, meaningless errands by Southern sympathizers in Federal jobs, just to get the ships out of the way, but as fast as they could be recalled, they were brought in and put on the blockade. Eight days after the first blockade was declared, on April 27, 1861, the blockade was extended northward to cover the North Carolina and Virginia coasts. This did more than prevent materials of war from coming into the South. It also prevented the export of the South's two important crops, cotton and tobacco, and thus prevented the Confederacy from getting any money. Cotton was money in any port in Europe. Southerners paid their taxes in cotton. And cotton, when it could be delivered to the mills in England, commanded prices that in turn would purchase the things the South needed. But the South could not get the bulk of its cotton to England, nor could it pay its soldiers in the field with cotton bales.

In 1860 the South exported \$200,000,000 worth of cotton. In 1862 the value of cotton exports was only \$4,000,000; and by 1864 practically nothing got out of the Confederate ports. So the Confederacy became bankrupt, turned to the printing press for its money, lost the faith of its own people.

In 1865 the value of the Confederate dollar was about 1½ cents. In other words, gold, compared to paper, had a value of sixty to one. It must be remembered that the wealthiest men in the South, inspired by loyalty to the Confederacy, turned their gold into paper and thus became penniless.

Propaganda was at work on both sides. Confederate propagandists devoted their attention primarily to trying to win European recognition for the South in capitals. They won a vast amount of sympathy in England, France, and Prussia. In the Catholic countries of southern Europe, priests were used to tell of the desecration of churches by the Union troops, and the Confederate Secretary of State, Judah P. Benjamin, prepared numerous "releases," as we would call them today, on the cruelty, inhumanity, and ruthlessness of the Union troops, the sort of thing we have read about in every war. The Union propagandists in Europe, however, devoted their attention primarily to breaking down Confederate credit. Robert J. Walker, who had been Secretary of the Treasury under James K. Polk, was sent on a special mission to Europe for this specific purpose. He wrote a series of articles for the financial page of the *London Times* to show how Jefferson Davis had caused the repudiation of a large issue of Southern State bonds which were widely held in London. Walker was very successful in his mission and also succeeded in borrowing \$250,000,000 from European bankers, a loan which helped the North amazingly.

As money values declined in the South, the printing presses were speeded up. Taxation was increased 100 per cent and then there were current rumors of personal chicanery in high places. On February 8, a deficiency of unknown size was discovered in the amount of the Confederate indebtedness. The discrepancy was not less than \$300,000,000 and not more than \$400,000,000, but it was enough.

This, then, was the situation which General Lee understood full well that day at Appomattox Court House. Manpower was exhausted. There were no more men left to fight.

Not only was his army cut off from supplies, but behind him the entire South was impoverished, hungry, bare. While he was acting solely for himself and for the army he commanded, he knew that the South now accepted him as its real leader—not Jefferson Davis. In February, 1864, Davis was obliged to send a special message to the Confederate Congress, calling attention to "secret leagues and associations" and "disloyalty and hostility to our cause" which were springing up all over the South. The rumor was circulated that Davis had vast sums of Confederate gold, and he was greatly discredited. No one believes those rumors today, and the vast sums of gold were never found. Gold does not come out of a printing press. At the end of the year 1863 the Confederacy owed \$1,221,000,000, and the State governments and smaller political units probably owed just as much more. As the war lasted a year and a half longer, the final indebtedness was vastly greater. When Lee surrendered, Davis fled. Later he was captured, imprisoned, and not released until 1867. There was no longer any Confederacy. As fast as the news spread, the other forces still in the field followed Lee's example. Therefore, it can be fairly stated that the surrender of Lee was in reality the surrender of the entire Confederacy.

Before we can really understand what led to Lee's surrender, we must go back to Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address and glean from it the phrase that above all others keyed the principle of the cessation of hostilities—"with malice toward none, with charity for all."

That made surrender easy. Grant remembered it when he wrote out the terms of surrender. Sherman remembered it. Describing his interview with Johnston and Breckenridge

when he offered, subject to confirmation, the terms which President Johnson and Stanton refused to ratify, he wrote:

“General Johnston then assured me that he had authority over all the Confederate armies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the same terms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply this desirable result, I ought to give his men and officers some assurance of their political rights after their surrender. I explained to him that Mr. Lincoln’s proclamation of amnesty, of December 8, 1863, still in force, enabled every Confederate soldier and officer, below the rank of Colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon, by simply laying down his arms and taking the common oath of allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrender of General Lee’s army, had extended the same principle to *all* the officers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, would restore to them all their rights of citizenship.”

There was no malice. There was ample charity. The aim of the Union was to put an end to the rebellion, with the least cost in blood and destruction. Incidentally, it aimed to end slavery. But slavery would end in fact, as it had already ended by proclamation, as soon as hostilities ceased. The South, on the other hand, fought for its right to secede and, having lost, abandoned that right. The South could have ceased fighting as soon as it became apparent it could not win. Prolonging hostilities would have gained no better terms than the very generous terms that were offered.

“Stop fighting and go home. Take your horses and hitch them to your plows. You won’t be disturbed for anything you have done so long as you obey the laws.” That was all the North wanted.

Lee thought those terms were generous. He saw that they made sense. Grant writes:

"When he read over that part of the terms about side-arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army."

Could he have resisted further? Grant wrote him on April 7, "The results of last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance. . . ."; and Lee replied on the same day, "Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance. . . ." So perhaps there was some avenue of escape or perhaps this was sheer bluff and bravado—though Lee was not a bluffer. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were of the opinion that Lee might somehow have effected a union with Johnston. But even if that had been possible, it would merely have postponed the inevitable. The South could no longer win. They could gain no better or more generous terms by holding out. It was logical and merciful and wise to surrender.

But it is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if Grant, so generous in his final victory, had taken the attitude he had adopted at Fort Donelson—"My only terms are unconditional and immediate surrender. I propose to move at once upon your works."

Of course, both Grant and Sherman had recently been in lengthy conference with Lincoln in the after cabin of the *River Queen*. They keenly appreciated the President's attitude, and they had the utmost admiration for his wisdom, his greatness, and his goodness. Grant was merely carrying out Lincoln's wishes as clearly as if Lincoln had written the terms himself. But if that had not been the case, would Lee

have accepted less generous terms? It is extremely doubtful. He was a proud man. He had fought magnificently. He had continued at frightful cost until the last vestige of hope of victory had vanished. As he stood there in his brilliant new uniform, he must have seen that in these generous terms he had gained all he could ever hope to gain by further fighting.

His surrender was entirely logical—the only thing to do.

Were Grant's terms overgenerous? A review of the subsequent history will show that they were not. For they laid the South open to the onerous carpetbag rule that followed. Grant, in strict obedience to orders, dealt only with the surrender of an army, not the surrender of the Confederacy. Indeed, it would have been hard to treat with the Confederacy as such without recognizing it as a legitimate government, which the United States carefully avoided.

Grant winced a bit when, in the preliminary conversation, Lee made some reference to a difference in the two governments. Grant was on the point of mentioning that the Confederacy was not a government, but he let it pass.

It should be noted, too, that Grant's terms were generous to the enemy as individuals only. As individuals, they were to give their paroles, lay down their arms. As individuals, they were to retain their side arms, their privately owned horses, their personal baggage. As individuals, under the general amnesty proclamation, they were pardoned and their rights as citizens restored. But there were no terms to the Confederacy as such. There were no terms to the rebellious States, which could have been recognized as entities.

Had Lee been able to foresee the future, the immediate enfranchisement of the Negroes, the invasion and exploitation of the South by the carpetbaggers, the humiliation, not

only of defeat but of being treated as a captive people, he would probably have tried for political rather than personal and individual terms.

But perhaps not. Lincoln was still in the White House. The leaders of the South had come to a realization of his true stature. They placed their faith in his word, just as Grant absolutely trusted the *bona fides* of Lee. They recognized him as their best friend. His assassination changed the entire picture for the South.

Sherman learned of Lincoln's death as he was setting out to confer with Johnston and Breckenridge to discuss the final surrender of the remaining armies of the South. While he kept the news secret from his own officers and men, he revealed it to Johnston. It could not in fairness be concealed. Too much of the South's future depended on Lincoln himself. Sherman tried to put a political twist in his original terms. In addition to the terms granted to Lee, Sherman provided:

"The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal . . . to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

"The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, [note that he did not say 'President,' with Lincoln scarcely cold] of the several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the

several States with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively."

These were the terms offered by the man the South has hated more cordially than any other. Of course, they demonstrate pretty clearly that a soldier's business is fighting—not treaty-making. Sherman was so anxious to prevent needless bloodshed and so afraid of anarchy and lawlessness in the South that he was placing in the hands of his enemies the means to renew the war. He was desperately afraid of guerillas and wanted the Southern States to have both the means and the responsibility to repress them. The sincerity of his most famous utterance, "War is Hell," has often been questioned, but the generosity of his peace terms bears it out.

Recognition of the State governments, of course, was the one thing Stanton and Johnson did not want. Lincoln, too, had been opposed to it; but Sherman had not understood this. And, of course, the specific provision for the re-establishment of the Federal courts implied that the courts had lost jurisdiction and also that other divisions of the Federal government, not specifically mentioned, were *not* re-established.

On the whole, it was a very bad document; but it was the sincere effort of an essentially kindly man, able above all others in his own field, but hopelessly beyond his depth in the tricky business of writing a treaty. A first-year law student could have done an infinitely better job. But it was not the work of a traitor. Grant had avoided a similar error only because on March 4 he had received the following telegram from Stanton:

"The President [it was Lincoln, note, at that time] directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference

with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's army or on solely minor and *purely military* matters.

"He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any *political* question: such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.

"Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages."

The italics, of course, are ours.

That was Sherman's mistake. He tried to make political as well as military terms. The surrender of an army is a military matter. A treaty of peace with a belligerent country is a political matter, a task for statesmen of the highest order, not for soldiers in the field.

Sherman was sorely offended by Stanton's and President Johnson's repudiation of his terms. More than that, Stanton by public proclamation implied that Sherman was bought by the millions supposed to be secreted by Jefferson Davis, and he sent Grant to relieve him of his command. Grant wisely and generously remained in the background and let Sherman write the final terms.

While it is unthinkable that Sherman in his first tentative offer acted other than honestly, it is clear that he tried to write into the surrender terms the will and intentions of Lincoln as he understood them. The news of the assassination had been a tremendous shock to him—so great that the other officers thought him suffering from some sudden illness. It would seem as if he tried to thwart any deviation from Lincoln's carefully thought-out plans, so fully revealed in the recent meetings on the *River Queen*.

It is significant that no peace terms were ever offered to the South, and, after the surrender of the armies, there was no authority left to sign a peace treaty. The war was never recognized by the Union as a conflict between sovereign powers. It was merely an unsuccessful rebellion. The thinking on the subject was a bit muddled and hazy, for under the Federal Constitution the States were sovereign powers and the Federal Government one which held limited, delegated rights. Our concepts have changed greatly since 1865, by amendments, by judicial decisions, and by the general acceptance by the people of a strong central government.

When the rebels were defeated, they were treated generously as individuals; but the States slipped right back into their places as defined by the Constitution, then undergoing the amendments the war had made necessary.

These amendments, three in number, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth, were the real peace treaty with the South. They were not offered to the South and accepted as terms of truce. Resistance was over. The rebels were amenable to the law. And this was the law.

However familiar these amendments may be to you, it is well to read them over in the light of their interpretation as peace terms.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XIV

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to Vote at any election for the choice of Electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or ju-

dicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.

5. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE XV

1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

In the light of the future developments and the viciousness of Stanton's attack on Sherman, it would appear that Stanton had thought through the entire situation and intended the subsequent treatment of the conquered States.

The so-called "reconstruction" of the South has evoked wide, but by no means universal, condemnation. Southern

historians, representing the former slave-holding class, naturally portray it in its worst light. A discussion of it does not fall within the scope of this book, but it is probable that it has caused more bitterness than the war itself. Yet, however much we may deplore those unhappy times, there is, perhaps, a word which may be said in justification.

Just as at the present time the entire Allied nations are saying that Germany must be defeated in such a way that she can never start another war, so, in 1865, the North was saying that the rebellion must be put down in such a way that it could never start again. The fear that the South would gain time to recuperate and would then reorganize and reopen hostilities was very great indeed.

At this distance, the fear appears unfounded. But it was terribly real at the time. The underlying cause of the war was slavery. And the last vestiges of slavery had to be wiped out so that the institution could never again be established. It was not enough to give the Negro his freedom. He had to be given power as well. The war aims of the North had to be established in such a way that they could not be contraverted by politics, by social discrimination, by chicanery and fraud, or by intimidation. The work was ruthlessly done, and in many cases by servants ill-equipped for their tasks. It worked hardship, injustice, humiliation, and many other iniquities. But it did wipe out slavery. It did assure the removal of that potential cause of future internal wars. It did prevent the Civil War from breaking out all over again.

Would that we had imposed carpetbagger rule on Germany in 1918!

Examine the surrender terms in the light of what followed. Note that there was nothing to prevent the United

States from policing and occupying the rebel States. Note that the surrender terms disarmed the South, paroled the soldiers, and pardoned them only on condition that they obey the laws. Generous though the terms were to the individual, and acceptable though they appeared to Lee and Johnston, they spelled unconditional surrender to the political units of the South.

S I X

"There was still France!"

JULY 19, 1870, saw the beginning of the Blitzkrieg known to history as the Franco-Prussian War. It was all over by January, 1871—all over but the shouting and the taxes and the bitterness that was to flare up in another war in 1914. To get at any underlying cause of this dramatic war is rather difficult. In 1866 there had been a very swift-moving war known as the Seven Weeks War between Prussia on one side, and Austria, Hanover, Bavaria, Saxony and other German states on the other. France had had no part in it and felt cheated of glory. France was then greatly concerned with Maximilian in Mexico and rather apprehensive of a war with the United States which then had, in its Civil War veterans, the hardest-hitting army in the world. France had to hold herself ready for a Mexican war and so missed in 1866 that opportunity for more Napoleonic glory. Napoleon III

wanted to demonstrate that he was as great a soldier as the first of his name. Probably Napoleon had to put on an act. His seat on the throne was none too secure. A nice, easy war against a "pushover" like Prussia would bring glory, honor, greatness, and a better grip on his none-too-loyal people. But Prussia wasn't a pushover. She had the most powerful military machine in Europe.

The alleged cause of the Franco-Prussian War was a minor slight to Beneditti, the French ambassador, by William I, the Prussian king. There had been a previous disagreement when Prussia sponsored Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern as its candidate for the throne of Spain. France had objected, and Germany had agreed to withdraw its sponsorship, so that *casus belli* had been removed. In that controversy Bismarck, the German chancellor, had seemed to demonstrate that he was complacent and obviously afraid of the great and blustering Napoleon. It is doubtful if Napoleon ever realized that Bismarck quietly engineered the whole thing, carefully arranged the insult to Beneditti, and maneuvered Napoleon into a declaration of war which Prussia ardently desired and for which she was so completely prepared. "I shall sign the peace treaty at Königsberg. It is in that city that the kings of Prussia are crowned." Thus declared Napoleon III on July 20, 1870, before any action had taken place.

The military students of the war attach great importance to the speed of mobilization. Bismarck had figured to the minute the length of time it would require France to mobilize. He calculated just when and where their forces would be assembled. He planned his own mobilization to move faster than the French. And he won in the race. This upset the

French plans, and after that the Germans had the initiative. The French never recaptured it. It will be noted that the Germans had the same advantage in 1914, and again, against Poland, in 1939. The Japanese similarly gained the initiative against the Russians by their sneak attack at Port Arthur and maintained it throughout the Russo-Japanese War. After Pearl Harbor in the present war, they maintained the impetus of their first attack throughout their long string of victories in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, the Southwest Pacific, and Singapore. The early gaining of the initiative is a factor which may lead straight to victory, as it did in the war we are now considering, and even when that initiative is lost, it means a long, uphill fight for the belligerents who are placed on the defensive in the early stages of the war.

The Franco-Prussian War began on German soil at Saarbrücken. It was only a skirmish against a single Prussian battalion, but the battalion retired, and the engagement was marked down as a great French victory. It was declared that the Prince Imperial, the heir apparent, had had his baptism of fire, and great rejoicing and *Te Deums* rang out across France. That was just two days before the first really serious engagement in which a very large force of Prussians surprised and defeated an entire French division at Weissenberg. Two days later MacMahon, alleged to be the most brilliant of the French generals, was badly beaten at Worth in Alsace, and on the same day a whole French army corps under Frossard was beaten at Forbach in Lorraine.

These defeats were translated by the then equivalent of a French propaganda ministry into a great victory, and it was even reported that the Prussian Crown Prince had been captured. It is the same sort of thing that so constantly

muddies the water of the present war and makes it difficult for the historian to get at anything resembling the facts.

Yet it is doubtful if this false propaganda was intended as a war measure. Any such news would violently affect the stock market, and it is believed that the false rumor was manufactured for the manipulation of the prices of securities on the Paris Bourse. When the news of the defeats finally came through, the shock was terrible. The propagandists, however, were now clearly trying to prevent damage to morale; for, although they admitted that the enemy was across the border and the war thenceforth would be waged in France, they claimed it gave France marked military advantages and that all could be recovered. The news, however, resulted in the resignation of Ollivier, the Prime Minister. Count Palikao replaced him. Now, all of this took place in the space of six days, from August 4 to August 10, 1870. Four days later the Germans had driven the French forces back to Metz, and in another four days, on August 18, they had won the important battle of Gravelotte and invested Metz.

Throughout modern times France has relied on fortresses. Metz, Verdun, the Maginot Line: these are just a few that are well known to everyone. But no fortress is impregnable, and the retirement of an army to an alleged impregnable fortress is usually the beginning of the end. Bazaine, who commanded at Metz, had close to 200,000 men. He could have met the Germans in the field, but when he crawled into his fortress, he had to call for relief.

MacMahon now began to fall back on Paris, fighting rear-guard actions and delaying the German advance as far as possible. It was an intelligent thing to do. But MacMahon

was not a free agent. The Prime Minister, Palikao, and the Empress Eugenie were fighting MacMahon's war from Paris. They ordered him to join Bazaine, because, if he did not, they feared there would be a revolution. There have been very few wars won by women. Boadicea and Joan of Arc at least were in the front lines and were well aware of the whole military situation. When Eugenie ordered MacMahon to do the impossible, she signed the death warrant of her empire. If MacMahon had joined Bazaine in Metz, the only result would have been that Bazaine's supplies would have been eaten up a little faster and the road to Paris would be wide open.

MacMahon tried to obey orders. With him went the dejected Emperor, no longer talking of signing the peace at Königsberg. The Germans met MacMahon at Sedan near the Belgian border and after a tremendous battle forced him to surrender on September 2. He surrendered, according to the Germans, 82,000 unwounded men and "one Emperor."

There was nothing now to stop the Prussians from marching on Paris. MacMahon had been removed from their path. The frontier fortresses, including Metz and Strasbourg, they calmly invested and left behind them; they were following the instructions which the great von Clausewitz had laid down nearly forty years before. German military men all studied von Clausewitz, one of the really great students of war. If the French had read his notable book, they showed no evidence of it in the strategy they pursued. By September 19 the Prussians had taken Versailles and commenced the investment of Paris.

But there was no longer a French Empire. Napoleon was a prisoner. The Prussians were no longer fighting against

him. The Second Empire was a thing of the past. In its place was a new provisional government called the Government of the National Defense, and Trochu, the Military Governor of Paris, placed himself at its head. He appointed Jules Favre as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Leon Gambetta as Minister of the Interior. It is said that the "author" of the new government was Thiers, who had twice been Premier, but he did not become a member of the new governing body until later. But the new government was all bottled up in Paris and the Germans were driving in the cork. Favre approached Bismarck and offered peace terms together with the payment of a heavy indemnity. Bismarck was willing to talk peace but insisted on annexing Alsace and the northern part of Lorraine. Favre answered: "Not one inch of our lands; not one stone of our fortresses!" and so the war went on. Somehow Thiers got out of Paris and made a round of all the other countries, trying to sell the idea of an alliance, but without success. So Paris settled down for a siege. They had brought up heavy naval guns from Cherbourg and Brest, but it was necessary to get help from the outside. Meantime, Strasbourg, besieged and bombarded from August 13, surrendered on September 27. A fortress must be designed to stand a siege, and the most vital necessity in a siege is a supply of food, water, and ammunition. Strasbourg had had very little food laid by. The city was starved into surrender.

During all this time revolt and terrorism played an important part. As early as the middle of August both the army and the civilians showed marked antagonism to Napoleon. Great care had to be exercised in issuing rifles. The revolutionists appeared dangerously anxious to get hold of them.

The National Guard was said to "have an unhealthy odor of revolution and absinthe."

In September, there was an insurrection in Algiers. In Paris, they feared the terrorists almost as much as the Germans. In October, the terrorists in Lyons were reported to have prevented the movement of 40,000 troops, but this is incredible. In January, in Paris, they attacked the Hôtel de Ville. It is certain that revolution prevented France from presenting the united front necessary to fight any war. It is certain, too, that the government at all times feared revolution at home as greatly as it feared the Germans.

On October 9, Gambetta made a dramatic escape from Paris. It would be nothing today, but it was pretty exciting in 1870. He escaped by balloon and came down in Tours. He pronounced himself as "delegate" of the government and commenced the reorganization of an army. No man could have accomplished more than he did. In four months he had organized, equipped, and sent into action an inspired and enthusiastic army of 600,000 men. This is important. It meant that France could fight on. It meant that although Paris might be taken, France could still survive.

Now let us go back to Bazaine in his snug fortress at Metz. Since the empire had fallen, he became possessed with the idea that there was nothing left to fight for, so he began to negotiate with Bismarck for some sort of truce or armistice so that he could lead back his troops to Paris and get a new government established. The world has never seen a more astute negotiator than Bismarck, and of course he knew what Bazaine seems to have forgotten: that days spent in talk can consume as much food as days spent in fighting. Incidentally, Bismarck made a distinction which Woodrow

Wilson echoed in World War I. He declared that Prussia was fighting not France, but the Empire. Bismarck simply toyed with Bazaine, but Bazaine's troops continued to eat and Bazaine's supplies continued to become exhausted. Then, when hunger did what German siege guns had failed to do, Bismarck broke off negotiations and demanded that Bazaine surrender. Bazaine did. On October 27, 1870, he surrendered 179,000 men, 1,570 cannon, and 260,000 rifles. The only army left in France was the Paris garrison and the enthusiastic but still inchoate and disorganized force gathered under the banner of Gambetta.

But this was not all. Had Bazaine held out, he would have kept 200,000 German troops away from Paris. The minute Metz surrendered, this large army marched on Paris and brought about the end.

Everyone knows the terrible story of the siege of Paris, when the daily bread ration was reduced to 300 grams and horse meat sold at our equivalent of \$2.40 a pound. Rats brought two francs apiece. The lions, elephants, and giraffes in the menagerie were slaughtered and served in the best restaurants. Then the shells began to fall from long-range German guns. They did but little damage, killing and wounding only about 400 people. But when the food ran out, the provisional government surrendered Paris—and also France. The Germans demanded Alsace-Lorraine, the strong fortress of Bellefort, and six billion francs as indemnity. They settled without the fortress and with five billion francs instead of six, but the Germans goose-stepped under the Arc de Triomphe and a German army was quartered in France until the entire indemnity was paid.

This was the end of the "Second Empire." Napoleon III

had made himself emperor by a *coup d'état* in 1851. He had had a stormy career. He had tried in 1836 to incite the garrison of Strasbourg to revolt. Arrested and exiled, he had been brought back and elected President in 1848. It was a time of barricades in the Paris streets, of tremendous rioting, wholesale banishments. Unhappy France had known little but insurrection, assassination, carbonarism, abdications, and terrorism since the days of the first Revolution. Napoleon III had brought some measure of prosperity and considerable grandeur and display. But now his day was over, and France did not care.

In 1873, Bazaine was tried by court martial for surrendering when he did. As a defense, he maintained that after the capture of the Emperor and the flight of the Empress there was nothing left to fight for. "All was lost."

"THERE WAS STILL FRANCE!" answered the president of the court. The same indictment could be found against the provisional government itself for surrendering all of France when they might have surrendered just Paris. It is true that Paris could no longer hold out, but Gambetta had 600,000 men, and that was a large army in 1870. The news of the surrender reached the French general Chanzy as he was about to lead a superior force against the Prussians at Le Mans. They had beaten him there, but, now reinforced, his chances of victory seemed bright. Strange that he uttered the same anguished cry, "There was still France!" Yet the French have always had the strange notion that Paris is France, and the capture of their capital invariably brings about the end of the war. The capture of Paris ended the war in 1871. It also ended the war in 1940. It might have ended the war in 1914 and again in 1918. One of von Kluck's

outposts is said to have been lost and captured in a Parisian suburb at the time of the first battle of the Marne, and the Paris taxicabs moved up the troops that, aided and abetted by "General Mud," turned back the German advance that nearly repeated in 1914 what the Germans had accomplished in 1871.

Von Clausewitz employs a term for the essential cracking point of resistance. He calls it the "center of gravity." It is not an accurate term, but the concept is exceptionally difficult to express. He says: "In states torn by internal dissension, this center generally lies in the capital . . . against these points the blow must be directed."

It is obvious that the fall of the capital need not mark the fall of the nation. The loss of Washington would be a serious blow to the American people, but in any invasion in which Washington were taken, it would mean for us only a more serious devotion to the fight. As a matter of fact, Washington was taken in the War of 1812, the White House was burned, but it was the merest incident in the struggle. In the present war a dangerous emphasis has been placed on the capture of Berlin and Tokyo. The war can be won without capturing the capitals, and the capture of the capitals need not necessarily end the war.

But you cannot tell that to a Frenchman. When Paris falls it is the end of the world for him. It is a bad thing for any nation engaged in warfare to be vitally vulnerable in any particular point. The center of gravity, to use von Clausewitz's term, should be in the fighting forces themselves. As long as a nation has the power to resist, it can snatch victory from defeat, but when the loss of a capital is synonymous with defeat, the enemy enjoys a simple, clearly defined,

physical objective, the winning of which will win the war. There was no fight left in the French people after Paris fell.

Paris would probably have fallen eventually even if Bazaine by his surrender of Metz had not released an army of 200,000 Germans to complete the investment of the capital, but the fall of Metz was an immediate contributory cause. That brings up the other great French weakness, the reliance upon fortifications. Verdun held out at a cost of 600,000 Frenchmen through the four long years of World War I, but the flanks of Verdun were supported by a line of entrenchments extending from the Swiss border to the Channel coast, and Verdun was a fortress besieged as an element in a huge siege that ran clear across France and Belgium. The isolated fortress does not enjoy that character. It may be left behind and by-passed while the mobile armies march on to fresh victories in its rear. In these days of rapid and flexible communications, a fortress becomes increasingly easy to by-pass. One of the weaknesses of the fortress is that it provides its defenders with such a wonderful but inglorious opportunity to crawl into a hole and pull the hole in after them. When the Maginot Line was by-passed, its defenders did not come out of their dugouts and attack the German rear. Fortress garrisons make few sorties and no large-scale offensive operations. There is no freedom of action from a fortress. But the mistake of retiring to them has been repeated time and again throughout history. It still goes on. Witness Corregidor. Witness Singapore. But the fall of Metz was merely contributory to the fall of Paris, and the fall of Paris was the end of French resistance. The Parisians forgot, as did Bazaine, that "THERE WAS STILL FRANCE."

S E V E N

“The Last Gentlemen’s War”

WHEN VICE-ADMIRAL T. T. CRAVEN, U.S.N., was on a mission to Russia a few years ago, he met a Spanish Admiral. They discovered that in their youth they had fought against each other in Cuban waters. The Spaniard sighed deeply and said, “You and I were in the last gentlemen’s war.”

By comparison with the present terrible world conflict and the one from which it grew, the Spanish-American War of 1898 seems more like a sporting event. There was gallantry, great bravery, greater generosity, and a kindliness of spirit that seemed to lift it above the squalor, bitterness, deceitfulness, and rancor of war as we know it in our day. It was, in truth, the last gentlemen’s war. The entire campaign was so swift, so simple, and so limited that we can spare a few pages to tell the whole story.

War was stirred up by Jingoism, principally by William Randolph Hearst through his newspapers and particularly through the *New York Journal*. Cuba had been engaged in a long war for liberation, and its thus far unsuccessful revolt had been put down ruthlessly and cruelly by the Spanish Governor-General. That aroused American sympathies. On February 15, 1898, the *U.S.S. Maine*, a second class battleship, was blown up and sunk in Havana Harbor with

a loss of 266 lives. Just who blew up the *Maine* has never been determined. When she was raised many years later, towed to sea, and ceremoniously sunk, it was proved without question that she was blown up from an outside source, probably a mine. Her berth had been shifted the day before by Spanish authorities, and it has always been assumed that she was deliberately moved over the mine so that she could be blown up and sunk.

Another theory is that Cuban revolutionists blew up the *Maine* in order to put the blame on the Spanish authorities and thus bring about American intervention on behalf of the revolution. This theory at least is plausible. It is impossible to see why Spain should wish to blow up our battleship. She had nothing to gain from being embroiled in a war with the United States, and everything to lose. Although putting down the rebellion in Cuba was costly, it had thus far been successful; and Spain, decadent, weak, and distant by the breadth of the Atlantic Ocean, could not afford to be embroiled with a young, wealthy, vigorous republic that had at its disposal what at that time was considered a very good navy.

It is interesting to note that Spain declared war on the United States on April 24, after a very minor engagement between two ships. The United States answered on the twenty-fifth by declaring that a state of war had existed with Spain since the twenty-first. It was obvious from the beginning that this would be a naval war, and since it was fought for the liberation of Cuba, it was clear that Cuba and Cuban waters would be the theater of action.

From purely private sources we have learned that General Nelson A. Miles was so convinced that action would take

place at Havana that he refused to accept privately owned maps of the territory around Santiago. Admiral Cervera was dispatched from Spain with what seemed on paper like a very formidable fleet, and the entire Atlantic coast of the United States was in a turmoil for fear this fleet would appear and bombard the cities and seaside resorts. Even at Larchmont, nearly one hundred miles from the ocean at the New York end of Long Island Sound, the inhabitants mounted Civil War cannon at Umbrella Point to render some resistance to this mighty Spanish fleet.

The regular army and a respectable army of volunteers were hastily trained and rushed to Tampa and Key West to form an expeditionary force. And the great white fleet donned gray warpaint and cruised in squadrons off the Cuban coast, watching for Cervera's fleet, which was known to be at sea. They expected him at Cienfuegos or Guantnamo, but he holed up at Santiago.

The American fleet under Rear-Admiral Sampson took up a blockade off the mouth of the harbor, just beyond the range of the forts, and the expeditionary force landed at Daiquiri and commenced an overland battle toward Santiago, taking in its stride the strongly fortified and prepared Spanish positions at San Juan Hill and El Caney.

The collier *Merrimac*, commanded by Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson, was taken into the mouth of Santiago Harbor under tremendous gunfire and intentionally sunk across the channel to bottle up the Spanish fleet. Hobson was taken prisoner and treated with extreme courtesy and kindness by the fine old Spanish admiral who tremendously admired his bravery.

On July 3, when Sampson had left the blockading fleet

for a conference with General Wheeler, Cervera squeezed past the sunken *Merrimac* and put to sea. With Commodore Schley in temporary command of the fleet, the American vessels closed in and destroyed the Spanish fleet in twenty minutes with great loss of Spanish life. In the American fleet, one man on the cruiser *Brooklyn* was killed and ten were wounded. It was the only death in the American fleet. No American ship sustained any serious injury. This was the second great naval victory of the war. In a few weeks the land forces took Santiago.

The first great victory had occurred in May when Commodore George Dewey with a fleet of rather inferior cruisers and gunboats, sailed from Hongkong, ran past the batteries at Corregidor and through a mine field that proved not so dangerous as it was supposed to be, and utterly destroyed the Spanish Pacific Squadron in Manila Bay. Dewey's great feat—and there is no gainsaying that it was a courageously and well-fought battle—gained him undying fame partly because of the fact that he withdrew in the middle of the action to “retire for breakfast.” Such calmness and complete command of the situation astounded the world. What happened was that Dewey, unaccustomed to such tremendous gunfire, was suddenly worried about his ammunition supply. He asked how many rounds were left. The officer who answered him thought he had asked how many rounds had been expended and he answered, “Fifteen.” Dewey, realizing that he would run out of ammunition in a few minutes, withdrew ostensibly for breakfast but actually to plan the best possible expenditure of what he thought were his very meager supplies. When he found he had plenty of ammunition, he returned promptly to the action and sank the bal-

ance of the fleet. Dewey's only casualties were seven slightly wounded out of 1,740 men in action. The Spanish, on the other hand, lost 167 killed and 214 wounded out of a total complement of 1,875.

Dewey captured Cavite and could have taken Manila, but he was wise enough not to try it because he did not have a sufficient force to hold it. On the twenty-fifth of July, Major General Wesley Merritt arrived and, with some troops previously shipped, had a force of 11,000 men. Dewey and Merritt bombarded the city, which had 13,000 troops in the fortifications, and it surrendered after a bombardment lasting an hour and a half.

Immediately after the surrender of Santiago, an expeditionary force left Guantanamo under Major General Nelson A. Miles to capture Porto Rico. Landings were made on four points on the island, and four columns moved upon San Juan, the capital. These columns were overcoming Spanish resistance when news was given them by the Spanish under a flag of truce that hostilities had been suspended. The end of the war had come.

Spain sued for peace through the mediation of the French Ambassador in Washington, M. Cambon. When that diplomat inquired at the White House if we would entertain a proposal of peace, he was told that we were resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages we had gained, but he advised Spain to accept our terms. Spain agreed to the terms in a protocol signed on August 12, 1898, and late in the autumn, American and Spanish commissioners met at Paris and signed a peace treaty.

The sole war aim of the United States was to procure the liberation of Cuba. We did not want Cuba for ourselves

and we kept control of it just long enough to make sure that Cuba could govern herself. As soon as Spain agreed to Cuban independence, our war aims were fulfilled. Now, why was Spain willing to liberate Cuba? It was because of the loss of her sea power. Her Asiatic fleet had been wiped out by Dewey. Her Atlantic fleet under Cervera had been wiped out by Sampson and Schley. A small reserve fleet had been put together in Spain toward the end of May and was to be sent to attack the eastern coast of the United States and thence to proceed to Cuba. After Dewey's victory, the Spaniards changed their minds and ordered the fleet to the Philippines. This fleet left Cadiz on the sixteenth of June, and when they heard of the fate of Cervera they turned back on the eighth of July. Without naval power except for this small reserve squadron, and with the United States in complete command of the sea, Spain was utterly unable to send any further forces to Cuba and her original forces there had surrendered. The independence of the island had been completely won beyond Spain's power of recovery.

In many wars the command of the sea is decisive, and in no war has this been more clearly demonstrated than in our war with Spain. But although the war aims were fully satisfied by the independence of Cuba, we had incidentally captured most of Porto Rico and driven Spanish power from the Philippines. Porto Rico appeared to be useful to us and, although it has proved to be anything but an asset in the long years since 1898, it is extremely useful to us now for its strategic value as an outpost base protecting the Panama Canal. So the taking of Porto Rico became an additional war aim and was our net gain from the war.

The Philippines, however, presented a problem. Presi-

dent McKinley gave long and prayerful consideration to what should be done with them. Practically, there was no need for our action against the Philippines. We could have freed Cuba without destroying the Spanish Asiatic fleet and without capturing Manila. But after we got these islands half-way around the world, we did not know what to do with them. We were like the man who had caught a bear and called for help to let go of him.

The Germans and the Japanese both wanted the Philippines. In July the Kaiser instructed his ambassador in Washington as follows: "His Majesty, the Emperor, regards it as a principal object of German policy to leave unused no opportunity which may arise from the Spanish-American War to obtain maritime fulcra in East Asia." Also, the American ambassador in Berlin was given a statement of what Germany expected from the war and what would be satisfactory to the Kaiser. The colossal impudence of the Germans and also their openly avowed sympathy for Spain almost embroiled us in war at that time. A German fleet anchored in Manila Bay and kept close watch on Dewey. At any moment hostilities might be expected to break out there.

In the following year at Samoa we again were very nearly involved in war with Germany, and a little-known accident occurred which almost set alight the flame of hostilities. A defective shell from an American cruiser burst in mid-air. One fragment struck a German warship and another fragment went through the German Consulate on shore.

While the peace terms were being drawn up, Germany asked for and expected the Philippines, but McKinley had no intention of turning them over to her. The Japanese also

asked for them, but met with the same refusal. Spanish treatment of the Filipinos had been notoriously bad, and the natives had been in insurrection against Spain and had helped the Americans in the capture of Manila; but they were clearly not able to govern themselves.

So McKinley had the bear and couldn't let go of it. He would not turn the Philippines over to Germany or Japan. To return them to Spain would be inhuman. To give them their independence was impracticable. The only thing we could do was to hang on to them for ourselves. We did not want them, but it was the only way out of the dilemma. The United States could have compelled Spain to sign any treaty, but since the possession of the Philippines was not one of our war aims, we did not take it by right of conquest but paid Spain a gratuity of \$20,000,000, in consideration of which she ceded the islands to us. Incidentally, Guam was captured by the expeditionary force that took Manila. We held on to Guam.

In view of the present war against Japan it is interesting to note this beginning of the American imperial system. With the change in sea power from sail to steam, it became very necessary for any nation with a navy to have coaling stations. The strategical range of a battleship in those days was amazingly short. The range of the sailing ship days was unlimited. A sailing ship would find no difficulty in carrying stores for a two-year voyage and could operate without difficulty far from any base. Some of our possessions in the Pacific were acquired long before 1898. At the start of the present war we had many islands in the Pacific—Hawaii, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Guam, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Swains, and American Samoa—not to mention the

long arm of the Aleutians stretching across the Arctic toward the Kuriles of Japan.

The acquisition of the Philippines stirred up great opposition in this country. It was rather difficult to conceive of a republic holding a subservient colony and governing its population against its will. The treaty eventually was carried in the Senate by just one vote. The Philippines were on the verge of acquiring their independence when they were attacked by Japan in 1941. At the time of writing they are still in Japanese hands. It is hard to see that the United States has had anything but grief and expense from the possession and administration of this colony so far away and so completely useless to us. Certainly its possession and the trend toward imperialism which it denoted were in direct conflict with the growing imperialism of Japan. Japan wanted those islands badly enough to want a war with us.

McKinley's solution of his dilemma seemed to be the only possible solution, but it must be mentioned in passing that England was very anxious for us to retain possession of the Philippines, and we owed a debt of gratitude to England. Certainly England's staunch support of the United States throughout the war was instrumental in keeping Germany from siding with Spain. Germany was not yet powerful on the sea, but she was a foe much more impressive than Spain; and if she had joined with Spain, our little war of limited aims, completed at trifling cost in a few short months of dashing warfare, might have turned into a very serious war indeed. England was anxious to have the Philippines in strong and friendly hands and most anxious that they should not fall into German grasp or be left so unprotected that Germany might seize them. It is rather interesting to

note in passing that even prior to this early day, Mahan made one of his amazing predictions. He stated in a lecture to the Naval War College, subsequently printed in one of his books, that prior to 1950 the possession of the northern coast of Africa would be vital to the welfare of Germany.

It is also interesting to note how clearly the war aims dictated the theater of operations. We wanted a free Cuba; therefore the war was fought in Cuba and in Cuban waters. As a mere incident to the principal action, the Philippine campaign was fought far out in the Orient. But at no time did we even think of attacking Spain itself, and, although our civilian population seemed to fear an attack on our own Atlantic coast, apparently there was very little thought on the part of the Spaniards of fighting us anywhere except in Cuba. Certainly if we had attacked the Spanish homeland we might have brought Germany into the war, but this was not necessary to the liberation of Cuba, and after that end had been achieved we had no further interest in fighting. We did not wish to punish Spain. We certainly did not wish to conquer Spain and hold a possession in Europe; and although the historians and analysts stress our fear of involving Germany in the war, the thought of attacking Spain herself does not seem to have occurred to anyone. This war was what von Clausewitz would term a war of limited aim. It was what we have called elsewhere a campaign war. As we look back upon it, it certainly would have been better for us if Dewey had not won his victory at Manila Bay and if we had made the campaign war so limited that we had never fought outside of Cuban waters.

One of the incidents of dramatic interest that was to have far-reaching consequences was the passage of the first class

battleship *Oregon*. The *Oregon* was on the Pacific Coast at the time of the declaration of war and she had to make a passage of nearly 16,000 miles to reach Key West and join the Atlantic squadron. No incident could have brought out more vividly the weakness of our strategic position with two coasts to defend, separated from each other by the long passage around South America and through the Straits of Magellan or around Cape Horn. This passage of the *Oregon* led directly to the building of the Panama Canal. It is to be hoped that our present vulnerability at Panama will lead to the building of a Nicaraguan Canal on which we have held treaty rights for many years. It should be our first project after the declaration of peace.

E I G H T

"Save what is still left to us!"

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1900, General Piet Cronje, principal military leader of the Boers, surrendered his army to the British after the battle of Paardeberg. Ladysmith had been relieved the day before. The British captured Pretoria, the capital of the South African Republic, and Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State. Mafeking was relieved. This was the turning point of the war. Up to that time it looked as if the determined little group of Boer burghers could defeat the might of Great Britain and force rec-

ognition of their complete independence. Influenced by the then prevailing military idea that the fall of the capital is equivalent to the fall of the country, Lord Roberts, who commanded the British troops, believed the war was over. It wasn't. It had reached the guerrilla stage which is sometimes more wearing, more costly, and more disheartening than the open warfare between armies in the field. The American Revolution reached this stage after Yorktown, but the apparent imminence of peace prevented it from going too far. In the American Civil War, Sherman feared that Johnston's troops would form into guerrilla bands. That is exactly what happened in South Africa. The Boer guerrillas moved swiftly, attacked suddenly, and then disappeared, and although they were small in number they kept an army of one-quarter of a million men chasing but rarely catching them.

At this stage, Lord Kitchener decided upon his well-known blockhouse policy; a series of small forts or blockhouses was built in radiating lines, like the spokes of a wheel, all over Boer territory. Each blockhouse had its garrison and was strong enough to resist all the guerrillas of the district. The blockhouses were placed sometimes a few hundred yards apart, sometimes as much as a mile apart. They were mutually supporting and were connected with strong barbed-wire fences.

Some of the Boers, notably General Christian R. de Wet, laughed at the blockhouses, but they effectively prevented the Boers from crossing from one district into another in the daytime and made it difficult and costly at night. Each guerrilla band was therefore confined to a narrowly limited territory in which the British forces tried to hunt them down. In

the engagements the British were frequently successful, but they were vastly more successful in reducing certain districts to starvation. While some of these districts were able to hold out and continue warfare for as much as another year, others could no longer carry on the fight.

There were a number of peace offers and attempts to get together, but because these were not successful we need not particularly concern ourselves with them. At length, on the thirteenth of May, 1902, the national representatives of the remaining Boer forces in the field gathered in a meeting at Vereeniging in the South African Republic, and for several days discussed whether or not they should make peace and just exactly what peace terms would be acceptable. The entire minutes of this meeting are included in an appendix to General de Wet's personal history of the war entitled *Three Years' War*.*

In a work of this character in which we are trying to uncover the human impulses that lead to the making of peace, this document is of inestimable value. Inasmuch as the vanquished always make the peace and nearly always express something other than their true feelings, the impulse to peace is unusually difficult to determine. Kings, presidents, and generals of a defeated nation are normally apologists for their defeat. They place the blame on someone else; they magnify unimportant things; they declare that they were misled as to fundamental facts.

The men who gathered at Vereeniging each knew what was happening in his own district. When they addressed that meeting, they were not talking to the world at large, nor

* Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, who have generously granted permission to quote from the actual minutes of the meeting.

to their enemies. They were trying to induce their brothers-in-arms to see things the way they saw them, and they expressed their honest and well-informed opinions. For three days, in morning, afternoon, and evening sessions. they debated the proposition and at length arrived at a conclusion. It would be interesting if we could republish the whole of this impressive document, but if we eliminate the reports by districts, the voluminous expressions of piety, the bombastic patriotism, and the elaborate courtesy with which they disagreed with their fellow-fighters, we can boil down the sense and the meaning to a few, short, pregnant speeches.

District after district reported. Some were able to hold out and others were not. The length of time was variously estimated at from two months to one year. No district thought it could hold out forever. The reports centered largely on four general aspects of resistance: horses, grain, women and children, and Kaffirs. The most serious shortage was horses. In the terrain of the various theaters of action the horse was an absolute necessity. Also, the type of warfare to which the guerrillas were limited was essentially of the hit-and-run variety which meant speed in attack, greater speed in retreat, and the ability to move far and fast out of reach of superior forces. As the shortage of horses developed, they tried to form infantry companies or voetganggers. This was lamentably unsuccessful. No Boer would trust himself on foot. He feared capture, and rightly, and in a country in which all men were born and bred in the saddle, asking men to walk was about as impossible as asking a desert rat to swim for from ten to twelve hours a day. The horses broke down because of shortage of grain, because of the terrible overwork of warfare, because the rains did not come and

there was but little forage for the animals, and because the British captured vast numbers of them. This attrition of the Boer horses was the fundamental cause of the defeat, just as we hope that our bombing of German airplane factories will be a fundamental cause of German defeat in the present war. It is recognized that command of the air today is necessary for victory. Command of the horse was equally necessary in South Africa.

It is interesting to note in the district reports that almost no district had both grain and cattle. Those that had cattle had no grain; those that had grain had no cattle. These two staple food elements rarely existed together, but it is doubtful if any of the normally overfed Boers ever had to face the true starvation conditions that Europe has known in two wars. The Boers were mighty eaters and there was no true starvation before the surrender. It was imminent because the supplies would be exhausted and could not be replaced, but it was not a matter of immediate necessity.

Some districts were absolutely denuded of women and children. There the men were free to fight. In other districts, however, the men were seriously handicapped by the presence of women and children who were frequently driven off from their farms by the British, and more frequently left to the mercy of the Kaffirs. The consideration of the women and children strongly motivated the peace.

The attitude of the Kaffirs was the fourth major consideration. In many districts they formed a positive menace to the non-combatants still left in the territory. In other districts the Kaffirs were friendly and would freely give or sell their food to the Boers. In still other districts the Boer commandos swept down upon the Kaffirs and appropriated (stole is a

better word) their food without compensation. The British used the Kaffirs by organizing them into raiding parties and also by buying all their surplus food, so that there was none left to sell to the Boers.

The first sessions of the meeting at Vereeniging were devoted to these reports on horses, food, women and children, and Kaffirs. Some of the reports were cheerful; many were desperate.

The meeting was opened with prayer and the debate was thickly interlarded with pious expressions of faith in God's intervention on behalf of the Boers. A few doubting Thomases expressed the belief that God was out to punish the Boers but nowhere did there appear the impious and unpatriotic thought that perhaps God might be helping the British. They did not seem to realize that the churchgoers in England were praying for victory as piously as were the farmers in South Africa. The question of the possibility of a specially ordained miracle was very seriously discussed. No one quoted Napoleon—"God is on the side of the strongest battalions," or was it "the heaviest artillery"? We have heard it both ways. The piety of the Boers is really impressive. This faith in a miracle definitely decided the votes of many of the representatives.

Patriotic outbursts were many and eloquent, but at one point in the proceedings one of the hard-headed Dutchmen reminded the delegates that they should discount speeches that were obviously intended to impress posterity and face the realities of the moment. The speeches we quote are clearly those which made the most impression on the meeting, for the sense of the meeting and the action taken by the peace

delegates was based upon these speeches and not on the others.

This is what Mr. De Clercq said:

"The question before us is, whether or not the war can be continued? To answer it, we must look forward into the future. We must ask ourselves what consequences will ensue from a continuance of hostilities, and what will be the result of their cessation.

"We have only fifteen thousand men against the enemy's quarter of a million. Our food and horses are scarce, and we have other difficulties besides these. It is impossible to go on with the struggle.

"Nevertheless, if I believed that to do so would give us a chance of retaining our independence, I also would be ready for further sacrifices. But as it is impossible to retain our independence, surely we shall only be storing up misery for the future if we continue fighting until every man of us is a prisoner or in his grave. I am of opinion that our most reasonable course is to save what is still left to us—our existence as a nation. It is not too late to save it now, but who can tell what the future holds in store for us? If we are to be still further reduced in number, we shall soon cease to exist as a nation. Can it be right to sacrifice a nation which has fought as the African nation has done?"

Note the considerations—impossible to win; the fact that conditions would grow worse instead of better; the fact that they could get better terms now than they could get later; clearly the time to make terms is while some measure of resistance is still possible.

This is what Vice-Commandant Breijtenbach said:

"The burghers whom I represent have told me to inform

them, when these deliberations have come to an end, whether a continuation of the war is possible, and if it be possible, how it is to be accomplished. If I cannot assure them that we are able to continue the struggle, the men of Utrecht will not fight any more. As you know, I can give them no such assurance.

“There are ten districts in the Transvaal which are unable to fight any longer. It surely is not proposed to leave these districts in the lurch! We must not only consult our sentiments, but also our reason. And what does the voice of reason say? This—that the continuation of the war is an impossibility. Should you decide now to continue the war, you would have to start a fresh campaign; and you know that that is beyond our powers.”

The strength of the Boer chain was obviously in its weakest links. The inability of ten districts to continue was enough to defeat those districts that could go on, but the most important word in Breijtenbach's speech was the little three-letter word “*how*.” A new campaign was impossible.

Vice-President Burger wound up his speech with the cry:

“It is criminal to say, ‘Come what may, we will fight till everything is lost and all of us are dead!’ ”

Commandant General Botha made a very long speech which we quote in part as follows:

“The war has now lasted two years. But the question for us to answer is this: Are we going forwards or backwards? My own conviction—a conviction founded upon the views expressed by my commandos and the speeches which I have listened to at this meeting—is that we are not gaining, but losing ground. There is nothing, in my opinion, more evi-

dent than that, during the last six months, the tide has been setting steadily against us, and in favour of the enemy.

"A year ago there were no blockhouses. We could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos.

"Then, as regards food. We are told that there is food here, and food there; but how are we to get at it? How are we to transport it from one district to another? Outside the frontiers of our Republics there are plenty of provisions, but it becomes daily more difficult to get them into our hands. The cattle, for instance, that used to be at Ladysmith have now been removed to Estcourt. Even the friendly Kaffirs, from whom we are now able to obtain provisions, may quite possibly soon turn against us. The time is coming when we shall be compelled to say, 'Hunger drives us to surrender.'

"The horses have been chased about so incessantly, and have suffered so much from want of forage, that their strength is almost exhausted. They are so weak that it is almost impossible to accomplish any long distance with them.

"As to the Cape Colony, I had always understood that the Colonists were going to rise en bloc, but General Smuts has just told us that there is no chance of such a thing happening. And he speaks from personal knowledge, having just returned from paying them a visit. Moreover, he has seen our horses, and says that it is impossible for them to go into the Colony, so it appears that our successes there are over. This is a severe check indeed; but it could not have been otherwise. We have not enough horses to enable us to give the Colonists effectual help, and they themselves have been

cowed by the heavy penalties imposed upon all those who did rise. Many of those who are well disposed towards us dare not join us now.

“Again, there is no chance of European intervention: not one of the Powers will do anything for us. . . . We were told that we had the sympathy of the nations of Europe—their sympathy, and nothing more!

“I have come to a subject that is very near our hearts—our women-folk. If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every kind of danger. . . .

“We have heard much talk about fighting ‘to the bitter end.’ But what is ‘the bitter end’? Is it to come when all of us are either banished or in our graves? Or does it mean the time when the nation has fought until it never can fight again? As to myself, personally, I can still continue the struggle. I have horses, my household is well provided for, and as far as my own inclination goes I am all for going on. But am I only to consider myself? Is it not my first duty to look at the interests of my nation? I have always been, and still am, of the opinion that, before letting the nation go to rack and ruin, it is our duty to parley. We must not let the chance for negotiations slip out of our hands. When our numbers have fallen to only four or five thousand men under arms we shall no longer have that chance, and this will undoubtedly happen if we hold out for another year, or even six months.

“There are some who say, ‘We must trust in God and keep on fighting,’ and I grant them that miracles are possible at all times. But it is beyond our power to say whether God will work a miracle for us. We do not know what His will

may be. If we continue the war, and if it should afterwards appear that everything has been in vain, our responsibility will be only the heavier, the blinder our confidence now is. And over and over again we shall hear, 'He is dead,' 'and he, and he.' Will not this make our remorse all the more bitter? Our commandos are so weak, our country so exhausted, that the loss of one great battle, the surrender of a single strong force, would spell ruin for us.

"'But we have managed to hold out for so long.' Yes, but there is a natural reason, a military reason, why this has been the case. The fact that our commandos have been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. In other words, the British army can at last concentrate its forces upon us.

"I firmly believe that, under like circumstances, no other nation in the world would have fought as our nation has done. Shall such a nation perish? No! we must save it. If we delegates are convinced that we can no longer offer resistance to the enemy, it is our plain duty to tell the people so. We must not let them be exterminated for want of timely advice. More than twenty thousand women and children have died in the camps during this one year.

"There are men of our own kith and kin who are helping to bring us to ruin. If we continue the war, it may be that the Afrikanders against us will outnumber our own men.

"What is there left to hope for? Are we to retain our independence by ceding a part of our territories? Most assuredly yes, if such a compromise is feasible. As regards Swaziland,

it is of so little importance to us that we can give it up without a thought. Then there are the goldfields—let them go. They are but a cancerous growth, sapping the very life of our country.

“We must face the fact that things are not at a standstill: we are slipping back every moment. We must all pull together, or everything is lost. If our sacrifices will buy our independence, well and good. But suppose that we are compelled to give it up—well, if it even comes to this, we must never do so unconditionally. An unconditional surrender would be well enough if the leaders only had to be considered. But we must think of the interests of the nation. We must say to our people, ‘We have no thought of ourselves: our only desire is to place ourselves in the breach, if so we may save you.’ ”

Note the thought: “we are slipping”; things getting progressively worse. That is always one of the fundamental thoughts that lead to a peace. When the situation is bad and getting worse, with no hope of making it better, peace becomes not only desirable but the part of wisdom.

Here is part of what General De la Rey said:

“There has been talk about fighting to the bitter end; but has not the bitter end already come? Each man must answer that question for himself.

“You must remember that everything has been sacrificed—cattle, goods, money, wife, and child. Our men are going about naked, and some of our women have nothing but clothes made of skins to wear. Is not this the bitter end?

“I believe that the time has now come to negotiate. England will never again give us the chance of doing so, should we allow this opportunity to slip by. But how shall we nego-

tiate? I must leave it to this meeting to answer that question. If we do not obtain what we ask for, we shall at least stand or fall together. Yet let us act with reason."

This is a little different slant. Most of the others wanted to stop before reaching "the bitter end." De la Rey believed they had come to "the bitter end." Yet clearly they had not. Resistance was still possible. The end was in sight but had not yet come. But to De la Rey it had already come.

In the final session Landdrost Bosman spoke in part as follows:

"My opinion is that the best way of ascertaining the probable future course of events is to see what has already happened in the past. A year ago there were six hundred burghers in my district, and each man had a horse; now there are not more than half that number, and many of them have to go on foot. Last year we had from three to four thousand bags of maize ready to hand; this year there are not more than as many hundred, and how to get at them is more than I can tell. If such has been the history of the past year, in what sort of condition shall we be at the end of the present one?

"The great difficulty with regard to our families is not how to clothe them, but how to feed them. . . .

"I do not see what we can possibly gain by continuing the war. Our own people are helping the English, and every day the enemy are improving their position. What advantage can there then be in persisting in the struggle? We have now a chance of negotiating, and we should seize that chance. For we have the opportunity given us of obtaining some help for our ruined compatriots, who would be entirely unable to make a fresh start without assistance. . . .

"It has been said that it would be shameful to disregard the blood already spilt; but surely one ought also to consider the blood that might yet be shed in a useless struggle."

Bosman looks both backward and forward. He sees how the last year of the war had been going definitely against the Boers and can see no hope of changing that situation.

In this one general meeting we see nearly all the motivations of peace. The end has come. The end hasn't come but it is in sight and it is better to make terms before the real end comes. If we fight on, starvation and destruction cannot be avoided. Let's stop before they get here. We can parley now; we cannot later. We have been losing and there is no chance to turn the tide. There is no hope of relief except by a miracle. No intervention by foreign countries. No hope of an uprising in Cape Colony.

Perhaps it is unfair to omit from our quotations the numerous speeches of the brave men who wanted to fight on, but there is something lacking in all of those speeches. There was not a single strategic plan, not a single mention of any scheme which might turn the tide, nothing constructive, nothing that would give the least hope that the reverses that the Boers had had in the past year would not inevitably be repeated if resistance were continued. If some one of these brave, stubborn, uninspired Boers had come forth with a single constructive idea, a means to defeat the blockhouses, a method of decoying and destroying a large British force, a brilliantly organized raid into Cape Colony; something, anything, other than the plethoric, obstinate, uninspired determination simply to continue with the policy that had failed, the sense of the meeting might possibly have been different, and a new page of glory might have been written

for the Boers. But there is nothing like that. Perhaps nothing could be done. Perhaps Napoleon might have done it. Or Washington. Or Frederick the Great. But not the Boers.

The delegates at the peace conference were kicked about rather brutally by Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener. When you read the minutes of that meeting, you cannot stir up any fondness for the proud and stuffy British representatives, but they were doing their job. The Boers were licked and they knew it, and they gave up their independence without any further struggle.

The Boer thinking was very apparently patterned on the American thinking at the time of the American Revolution, but somehow the spark was gone. This was a war of independence like our own, it was fought in a theater distant from England, and like our war was fought by untrained farmers with rifles in their hands, against trained troops of the world's mightiest power. The British turned the Kaffirs against the Boers just as they turned the Indians against us. But somehow the great spark was missing. The Americans were politically minded; their thinking was fresh. It gave rise to magnificent expression. Great documents like the Declaration of Independence flowed from their pens, great speeches rolled from their lips. And we were fortunate in that in one country, at one time, we had raised such a galaxy of great men. The Boers were dully imitative, and one gets the impression that they were not so vitally interested in freedom and independence as were we.

England was single-minded in its attitude towards the Boers but in the American Revolution our independence was a political football. France, Spain and Holland helped us to our independence because our independence was im-

portant to them. No one was interested in the Boers to the extent of helping them. Even Germany was better served by having a British Colony as a neighbor than an independent republic which might stir revolution in her own poor colony. England could fight the Boer War without distractions. England had many distractions in her struggle with us. Yet somehow the peace made in 1902 has been a lasting one. Out of it has come the Union of South Africa and it may well be that independence, which has been such a glorious blessing to us, might have been a less fortunate situation for the Boers.

N I N E

“ . . . no foot has been placed on Russian soil ”

IT WAS THE CZARINA'S BIRTHDAY. The American Ambassador, Meyer, approached the Czar at the birthday party. He had a message from President Theodore Roosevelt offering, provided the Czar was willing, to seek Japan's consent to a meeting to discuss peace. The Czar asked time to consider, but Meyer was insistent. At length the Czar declaimed: "You have come at a psychological moment. As yet no foot has been placed on Russian soil, but I realize that at almost any moment they can make an attack on Sakhalin. Therefore it is important that the meeting should take place before that occurs."

The Czar did not mention that no Russian foot had been

placed on Japanese soil. In judging the Russo-Japanese War, we must bear in mind that it was a war of the campaign type which took place at a distance from the territory of each of the warring nations. To reach an agreement of peace in a war of this character, fought in a distant theater of operations, is a very different matter from reaching a conclusion where one country is invaded and the power to resist is extinguished. Japan won the war. In retrospect it is hard to find any Russian victories even of a minor character. Japan attained all of her objectives. Japan inflicted great losses upon Russia. Yet all these victories, all these losses, were not enough to prevent Russia from carrying on. Russia's power to resist was destroyed by Russians in Russia, not by the Japanese in Port Arthur.

In order to understand the peace it is necessary to go back a bit and review briefly the events that led up to the opening of the war. In 1894, Japan had captured the important naval base of Port Arthur from the Chinese. But the following year she was compelled to retrocede the port and the entire Liao-tung Peninsula to China. Many European nations, Russia among them, forced her thus to give up the fruits of her victory.

Russia's ambitions had turned eastward. In 1875, by threat of overwhelming force, when a weakened Japan was emerging from feudalism and was confused by her necessary reorganization, Russia had compelled Japan to cede to her the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Russia had long held the northern half. In 1891, Russia commenced the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. That was acceptable to Japan as long as Russia kept her railway on Russian soil.

In May, 1896, however, Russia concluded a treaty with Li Hung-Chang, Chinese Prime Minister, which permitted Russia to link the Trans-Siberian Railway with the East China Railway, and two years later the Trans-Siberian was extended through Mukden to Port Arthur. You will note how this railway story parallels the history of the South Manchuria Railway that has figured so prominently in the Sino-Japanese troubles since 1931.

Russia had a pretty good excuse for the military occupation of Port Arthur in 1897. The Germans had occupied Kiaochow, which was dangerously near this new terminus of the railway. But Japan resented Russian occupation of the city which she had conquered and then lost. In 1898, Russia leased the whole Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, from the Chinese. It was a legitimate lease with a legitimate reason. Russia needed an ice-free port. But when she started fortifying it, Japan took it as a threat against Korea and strongly resented the methods by which Russia had deprived her of it, given it back to China, and then taken it over for herself.

Japan got nowhere with diplomatic protests and then, in 1902, she did what she subsequently repeated in 1940. She made a treaty with Russia's potential enemy, England—just as in 1940 she made a treaty with our potential enemies, Germany and Italy. England's more powerful protests made Russia agree to withdraw her forces from Manchuria by October 8, 1903. This promise was never kept.

In February, 1904, the Russian Asiatic Fleet was comfortably divided. Part of it was at Port Arthur and part at Vladivostok. Japanese ministers were politely protesting at St. Petersburg. Then, just as they were breaking off nego-

tiations and before any declaration of war, Japanese torpedo boats steamed into the outer harbor at Port Arthur at night and blew the Russian ships out of the water. It was Pearl Harbor on a small scale. But everything was on a small scale by modern standards, and Japan achieved at Port Arthur exactly what she achieved at Pearl Harbor, by exactly the same methods. The same diplomatic negotiations, the same treacherous attack without declaration of war, the same hit-and-run tactics, and the same result: gaining naval superiority at one blow before the war began. Russia should have expected it. Japan had used the same methods against China ten years before. We should have expected it at Pearl Harbor. As a matter of fact, we did—only no one on the spot quite believed it.

Japan's sneak attack was the first of many victories by land and sea. When, finally, Rozhdestvensky's fleet, which had steamed from the Baltic to the Far East, was completely wiped out in the brilliant naval victory at Tsushima, peace was in sight.

The war was fought largely on the sea and in the Liaotung Peninsula, and this, as has been pointed out, had merely been leased by China to Russia. Japan's command of the sea enabled her to move her troops safely by water, a relatively short distance, to the theater of operations. Russia had to move her troops thousands of miles over the long, inadequate, single-track line of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The problem of supplies and communications was easy for Japan; next to impossible for Russia. Russia was badly organized to fight any war, and particularly badly organized to fight a war in which the service of supply and communications were absolutely essential. Her officers were unpatriotic,

incompetent, and dishonest. They stole money and supplies and connived with contractors to accept ammunition that did not fit the guns, and food not fit for stomachs. Even the Grand Duke Cyril (Kirill Vladimirovich) diverted funds intended for naval purposes to his private use although he held the position of Grand Admiral of the Fleet.

Perhaps it is not necessary for a foe to set foot on the hallowed soil of the country it is fighting. In the present war, up to the time this is written, no foot has been set on German, English, American, or Japanese soil, if we except distant colonies, off-lying islands, territories, and dependencies. Of course bombs have fallen, numerous people have been killed, and the powers of resistance have been weakened by direct attack, but there has been no invasion. We must not, however, conclude that because there was no invasion of either Japan or Russia in the war we are now considering, it presents any real parallel to the present war. The Russo-Japanese War was a "campaign" war, which is different in character from the war we are now fighting.

Except for our war with Spain, the Russo-Japanese War was the first of the modern conflicts. On land, actions were fought by troops for the first time at really long ranges. Great battles were decided at such distances that the soldiers could not see one another or even see their smoke. At Tsushima we had the prototype of war at sea between modern battleships, and this battle was studied exhaustively by all the navies in the world until Jutland, Coronel, the Dogger Bank, and Falkland Islands gave us more modern applications of the principles demonstrated in the Far East.

At the close of the war Japan's army had not engaged the Russians for four months, but Japan had absolute command

of the sea and Russia had no fleet that could dispute it with her. Sakhalin Island lay at Japan's mercy.

At first glance, the military situation would seem to dictate the peace. But it must be remembered that the Russian army had a peacetime strength of one million men, and at the end of the war Russia's effectives still outnumbered all the men Japan could put in the field. When the peace-treaty terms were published in Japanese newspapers, they were printed within mourning bands, and the commissioners were warned not to return to Japan.

In most of the accounts of the war, we find mention of internal troubles in Russia. Investigation shows them to be of a magnitude sufficient of themselves to prevent Russia from continuing the war. Although Japan won all the victories and defeated Russia brilliantly, it was the internal strife that brought an end to the struggle.

It must be remembered that the Little Father of All The Russias was anything but a popular monarch. He was perhaps as cordially hated as any ruler in our times. It must also be pointed out that the war itself was not popular. It was recognized as a purely commercial war for the benefit of a few investors. The Trans-Siberian Railway had been built at enormous cost. It needed a terminal at Port Arthur in order to begin to make a profit, and on Russia's side the entire war was fought for the sake of the profit of the stockholders of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

At the time of the conflict, the western world little realized how deeply the seeds of revolt had been planted, nor could anyone know that those seeds would flower into the revolution of 1917. Yet we know that the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were well organized. We know that Lenin was sitting

in the background quietly planning each step; that Trotsky, an eloquent youth of twenty-eight, appeared on the scene as vice-president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies. In fact, in one of Lenin's lectures, delivered twelve years later, he declared that the revolution of 1905-1907 was the dress rehearsal of the revolution of '17.

The most dramatic chapter in that revolution was the riot on "Bloody Sunday," when the priest, Gapon, led a parade of thousands of people, gathered from all parts of the city of St. Petersburg, to the square in front of the Winter Palace. Their object was to submit a petition to the Czar. The demonstrators carried ikons and started out in an orderly manner, and Gapon had written a letter to the Czar guaranteeing his personal safety and asking him to appear before his people. But the Cossacks charged the crowd. More than a thousand were killed and two thousand wounded. There is considerable evidence that Gapon was an *agent provocateur*, engaged by the police to stir up a riot they could put down with appropriate slaughter as a warning against similar uprisings. But "Bloody Sunday" developed an importance that made it really the beginning of the revolutionary movement that culminated in 1917.

The rest of the revolution seemed to masquerade largely in the guise of strikes, but the strikes spread to the army and navy and turned into mutinies. For the ten years prior to 1905, the average number of persons involved in all the strikes in Russia was only 43,000 per year, but in January, 1905, the number jumped to 440,000. They struck in Moscow, in Riga, in Lodz, in Baku, in Odessa, in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Vilna. And these strikes were something more than the ordinary industrial struggle. They were strikes

against the Czar, and the Russian word for striker became synonymous with "revolutionist." Soldiers and sailors were not permitted to attend meetings of the workers, but there seemed to be no rule about the workers attending meetings held by the soldiers and sailors. So the two mingled, and the revolutionary spirit spread like wildfire among the armed forces. In one of the conflicts in Moscow, shortly after the war, 8,000 revolutionists resisted the government for nine days, and during that time the government kept its garrison locked up. They dared not trust the soldiers for fear they would join the revolutionists. It became necessary to send for the Demenorsky Regiment from St. Petersburg.

It is significant that in Sevastopol the fury of the strikers was directed against the naval depot, and the stores and arsenals were set ablaze. But perhaps the affair most threatening to the Czarist control of the armed forces was the mutiny on the *Prince Potemkin*. It began as an objection to a putrid meat ration, but a social democrat, Matyushenko, seized the leadership, disarmed and murdered the officers, and turned the mutiny into revolution. "Down with Autocracy," "Long Live the Constitutional Assembly,"—these were the rallying cries of the mutineers. The *Potemkin* was joined by the *Georgii Pobedonsetz*, the Destroyer 267, and the *Vega*, but they ran short of coal and supplies and finally gave themselves up to the Rumanian government.

Nowadays we think of strikes as engineered by organized unions for higher wages, shorter workdays, etc. In Russia, during the period we are discussing, the so-called strikes were really revolutions directed for political rather than industrial advantages. Moreover, a large number of the strikes were purely agrarian.

These revolutions were not without result. In November, 1904, the Zemstvo Congress met and demanded many reforms—changes in the judiciary, freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly. It also demanded the calling of a national assembly and the extension of local self-government. On Christmas of the same year, the Czar promised these reforms in an imperial edict. On January 22, 1905, “Bloody Sunday” reached the point of a real uprising. On March 3, 1905, the Czar issued another imperial edict in which he promised to “invite the worthiest persons invested with the confidence of the people and chosen from the population” to prepare new legislative proposals. On June 4, there was a congress at Moscow composed of the “Union of Unions,” which was probably the beginning of the Soviet plan of government. Three more imperial edicts appeared on April 30, May 14, and July 8, granting small measures of reform in religious and farming control. On June 19, 1905, the Czar consented to meet a deputation of fourteen from the Zemstvo Congress, and he declared once more his intention to call a national assembly. A month later there was a great get-together of the General Congress, the Zemstvo, and the Four Councils, and again in a month there was an imperial decree creating a Duma. This body had no legislative powers and was not truly representative, but it showed a tremendous change in the attitude of the imperial government. These developments are recorded not so much as a history of the Russian revolution, but to indicate the effect of all these uprisings up to the time of the peace treaty. Their influence upon Russia’s desire to treat for peace is obvious. To complete the story, it was not until October 30, 1905, that the Czar signed the first Russian constitution, and

it was not until May 10, 1906, that the meeting of the first Duma was held.

In all probability the rulers of Russia have faced more attempts at assassination than the rulers of any other country. The bomb and the dagger were the weapons of the individual would-be assassins. But on January 6, 1905 (old style calendar), the Czar was attacked by shrapnel. In the ceremony for the annual blessing of the Neva on the Feast of the Epiphany, in the presence of all the nobility and all the clergy in their most elaborate, sacerdotal robes, shells were fired from the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul on the opposite side of the Neva. The guns were supposed to be loaded with blank cartridges and to be fired as a salute, but someone substituted shrapnel for the blanks and rained a perfect hail on the chapel, with the Emperor as the target. There seemed to be no question but that this attack was intentional and not accidental. Warning had been received that an attempt at assassination would be carried out on that day. It is probable that when he was fired upon by his own fort, the Czar realized that he could no longer carry on the war.

The strikes, riots, and disturbance assumed more dramatic proportions than the numbers engaged or the actual results of the disturbances seemed to warrant. If we were to see Washington turned into an armed camp, with rifles stacked in the streets, trucks and field guns rumbling up and down, bonfires built by the soldiers bivouacked there; if everyone who stirred out of his house were challenged and questioned and ordered to return, we probably would feel that the end had come. Yet it must be pointed out that the 440,000 rioters in a single month in Russia probably exceeded the number of soldiers ever engaged against the Japanese. When conditions

of that sort exist at home, it is time to make peace in an unpopular war six thousand miles away.

And that war was unpopular. Army and Navy officers were chagrined at their constant defeats but did not seem to derive from them any resolution to do better. Rather they seemed to show a philosophical acceptance of defeat and the realization that they were up against something they could not beat.

It is doubtful if the Russians ever realized the Japanese were about as thoroughly exhausted by their own victories as the Russians were by their defeats. The war was badly financed. It is said to have cost Japan \$1,000,000,000, aside from the interest paid during the war itself. Most of this money was raised by loans, about half of which were domestic and the other half floated largely in London and New York and, to a small extent, in Berlin. The loans carried a nominal rate of interest of 6 and 4½ per cents, but the bonds were sold very much below par so that of the 725,000,000 yen borrowed abroad, Japan paid nearly 27,000,000 yen to float the loans. By 1907 about one-quarter of the national income of Japan was being paid out in taxes and 53 per cent of that tax revenue was paying the cost of the war. By the summer of 1905 the war was costing Japan approximately \$1,000,000 a day. Japan had a credit of \$50,000,000 in New York and almost \$150,000,000 in London, but her leading statesmen came to the conclusion that they had reached the bottom of the barrel so far as further foreign loans were concerned. Japan, therefore, could look forward to a long period of bankruptcy in which her industries and her merchant marine seemed doomed to ruin.

Japan's manpower likewise seemed close to exhaustion.

At that time, out of 10,000,000 productive males, approximately 2,000,000 were working in the war effort—1,000,000 in war industry, and another million in the army. Official statements show that 999,868 actually went to the front. These figures state Japan's losses as follows:

66,068—killed in action;

21,879—died of disease;

29,000—medical discharges for ill health or wounds.

These figures would not appear plausible to us were it not for our current experience with Japan as an enemy. Ordinarily the number of wounded is greatly in excess of the number killed in action, but with the Japanese passion for hara-kiri, the figures prove acceptable. Perhaps it was money or perhaps it was losses that kept Japan out of action for four months before the peace conference, but it seems probable that Japan had attained all her war objectives and was simply seeking to make a peace that would consolidate them.

Let us examine these objectives. Probably the most important, and the one that has never been mentioned officially, was Japan's desire to wage a war against a white people and, by defeating them, demonstrate her power to the world. Russia gave a convenient excuse and Russia was ideal for the purpose. The bear that walked like a man was, in fact, a very clumsy bear, and Japan was well aware of Russia's weakness. Japan's victories on land and sea were convincing evidence of her military and naval superiority. If she gained nothing from the peace but a cessation of hostilities, she would still have attained her main objective.

Second, she wanted Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula; partly to weaken Russia, partly to injure Russia

commercially through depriving her of an ice-free port and a good terminus for the Trans-Siberian Railway, partly to protect Korea, and partly to regain the fruits she had won in her war against China and of which she had been deprived by European intervention. There her war aims stopped. She had taken Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula by force of arms, and a peace made now would consolidate that gain and see it acknowledged by all the world. It would seem as though her attitude toward Sakhalin was to gain it, if possible, in the peace, but, if that were not possible, to let it go rather than risk a further war effort. This is mere conjecture, but it seems to be borne out by the attitude at the peace table.

It is significant that Japan made the first move for peace. President Theodore Roosevelt had offered his services as a mediator on several occasions. It has been said that he desired to win the Nobel Peace Prize. If so, it was a laudable ambition. But Roosevelt did not need the Nobel Prize to add to his stature. In 1905 he was easily the most important person in the world, and he knew it. If Roosevelt wanted peace, it is because peace in itself is a desirable thing. Roosevelt disliked Russia's ambitions, was sympathetic with Japan, and glad to see Japan win. Afterward, he was not so sure. France wanted peace because her loans to Russia were jeopardized by a continuance of the war. England, as an ally of Japan, could not very well act as a mediator, and England had very nearly become embroiled with Russia through an attack by Russian war vessels on British trawlers that was probably accidental. Germany did not want peace at all. In July, 1904, Baron Eckardstein became the intermediary for tentative peace overtures, but he quickly received instruc-

tions from Von Bülow to spend his time on something else. Germany deemed intervention not desirable. Germany wanted more war—not peace. Germany's interest, of course, needs no explanation.

On April 18, 1905, while Roosevelt was off on a combined speech-making and hunting trip in the Southwest and in Colorado, the Japanese minister, Kogoro Takahira approached Secretary Taft and revealed to him that the French minister of foreign affairs, Théophile Delcassé, had approached the Japanese minister to France, Motono, on the matter of peace and had volunteered to bring Japan and Russia together. Japan preferred that President Roosevelt make the first move, for Takahira pointed out that the German Kaiser had landed in Tangier and displayed considerable hostility to France; so France had a new self-interest in bringing the war to a close.

Japan's selection of Theodore Roosevelt was a fortunate one, for he was definitely pro-Japanese. He felt that Japan had been cheated of the fruits of her war with China, not in the interests of China, but for the benefit of Russia. He was resolved she would not be thus cheated a second time. (While it is in the nature of an aside, we might remark that it was Theodore Roosevelt who suggested to Japan the idea of a Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia, with Japan in the rôle the United States plays in American affairs. This the Japanese developed into their so-called "Sphere of Influence," which was so direct a cause of the present war.)

The scene of the treaty was at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. It was August; it was hot; Washington was no place for a treaty which might raise high temperatures without help from the weather. Newport was thought of; but New-

port was then the social capital of America, and it was feared that there might be some social discrimination against the yellow men of Japan in favor of the white negotiators from Russia, so Portsmouth, with its fine New Hampshire climate, its good hotels, and the Navy Yard near-by, was selected as the scene for the great treaty. What the Navy Yard had to do with it is difficult to determine, but Roosevelt chose all possible opportunities to display our fine navy to every nation in the world. The navy was Roosevelt's "Big Stick."

Both belligerents consented to the meeting, and then began a very childish backing and filling in the selection of the negotiators. Each country seemed afraid of selecting a negotiator who was the social or political superior to the negotiator sent by the other country. That is always a serious mistake. If there is anything we can learn from the history of our peace treaties, it is this: always send the ablest men in the country to conclude a peace. Let them get down to business and devote their attention solely to the job in hand. The best and the ablest are none too good.

The Czar tried to appoint several unimportant negotiators, all of whom refused to serve. At length he appointed Count Sergei Yulievich Witte and Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen, the Russian Ambassador in Washington. Japan had watched the preliminary appointments jealously and, assuming that Russia was not sending her best, decided not to send Marquis Ito. This was perhaps a serious mistake. Witte was most acceptable to Japan and highly respected by the Japanese. Had he been appointed in the first place, Japan would probably have sent Ito. Instead, the Japanese negotiators were Baron Jutaro Komura, who had been Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese minister in Washington, Kogoro Takahira.

The conference seems to have been fought out largely on the basis of indemnities. Japan wanted Russia to pay the full cost of the war. Japan feared imminent ruin if a full indemnity were not forthcoming. The Russians, on the other hand, refused absolutely to pay any indemnity or to cede any part of Russian territory. If Komura had been a little more moderate and a little more understanding, he could easily have obtained from Russia a face-saving payment which would have amounted to an indemnity. The whole of Sakhalin Island would have been ceded to Japan, and then Russia would have bought back from Japan the northern half of the island, which Russia had held many years, at a price which would have amounted to a very substantial war indemnity. The conference had been ordered terminated on August 28 but was still sitting on August 29. Witte finally handed a note to Komura in which he stated that Russia absolutely refused to pay the 1,200,000,000 yen Japan demanded. Then he offered the southern half of Sakhalin on condition that the northern half remain in the possession of Russia without any compensation. Within a few minutes the offer was accepted. Witte announced that the line of demarcation of Sakhalin would be the fiftieth degree of latitude.

Thus Russia paid a surprisingly small price for a great defeat, and although Japan had attained all her war aims and half of Sakhalin Island as well, the news was received with riots and indignation. The riots were directed against the United States. On September 6, four American churches were burned and the American legation was placed under guard. This was not the beginning of anti-American feeling

in Japan. It had been nurtured and cultivated ever since Commodore Perry opened the door to Japan with the threat of force and loss of Japanese face more than ninety years before.

T E N

"Peace Without Victory"

IN TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE EVENTS that led up to the Armistice of 1918, we realize that we are entering perhaps the most controversial field in the world. Everyone, whether informed or not, has his own opinion of what brought about the end of World War I. There have been more words written about this war than all the other wars in history combined. More theories have been advanced, more widely recognized or self-proclaimed experts have pounded their typewriters to express their own pet explanations. Yet in a book of this character, World War I cannot possibly be omitted. We face the task of explaining how the end came with all humility, and with the full realization that whatever we say will provoke a storm of dissonance. To those who disagree with us, let us answer now as follows: You have your ideas and we have ours. We have told the tale as we see it. If you do not care to accept this explanation, that is your privilege. We shall not insist upon it. But read this chapter with an open mind, for we have tried hard to see it from all points of view and from both sides of the peace

table, and we have approached the study of this war as far as possible without preconceptions.

We shall answer some critics in advance as follows: There is no simple explanation of the end of World War I. The war came to an end for a great variety of reasons, all involved and interlocking. It is impossible fully to evaluate them, impossible to say that this factor counted more than that.

In listing a number of causes of any given effect, we are apt to ascribe equal value to each cause cited. Any such conclusion would be erroneous. Most certainly the war was won by the men who fought and bled and carried on in the mud, blood, rotting corpses, and lice of the western front. The people who say that Woodrow Wilson's words were more important than bullets read the words but did not feel the bullets. Wars are won on the battlefield. The other contributing causes determine the path from the battlefield to the peace table, but the modern historian somehow puts the emphasis, if merely by weight of words, on the action of the diplomats, the economists, the propagandists, the negotiators and apologists. Lest we make this same mistake, we repeat—the war was won on the battlefield.

The delirium of joy that shook the world on November 11, 1918, was not due merely to the cessation of hostilities. The news came as a glorious shock to a world unprepared for peace, a world convinced the war would stretch its weary length through years to come. Since 1914 thousands of little flags had been placed on thousands of maps, moving down to the Marne perilously close to Paris, moving back somewhat toward Germany, moving again toward the Marne, and again toward Germany. Exciting salients were pushed

out in these lines of flags, giving hope that a break-through in the stalemate of the western front might at last be accomplished. but always the salient was bitten off or straightened out, and siege warfare stretched across Europe from the Channel to the border of Switzerland without much hope that it would ever be broken.

On March 21, Ludendorff launched the first great offensive of 1918. Its strategical purpose was to separate the British and the French armies. He attacked at St. Quentin with the idea of reaching the Somme and then changing the direction of the attack northwestward, in order to back the British army against the coast and hold off the French army along the line of the Somme. But Ludendorff had seen previous offensives break up on the western front because of insistence upon the strategic plan, and he was prepared to alter his plan if tactical considerations demanded it. Byng's Third Army held the German Seventeenth Army south of Arras, but the German Eighteenth Army had such an easy time of it that Ludendorff changed his plan and aimed at Amiens and eventually Paris. This first attack continued in varying stages throughout the rest of March and most of April, and was the most successful attack that had thus far been carried out on the western front.

The second attack began on May 27 before the Allies had fully recovered from the disaster of the first offensive. This went through the Chemin-de-Dames, across the Aisne, and down to the Marne, within forty miles of Paris. It was there that American troops and marines launched a counter-offensive at Chateau-Thierry that was to carry them with increasing and well-sustained momentum right to the armistice.

The third German attack began on July 15, but by this time the American army was in strength, and the Second Battle of the Marne marked the end of German successes.

From July 15 to November 11 was a very short time in the history of that war and, although it was marked by stubborn fighting in which the Allies were fairly consistently successful, it appeared to the waiting world like pushing back the German salient—not essentially different from the numerous other salients that had been formed and pushed back in the endless siege warfare of the western front. We could not know that the characteristic hardness of the German military arm concealed a brittleness as well. We could not know that Germany, oft reported starving, was now starving in fact. We could not realize that a nation which could score such brilliant success after four long years of warfare was heartsick and war-weary to the point of abject quitting. So the Armistice came as a glorious shock. Even the best informed believed Germany was capable not only of further resistance but of actually winning the war. She had come so close to it in March, in April, in May, and in July. And most of all we could not know that this last terrific effort of the German armies really precipitated the revolution which caused the end.

We must take with a grain of salt the explanation of the German failure offered by Ludendorff and Hindenburg. They are apologists for their lack of success. Nevertheless, Ludendorff's explanation of the reason for this great offensive is certainly plausible and acceptable. There was only one thing he could do. He had to make a terrific effort to win the war in 1918 for, after that, he knew that Germany would be defeated. The country behind him could hold out

no longer. He was running a race with time on the home front and running another race with the American army on the western front. According to Foch, there were but 27,000 American troops at the front at the start of the first German spring offensive. If that was really the fact, it was doubtless Foch's own fault. The French and British wanted the American troops joined to their armies and would not permit a separate American army to function as a unit. General Pershing was properly stubborn in support of his idea of a separate army, knowing that American troops would not take kindly to orders from foreigners and probably suspecting strongly they would be sacrificed in favor of troops of the commanding generals' own nationals. Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier, urged that a letter be written to President Wilson requesting that Pershing be relieved of his command because of his stubbornness and unwillingness to co-operate. According to reliable American sources, there were 300,000 American troops in France in March. In the next three months, the following reinforcements were landed: in April, 117,112; in May, 224,345; in June, 276,372. There were more than two million in France by the armistice.

But at the start of the German offensive, Ludendorff had superior manpower. It was necessary for him to use it before the increasing strength of America swung superiority of manpower to the Allies. He came perilously near achieving his objective. In all probability Ludendorff realized, as later he claimed to have realized, that the German offensive of 1918 would win the war or wreck Germany, but Germany would be wrecked by another winter anyway, and this was the last opportunity for the Germans to seize the offensive. After

the arrival of the American army the offensive would pass to the Allies and would remain with them.

The last months of the war saw a change in German tactical methods that may have contributed very strongly to the defeat. Trenches ceased to play an important part. Pill-boxes took their place. A pretty thorough study of the military aspects of the war fails to reveal whether this change in the German defense methods was a cause or a result of their retreat. Did they use pillboxes instead of trenches because they were moving so fast they could not dig in? Or did they just get tired of digging trenches and resort to pill-boxes instead and then fell back because the pillboxes were not so effective as the trenches? To the layman, such a reason is inconceivable; but the layman can never appreciate the boredom of war. Many an ill-conceived battle has been fought because troops were tired of marching. Many a good position has been abandoned because the defenders were tired of holding it. Of course, such decisions are rationalized on other grounds, but the true motivating force is often boredom.

Certainly the Germans were masters of trench warfare. Their trenches and dugouts were miracles of strength and comfort. Their scientific use of concrete and corrugated iron, their skill in making trench sections mutually supporting, their elaborate employment of barbed wire entanglements, their elastic system of defense in depth, their electric lights and telephones, their heating and cooking devices, and the marvels of their service of supply were such as the Allies tried vainly to imitate. The German trenches were a fort without apparent weakness anywhere in the long line of the western front. It seemed that the Ger-

mans always had the hills and commanding positions. However battered by world-shaking barrages, they always could leap out from these trenches to offer ferocious resistance. And when a system of trenches was taken, before the parapets could be turned and the position consolidated, the German artillery, with accurately taped range, would deliver a murderous bombardment and their infantry would sweep back in a devastating counterattack that was far too often successful.

Why was this invincible system of trench warfare abandoned for the experimental pillbox? The pillbox was an isolated machine-gun nest with a small crew of desperate men pouring out a withering fire against the Allies. These pillboxes were mutually supporting but were not hooked up to one another continuously as were the trench systems that had served so long and so well. It would seem at this distance as though the pillboxes were used as the most scientific method of fighting a rearguard action to cover the retreat of the German armies; but in the closing months of the war they were certainly reputed to be an improvement upon the now antiquated method of trench warfare. Perhaps the development of the tank required something more than trenches, for the tank was the answer to the trench, the barbed wire, and the machine gun. Its armor was sufficient to protect it from machine gun and rifle fire. Its caterpillar tracks enabled it to wallow into and out of shell holes, to cross trenches as readily as it could cross a concrete road, and to sweep before it acres of barbed wire, thus clearing a path for the infantry.

Of course, the answer to the tank, and especially the slow-moving tank of World War I, had existed long before the

tank itself was conceived. Artillery was the answer. A single hit from a light field piece would wreck any tank, and if the tank were hit before it mowed down the barbed wire, the trenches were safe. But of all arms of the service, the field artillery is the slowest to change. In modern times field artillery has always fired over the brow of a hill or behind some other protection with the use of a panoramic sight and an aiming point somewhere in its rear. With a few modern exceptions, field artillery still goes into action backward, with the guns pointing to the rear instead of to the front. Field pieces are wheeled into position with a complete turning movement of the horses or tractors that draw them. The tank could be defeated by the simple method of teaching old dogs new tricks. But they did not learn those new tricks in World War I. They would not learn them in the so-called Battle of France in World War II. When Weygand finally persuaded his artillery to resort to direct laying, the German tanks advanced behind a smoke screen and the Battle of France was over.

So it is our guess that the pillbox was introduced not as a necessary concomitant of rearguard action, but as a substitute for, and improvement on, the hated trench. The armies of the world certainly hated to dig trenches. They had dug them, lived in them, suffered in them, and died in them for four long years. But the pillbox proved inadequate. The pillbox, or rather the absence of the trench, in the last months of the war, certainly accelerated the end.

It is difficult to compare numbers because of the difference in divisional strength. In general, an American division was twice as strong as a German division; and if we count an American division as two German divisions, we can see

how the balance of power changed to the Allied side largely because the Americans were on the front. In May, 1918, the Germans had 207 divisions while the Allies had only 153. After the battle of St. Mihiel on September 12, the German strength had dropped to 192 divisions while the Allied strength had increased to 210. Yet this was only twenty-two days before the Germans' first overture for peace, and it is hard to ascribe German failure to the slight numerical advantage which the Allies enjoyed for such a brief period.

Let us look for a moment into this failure of German manpower. The eastern front had collapsed with the Russian Revolution, and the complete German victory over Russia was hailed with delight by Germany and with gloomy foreboding by the Allied world. Yet a treaty of peace was not signed until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in January, 1918, and now, at this distance, it would appear that this peace with Russia was a main contributing cause to the Allied success and one of the greatest disasters Germany had ever faced. If Germany had been able to free her troops on the eastern front immediately after the Russian defeat, she might have won the war. Between the first of November, 1917, and the middle of March, 1918, 40 divisions were moved from the eastern front to the western front. These troops, however, were not of the calibre of the troops they reenforced. They were played out by their long, difficult war in the east; they resented being moved to the western front; and they had been pretty thoroughly indoctrinated with Bolshevism and the desire for world revolution by their contact with the Russian revolutionists. The infiltration of these troops among the tough, patriotic troops fight-

ing on the western front seriously injured the morale of the entire army.

In laying down terms for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans made a typically German mistake. They snatched from Russia Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Courland (later divided between Latvia and Lithuania) and made them part of Germany, thus keeping these territories hostile and making necessary a powerful police force. Also, the vast granary of the Ukraine was a terrible temptation to the starving Germans, and they occupied that with German troops. It took 53 divisions and 13 brigades to do this policing job at a time when there were only 192 divisions and 3 brigades on the western front. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which should have released the entire German force for action against the Allies, kept approximately one-fifth of the army tied up in the east where the war had already been won. If the Germans had imposed reasonable and acceptable peace terms upon Russia, this large force could have swept down to Paris and to the Channel coast, and Germany would have won the war in the spring of 1918.

Of course, when the final peace treaty came along, they lost Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Courland, and the Ukraine. They had not even gained the temporary advantage of food from the Ukraine, for the war and the revolution had prevented the planting of the granary of Europe, and the harvest was insignificant. With the typical German disregard for treaties, characterized by the Kaiser as "scraps of paper," it would have been easy for the Germans to have made a treaty with Russia that would have given them peace and security on the eastern front, and that should have been the Germans' sole aim. Then they could have finished off the

Allies on the western front and, before disbanding their victorious armies, have moved upon Petrograd, wiped out the incipient Soviet government, and taken what they pleased. Reporting to the German Reichstag and to the Commission of the German Constituent Assembly, which sat between the years 1919 and 1928 to inquire into the causes of the German collapse, Generals Von Kuhl, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff all testified that they should have finished the job in Russia by knocking out the Soviet government before attempting to move their troops to the west, and that they could have done this but for the procrastination of the Russians, which resulted in a long armistice preceding the peace treaty. But it is evident that even the defeat of the Soviet government would have been a mistake. Only peace and the friendliness of Russia could have released the troops to win the war in the west.

With the problem of manpower facing both the Germans and the Allies on the western front, it is strange that the Germans should have permitted the separation of one-fifth of their available force for service in the east. But it is equally strange that the Allies should have attempted so many extraneous campaigns, in Gallipoli, Palestine, Mesopotamia, German East Africa, and other places. The western front was the decisive theatre of action, and both sides knew it. But neither side concentrated full power there.

Yet even without the troops from the eastern front, Germany's force of 192 divisions certainly should have been adequate for defensive warfare, if they had stuck to the old impregnable trench system. For the moment, we are speaking solely from the military point of view, not taking into consideration the other factors that led to the end of the war.

One of the reasons for the high measure of success of the German armies lay in the way in which the trench system developed.

At the start of the war both the French and German armies believed strongly in the doctrine of the offensive. Foch, in his memoirs, declared the offensive was all the French army knew. That seemed to be the lesson they had learned in 1870, and the French generals were unable to think of any type of defensive warfare or of a proper combination of the defensive and the offensive. Nevertheless, at the outset of the war the Germans held the offensive by their violation of Belgian neutrality, by their numerical superiority, and by the swift development of their campaign in accordance with the carefully worked out and long rehearsed plan. The war started as a war of swift movement that brought Von Kluck clear to the Marne. After that first big push, the two armies faced one another right across Europe and therefore built earthworks and dug trenches. At first these trenches were small, temporary expedients in a war of movement. But the trenches stopped the movement. They were dug deeper and better, with vast systems of intercommunication, with deep dugouts, firing steps, parapets, and secondary and support trenches extending far to the rear. The barbed-wire entanglements and the machine guns made them all but impregnable, and power passed from the offensive to the defensive.

With the exception of the battles for Verdun and a few other actions, the Allies took the offensive at a time when the Germans enjoyed the great strength of the defensive. It was unbelievably costly to the Allies. This sort of thing has happened many times in the history of warfare. At Agincourt,

the English long bow wrote a new chapter by giving unprecedented power to the defense. The invention of the bayonet in a similar manner won all the battles for the Duke of Marlborough. In those days armies were distinctly limited in size by difficulties attending the movement of the train. It was customary to protect each musketeer with a pikeman. The musketeers would fire at the advancing cavalry, step behind the pikemen, and reload for their second volley, while the men with the pikes held off the cavalry. With the invention of the bayonet, every man became pikeman and musketeer, too. It meant double the fire power and double the pikes with the same number of men. Similarly, in the middle phase of World War I, the trench, the barbed wire, and the machine gun made a serious breakthrough impossible despite the development of tremendous barrages, tanks, poison gas, hand-grenades, flame-throwers, and all the other inventions designed to break down this impregnable combination.

August 8, 1918, is generally spoken of by the Germans as the "black day." Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff speak of it in this way in their memoirs. That is the day the Allies penetrated the lines along the Aisne with their tanks and after them sent cavalry, the first use of cavalry since 1914. But the victory of the Allies on that day was not what made it significant. It was the collapse of the German forces. They were no longer the capable fighting men they had been. It was obvious to their leaders that they preferred peace to victory; that their hope had vanished. Fresh troops going into the lines were called "black legs" by those retiring. They were told that they were simply prolonging the war. The officers did not even try to control the men. A field gun

was captured by an airplane. Whole companies surrendered to single Allied troopers. The Americans were at the front in strength. The race against time had been lost.

It is significant that Ludendorff's "Black Day," August 8, 1918, was to Foch just another victory, not particularly indicative of German collapse but proof of his own superiority in the tactical use of tanks and productive of results in the gaining of ground and the capture of many prisoners and much war material. Foch did not realize the moral collapse of the German army which was so clear to Ludendorff. But from that time on until the armistice, November 11, the gains of the Allies on the western front were consistent and speedy. Italy, too, staged an astounding comeback. Disastrously defeated at Caporetto, driven by the German and Austrian armies deep into Venetia, Italy somehow made a stand and, supported by British, French, and American troops, won a brilliant victory at Vittorio Veneto and had the Austrians retreating at the same rate the Germans were retreating on the western front. Another great Allied offensive against Bulgaria produced a revolution there and brought an armistice on September 29. But the real victory was won on the western front. The German army that had been within forty miles of Paris in July, by November was driven back to lines that had not been "front" lines since 1914. They ran approximately from Ghent to Mons to Sedan.

On the sea, too, there was a similar race for time. The surface vessels of the German High Seas Fleet kept the British Grand Fleet concentrated at Scapa Flow, with the battle cruiser force at Rosyth. They stayed there for most of the war. Only in the battles of Jutland and the Dogger Bank were there any major engagements. Sea raiders and

von Spee's raiding fleet were engaged in many battles, particularly at Coronel and the Falkland Islands. But in general the British fleet had command of the sea, and the German navy could do nothing against its strength. Nevertheless, by its mere position behind the strong defenses of Heligoland, in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, it was able to keep most of the British naval force immobilized for almost the entire four years of the war. Furthermore, Germany resorted to the use of submarines. For a time the submarine warfare was phenomenally successful, and it seemed that submarine warfare alone would starve England into surrender. In fact, at one time Hindenburg claimed that, if forced to retreat, Germany could hold the Hindenburg Line until the submarines had won the war.

It is generally admitted that at one period England was within six weeks of starvation, and there seemed no hope of stopping the menace of the *Unterseeboot*. But however close the submarine came to winning the war for Germany, it was a direct cause of losing it. For it was the submarine that brought the United States into the war, and the United States, with its manpower, its fresh morale, its supplies, its navy, and its defeat of the U-boat, made it impossible for Germany to win.

The defeat of the U-boat has been attributed to the convoy system, but that is only part of the story. It is unfortunate that the whole story cannot be told, for we are still successfully employing tactics and techniques that proved effective in the last war and are even more successful in the current war against a tremendously augmented submarine force. The defeat of the submarine can be measured in two ways: The attrition of the submarines and their carefully

trained crews is one measurement, but it does not tell the whole story. More important is the circumvention of the submarine, the ability to run the submarine blockade, to land 300,000 troops in the front lines and a total force of 2,000,000 men in France, to supply this army, to feed France, to feed England, and to cause the failure of the submarine's mission.

An important phase of the war at sea is all too often neglected by the historians—mine warfare. Doubtless many a ship said to have been sunk by a submarine succumbed to a mine. Authoritative opinion sets the losses due to mines at about equal to the losses due to submarines. Mine sweeping was a pretty clumsy effort at the start of the war, and its cost in sweepers and lives was appalling. It is estimated that for every two mines swept up, the cost was one mine sweeper and fifty per cent of her crew. The technique was improved, however, and toward the end of the war the successes against mines were at least equal to the defenses against submarines.

The submarines and mines caused the Allies to engage in a great race against time, a shipbuilding race to replace lost tonnage. In this race, for a dangerously long period, it seemed that the submarines would win; but the ships began rolling down the ways at what was then a phenomenal speed, and gradually we reached the point where we were building more ships than the submarines could sink. In April, 1917, German submarines sank 277 ships. In only two months of that year did they sink fewer than 100 (96 in January, and 95 in November). Toward the close of the war these numbers had diminished amazingly: June, 1918—77; July—83; August—84; September—65; October—

41. In 1917, 66 German submarines were sunk. In the ten months of 1918, 88 were sunk. But in 1914, '15, and '16, in the three years before we found out how to do it, we were able to sink only 49 submarines out of the entire German fleet. The success of both the anti-submarine campaign and of the shipbuilding campaign won the sea race for time for the Allies. England did not starve.

Among the niceties of international law so bitterly discussed at the time was the question of whether a blockade could be declared when the only blockading ships were submarines. The submarine cannot visit and search. The submarine could not capture a ship and hold it as a prize. To be successful a submarine had to deliver a sneak attack without the customary formalities exercised by a blockading surface vessel. Nevertheless, the Germans maintained that theirs was a legal blockade of England. On the other hand, the Allies, with absolute command of the sea, maintained a perfectly adequate blockade of Germany.

Germany depended upon its imports for vast quantities of materials of war. In the metals it particularly needed copper, nickel, tin, and mercury. Although it was able to get a large quantity of iron ore from northern France and Sweden, it seriously lacked the hardening alloys so necessary in the production of armament steels—manganese, chromium, wolfram, molybdenum, and a number of necessary silicates. Aluminum presented a problem. Although it was not so widely used in airplanes as it is today, it was important as a substitute for copper, and the bauxite previously imported from France was now cut off. The Germans managed to extract aluminum from native clays, but the process was expensive. Leather, wool, asbestos, sulphur,

graphite, phosphates, asphalts, and resins had all been largely items of importation, and the shortage was acute. Germany's timber resources were limited, and the blockade caused severe shortages.

Naturally, all goods produced in the tropics were cut off, including vitally needed supplies of rubber, cotton, jute, hemp, and silk. Perhaps the most serious loss was of nitrates for explosives, and Germany's greatest single achievement in providing substitutes was the manufacture of nitrates from the air. Without them she could not have kept in the war. But she never produced even enough for the powder factories, and she had none to spare for fertilizer or other necessary uses. This seriously affected her crops. The unprecedented expenditure of maintaining so vast an army for so long a time exhausted all German resources in materials. Germany's amazing chemical industry developed surprising substitutes, or ersatz materials. Clothing was made of wood, lubricating oil was squeezed from the seeds of sunflowers, salad oil from the pits of fruit, bread was made from such substitutes as potatoes, bean meal, and beets. Ersatz tobacco was made from hops, pine needles, and the leaves of various plants. But ersatz bread was reported to have caused serious intestinal trouble and ersatz tobacco was said to be highly harmful to the users.

As in the case of every war fought by nations rather than by professional armies, the labor shortage was acute. The use of women and children does not make up for manpower engaged in the armed forces and for the terrible loss through death, wounds, and sickness. Germany is using slave labor of conquered countries for the purpose today, but we have no means of judging how successful this effort is.

The most serious shortage in foodstuffs was in butter and other animal fats. Eggs, meat, and dairy products were practically unobtainable. All the belligerents were suffering from these shortages. The Allies had a scientific commission on food to recommend the minimum daily ration of fat. This commission decided that people could not live on less than 75 grams per day. In 1918, 75 grams had to last a German for two weeks. The blockade prevented the importation of fodder, and milch cows were slaughtered for meat. That meant no milk, no butter. Germany has always imported a large part of its milk and butter. The blockade put a stop to that. In the years 1912 to 1914, Germany's imports of animal fats for human consumption averaged more than 161,000 tons. In the first ten months of 1918, fewer than 2,000 tons were imported.

During the last month of the war the Germans were allowed approximately one-eighth of their normal meat consumption, and the meat animals were so poor in quality that the nutritive value was very low. Before the war Germany imported more than 62 per cent of the fish it consumed. But the imported fish in 1918 dropped to less than a quarter of the prewar imports, and German fishing boats could not go out because of the blockade and because they had no fishing tackle. Chickens were very widely used for meat. That meant the end of the egg production. The conditions were probably better in Berlin than in any other city, and anyone who got one egg a month in Berlin was lucky.

Beans, lentils, and peas, the last resort of starving nations, proved far from adequate because the supply was so low. In 1912, Germany imported 310,800 tons of these foods. In 1917, it imported only 1,708 tons. Of course,

cheese disappeared along with butter and milk. The things which every northern country imports from the Tropics and the Orient—coffee, tea, cocoa, spices—disappeared early. Coffee made from extract of sugar-beet shavings and vegetable waste did not satisfy the coffee-loving Germans. Another serious shortage was beer. All available grain was needed for food. The Germans have a holy, ritualistic respect for beer, and they consume enormous quantities of it. All the amenities of life of the lower and middle classes center about its ceremonial drinking. The German cannot relax or expand without it. The effect upon morale of the loss of beer is something that could never be appreciated outside of Germany itself.

We have felt incipient shortages in critical war materials in the present war. We have seen drives for scrap metal, waste paper, rubber, aluminum. But these have been nothing compared to the terrific search for metal in Germany all during World War I. Church bells, ornamental fences, all metallic fittings in houses, anything, everything, that could be turned into materials of war was ripped out and dedicated to the great god Mars. It was not the good-natured cheerful co-operation of the lavish American. It was done under compulsion, with threat of dire punishment for concealing or withholding metal. In our own rationing we have gradually seen conditions improve and the necessity for conserving some items disappear. Our present defeat of the submarine is permitting ample supplies of bauxite to be brought in, so that our domestic aluminum pots need no longer be converted into airplanes. The synthetic rubber development will soon supply our needs. The removal of some

meats from the ration list shows that we are playing a winning game.

In Germany in World War I, rationing began early. Goats and horses were used as human food throughout the war. But the rationing never improved the situation. It grew steadily worse. The rationing grew tighter. Everyone was hungry and everyone became weak, exhausted. Small wonder that the eyes of German leaders turned to the granary of the Ukraine after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was a terrible blow to find that granary empty, to realize but a trickle instead of a flood, to face the fact that crops had not been planted because of war and revolution and therefore could not be harvested to save Germany.

The influenza epidemic which swept over the world in 1918 was perhaps more terrifying in Germany than in the Allied nations, and this virulent and deadly disease caused fear and consternation even in America. But Germany had a weakened people, starving, undernourished, with low resistance. The epidemic was the cause of 300,000 deaths.

Take a starving, sickened people, crack the whip over them for four long years, have them face a winter of starvation after a starving summer, let them realize that conditions cannot possibly be better and cannot be endured if worse, and you can keep them going only by the hope of victory. When the hope of victory disappeared, Germany collapsed. The apologists, Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Hitler, complain of the collapse of the home front as a stab in the back. But the home front could not have done otherwise. The country could not have endured another winter of war.

The German is a peculiar being. He loves to be led, to be regimented, to be ordered about, to be told what to do; but

he also loves the heaped-up plate of rich food, enormous quantities of beer, expansive jollification with his boon companions and his pipe. Probably only a German would let his leaders, as the Kaiser and as Hitler, do his thinking for him. But with any people, anywhere, it is fatal to tell them *how* to think. When the Germans were told they were to think only about victory, they knew they were defeated. When they were forbidden to face the facts, even in their own minds, it was inevitable that they should do so. If the leaders of Germany are right in their complaint that the home front collapsed and stabbed the army in the back, then the leaders themselves are to blame. A tyrannous government may command all the outward manifestations of conformity, but it cannot stop people from thinking. The minute it attempts this, it arouses the very thoughts it is striving to stifle. Toward the end of the war the German people began to think, perhaps for the first time in a century, and this was what they were thinking: "We cannot win. Our leaders are incapable. The slaughter will go on until all our men are killed. There is no food in sight for the coming winter. Soon we will be fighting on German soil. We did not hold that Hindenburg Line. The submarines have not starved England. We have been misled. We have been fooled. Why stand for more? We want peace."

· Into minds thinking these thoughts—and doing their own thinking for the first time—slipped the Allied and American propaganda. Most of the writers on World War I have ascribed to our propaganda a power greater than that of our bullets. But it must be remembered that most writers are themselves propagandists and perhaps have an exaggerated notion of the power of the printed word. To the German

apologists, propaganda is the only explanation of the change of heart of the German people.

Ludendorff complained bitterly of the effectiveness of the propaganda. Hitler ascribed to it the sole reason for the collapse of the German people. Hitler is amusing in his description of how American propagandists seized upon a German munitions strike and played it up as a revolution, thus counteracting the moral effect of the German victories in the spring of 1918. A careful study of American newspapers fails to show any case in which the strike was described as anything other than a strike. As a matter of fact, some of the writers specifically warned their readers not to hope that a plain, ordinary strike in any way resembled a revolution. This is proof that Hitler is a liar—if proof be needed.

There is no gainsaying the fact that we did an effective propaganda job, but let us strive not to be swept away by any exaggerated notions of its power. The various writers stress the fact that 65,000,000 leaflets were dropped into Germany by airplane or smuggled across the Russian border. They do not seem to realize that 65,000,000 pamphlets is a pitifully small and inadequate number. The population of Germany in 1918 was not less than 70,000,000. Sixty-five million pamphlets would be less than one pamphlet per person, and the essence of propaganda is constant repetition and reiteration.

No worse method of distribution could be conceived than dropping leaflets from airplanes. The waste of leaflets dropped in barren fields, on roofs, with bunches here and none there, is simply appalling. Out of 65,000,000 thus distributed, probably fewer than 1,000,000 were ever seen

or read. Nevertheless, the propaganda was effective, not because it gave new thoughts to the German people, but because it emphasized and corroborated the conclusions the Germans had reached for themselves. The propaganda of the German government, forced upon the people, specifying how they must think as well as how they must speak, was opposed to the thinking of the people, therefore insincere.

One of the tricks of the Allied propagandists was to reprint lists of food served to American soldiers, to point out that prisoners were fed the same rations as soldiers, and to reprint orders to the effect that all prisoners must be treated well. Doubtless this had an influence on the vast number of starving German soldiers who hankered for the fleshpots of the Americans and sold their honor for the sake of their bellies.

It is wrong to think of propaganda as a distinct and separate means of ending a war. Every victory the Allies won, every gain made, every failure of the Germans, every slogan, every song was part of the moral or psychological force that broke the German will to war. The organized propaganda was simply part of the whole campaign, and undoubtedly the greatest propagandist of all was President Woodrow Wilson.

It is very hard for an American who reached his adult years before World War I to appraise Woodrow Wilson properly, or to see him in the same light as did the rest of the world. We know that he was elected President because of a fight between Roosevelt and Taft which split the Republican Party into the Republican and the Progressive Parties. We know his rather unexciting background as a

professor of history and political science, as President of Princeton University, and as a man not versed in the difficult personal contacts of the political world. We know that he was re-elected President on the platform, "He kept us out of war," with the implied promise that he would continue to keep us out of war—a promise which was broken immediately after his re-election. We disliked his pedantry, his narrowness, his prissiness, his extreme egotism, and his definite lack of personal charm.

Because of this distinctly American attitude, it is hard for us to realize the terrific impact his speeches and writings made upon the rest of the world. Wilson preached distinctly American doctrine. To us in America it was old, stale, familiar, definitely uninspired. But to the European countries it was a new school of thought, a gospel of freedom, an expression of idealism, new, inspired, God-given. There was something Messiah-like in the way he preached American platitudes to a world unfamiliar with them. The comparison between Wilson and God was frequently made. At one time Clemenceau, commenting upon it, said that Wilson was actually worse than God. Wilson had Fourteen Points. *Le Bon Dieu* had only Ten.

Wilson, coached by George Creel, who headed the American propaganda front, had that rare gift for coining slogans, simple, pungent phrases, easily translatable into any language. One of his earliest, coined before our entrance into the war, was "Peace Without Victory." It did not produce the effect he desired, but it has lasted through the intervening decades and has led to a vast misconception that aided materially in bringing on the present war. To give us something to fight for, he coined the phrase "A war to end wars."

That concept, too, has been conspicuously barren of results. But it was an important rallying thought to the American forces, a cause of unification of effort, and a bright light of hope in a sadly suffering world.

Perhaps Wilson's most productive contribution to the propaganda front was his distinction between the German people and the German government. In his Flag Day address of June 17, 1917, Wilson declared: "We are not the enemies of the German people and they are not our enemies." He declared our enemies were the military masters of the German people and that these masters were the Germans' enemy as well as our own. It was a distinction which certainly helped foment the revolution which ended the war.

Wilson revived the old custom of the President addressing Congress. On January 8, 1918, he read to Congress a statement of the war aims and peace terms of the United States. Although this was addressed to Congress, it was intended for all the world. So important were these Fourteen Points that we have set them down here almost in their entirety:

WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the na-

tions we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

On July 4, 1918, Wilson added four more points, listed here with slight abridgements:

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the

people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right. . . .

The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just.

There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.

National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action. . . .

These eighteen points (fourteen and four) were made the subjects of Creel's pamphlets, were flown over Germany, were carried by balloons and dropped between the German lines, were translated and published in every newspaper on the globe.

Americans are familiar with American propaganda, but are far less familiar with Russian propaganda. Yet we must not forget that even more powerful than our well-conceived and well-planned paper bullets was Russia's propaganda for Bolshevism and world-wide revolution. During the long months between the Russian military surrender and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, German and Russian soldiers fraternized on the eastern front. It is hard to see how such

fraternization could be the means of conveying an involved political ideology, especially when the difference in languages is considered, but all the German sources stress it. Socialism was already strong in Germany, and the Socialists had the largest representation of any party in the German Reichstag. The German soldiers who returned to Germany or were transferred to the western front brought back with them from Russia the virus of revolution. The field for its burgeoning was well prepared; the sufferings of the German people made Russian doctrine most acceptable. All these things undermined the German will to fight. Ludendorff, Hindenburg, and Hitler declared that the revolutionary spirit started at home and spread to the front lines. Foch declared that it started in the front lines and spread to the home front. Probably the truth of the matter is that the spirit of revolution caught hold wherever Germans dared to think for themselves, for when the revolution finally broke out, it spread like wildfire in a matter of days. But the Allies were not on German soil.

So many things happened between the last days of September 1918 and the early days of November that we think it helpful to record the events of the end of the war in chronological order.

September 28: It was on this day that Ludendorff decided that the end had come. He knew that the Allies had definite superiority. He saw his army falling to pieces, with the old fighting spirit gone. He knew that never again could he whip the Germans into another offensive. The war aims of the German people could never be attained. Any further fighting was useless, and the time to make peace was while resistance was still possible.

September 29: Ludendorff arranged a meeting with the Kaiser and Chancellor von Hertling. He laid his case before them and persuaded them to ask for peace terms. This led to the resignation of the Chancellor and the appointment of Prince Max of Baden as the new Chancellor. Prince Max did not relish the job, but someone had to take it. His appointment, however, was not confirmed immediately. On this day, too, Bulgaria signed an armistice.

October 3: On this day Prince Max was confirmed as Chancellor, and his first official act was to send the following note to President Wilson:

"Berlin, 3rd October, 1918.

"The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take in hand the restoration of peace, to bring this request to the notice of all the belligerent states and to invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the initiation of negotiations. The German Government accepts as a basis for the peace negotiations the programme laid down by the President of the United States of America in his message to Congress of the 8th of January, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his speech of the 27th of September, 1918.

"To avoid further bloodshed, the German Government requests the President to bring about the immediate conclusion of an armistice, by land, by sea and in the air.

(signed) Max, Prince of Baden, Imperial Chancellor."

October 8: On this day Wilson's reply arrived in Berlin. Wilson insisted that as a preliminary condition the German Government accept the Fourteen Points. Only the details of their application would be discussed. Wilson also wished to know "whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war." It is significant that the Germans wished

to surrender to Wilson, and that Wilson dealt with the Germans without taking into full account his other Allies.

October 12: Prince Max's second note to Wilson left the interpretation of the Fourteen Points to the Allies. It also declared: "The Government had been formed by negotiation and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag." It declared that it represented both the German Government and the German people. This did not satisfy Wilson.

October 14: Wilson's reply made it perfectly clear that he was not making any deals with the German Kaiser. "The arbitrary power that could separately and secretly and by its single choice disturb the peace of the world" would have to be destroyed before he would enter into negotiations, and he stated clearly that it was within the choice of the German nation to destroy it. In other words, Wilson demanded, in no unmistakable terms, the abdication of the Kaiser. This was too much for Ludendorff. He saw nothing to do but fight on. He had four weeks of campaign weather left. He could fight rearguard actions, retire to the Meuse, and start again in the spring.

October 20: On this day the Kaiser took a rather remarkable step. He ordered the unrestricted submarine war brought to an end. What he hoped to gain by this is not very clear. It had all the appearance of a deathbed repentance. Perhaps by so doing he was trying to appease Wilson. Perhaps, by what we know happened a few days later, he was trying to appease his own navy. At any rate, it was too late to do any good. A third note was dispatched on this day to express the hope no demand would be made that was incompatible with the honor of the German people or with paving the way for a peace with justice.

October 23: Wilson's third note, which arrived on this day, was uncompromising. If he had to deal with military masters and monarchial autocrats, the terms would be not negotiations but surrender. This confirmed Ludendorff in his desire to fight on. Hindenburg sent a dispatch to the army, but its publication was stopped by the government. There was a great row in the Reichstag over Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's action.

October 26: Ludendorff prepared a letter of resignation. It was never delivered. On the same day Ludendorff was dismissed. Hindenburg's comment is that politics demanded a victim.

October 27: The fourth note to Wilson declared that "The peace negotiations would be conducted by a people's government in whose hands rest all decisive powers, both actual and constitutional. The military authorities also are subject to it. The German Government now awaits proposals for an armistice which shall lead toward that peace of justice the President has outlined in his proclamation." On this day, too, Austria-Hungary gave up, offering to enter into peace negotiations without awaiting the result of negotiations elsewhere. In other words, Austria-Hungary was through, whether Germany was or not.

October 29: This day the German fleet was ordered to sea. This action has been subject to wide criticism both in Germany and the rest of the world. But from this distance it seems like a logical move. The army had failed but was still holding. There was always a possibility of victory at sea. Some years later Admiral Lord Beatty, addressing the midshipmen at Annapolis, hailed them as "brethren of the mist." The danger of fog and low visibility in any sea fight could

always upset the best laid plans and give victory to the weaker fleet. A sea victory at that time would have spread renewed hope throughout Germany. If the Grand Fleet could be defeated and communications cut between Great Britain and France, the least that would happen was that Germany could look forward to better peace terms. But the Germans did not realize what had taken place in their High Seas Fleet. The devastating effects of the battles of Jutland and the Dogger Bank had left their marks. A fleet that lies in idleness conjuring up memories of death and destruction is not able to put to sea and face a superior enemy. The German sailors did not relish the order. They called it a death ride. The crews of two of the ships mutinied and flatly refused to put to sea. This was the start of the German revolution.

Before we go on with the chronology, it is well to look at the impending Armistice from the point of view of the Allies. Wilson, sitting in the White House, was rather strongly reminded by the generals on the western front that whereas peace terms might be a matter for governments, an armistice was a purely military matter and should be conducted by the commanders in the field. This concept was altogether sound, because if the peace terms failed, hostilities would be resumed, and only the commanders in the field could know what steps would be necessary to maintain the superiority that had been won at great cost. If the Armistice were merely to gain a breathing space and a chance for recovery of the German army, some compensation must be made to offset those gains. Ahead of the Allied troops was the Rhine, an almost impassable barrier. If the German Army could make use of the Armistice to retreat behind the Rhine, they could hold off the Allies for a long time to come. The war

would not be won at the earliest before 1919. Therefore Foch insisted (and the other generals backed him up) upon the following stipulations:

The German army must retreat behind the Rhine.

At least three important bridgeheads must be established by the Allies on the Rhine's right bank, with a radius of nineteen miles, and the means left behind for carrying on the war must not be destroyed. Such things as railroads, roads, factories, bridges, and immovable military stores and materiel were not to be ruined. Thus, while the Armistice delayed the signing of peace, the Allies could consolidate their positions in such a manner as to be able to drive on into Germany, and the formidable barrier of the Rhine would be removed.

October 30: This day saw the surrender of Turkey. Germany was now alone. Bulgaria and Turkey had surrendered, and Austria-Hungary was ready to surrender.

November 4: The mutiny in the German fleet had spread from the two initial ships throughout the navy. The mutineers took Kiel.

November 5: The revolt in the fleet spread to Lubeck.

November 6: Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and Bremen fell into the hands of the revolutionists. It was no longer a purely naval affair.

November 7: See how quickly the revolution spread! On this day it had taken over Hanover, Brunswick and Cologne. Bavaria set up a separate republic, with Munich as capital. The Social Democrats declared they would abandon the government if the Kaiser did not abdicate. The Kaiser was hiding in Spa, trying to decide what to do. On this day, the day of

the false rumor of the signing of the Armistice, the German commissioners crossed the Allied lines and were escorted to General Foch. They were: Secretary of State, Erzberger; Major General von Winterfeldt; Minister Plenipotentiary, Count Oberndorff; Captain Vanselow of the German Navy; Captain Geyer of the Staff; and Captain von Helldorff of the Cavalry. The Allied negotiators were: Marshal Foch, Admiral Wemyss, General Weygand, Admiral Hope, and Captain Mariott, R.N. On this day, too, Austria-Hungary finally surrendered.

November 8: The revolution reached Aix-la-Chapelle and Viviers, only ten miles from Spa, where the Kaiser was still hiding. On this day was held the first meeting of the negotiators for the Armistice. The meeting took place in the Forest of Compiègne, in Marshal Foch's private railroad car. Hitler, with a fine sense for the dramatic, signed his peace treaty with France in the same car, at the same spot, in 1940. It may be that that car will be used again for a similar purpose before many months have passed. But Hitler was not the first to do this sort of thing. The Peace Treaty of 1919 was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where Germany had humbled France after the Franco-Prussian War. Even great nations can be spiteful. Later we shall touch upon the terms of the Armistice, but let it be said here that just two objections were raised by the Germans, and both reflected their great concern for the revolution at home as well as for the cessation of hostilities on the western front. The first objection was to the surrender of 30,000 machine guns. The German delegates declared that if they delivered that number they would not have the means of firing on their own people at home! The other objection was

to a continuance of the blockade, because if the blockade continued, Germany would starve. No two circumstances proved so conclusively the power of the revolution and the desperate straits of the German people.

November 9: While the Armistice was still being debated, the crack Jäger Battalions, the most trusted troops in the German army, joined the revolutionists and marched through the streets of Berlin. Still the Kaiser vacillated. He wished to hang on to some remnant of his former glory. He was willing to resign as Kaiser but wanted to continue as King of Prussia.

November 10: On this day the Kaiser finally made up his mind to abdicate. He declared to Prince Max of Baden not that he had abdicated but that he would do so presently. Prince Max immediately circulated the news that the Kaiser *had* abdicated. That was the end of the war-crazed monarch who had brought Europe to such a terrible fate. He was rushed to the railroad station and, after some delay, over the border into Holland, where he had previously prepared a retreat at Doorn. The Kaiser never abdicated. He was simply deposed by the premature announcement by Prince Max.

November 11: The Armistice was signed at ten minutes past five in the morning, but it was agreed that the time of the signing was exactly five o'clock. The negotiators had started their final session at two in the morning. By its terms hostilities were to cease six hours after the signing. At the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918, the Great War came to an end. It is to be regretted that those last six hours of needless fighting cost many lives.

These were some of the conditions of the Armistice:

A—*Clauses Relating to the Western Front*

1. Cessation of hostilities by land and in the air six hours after the signing of the Armistice.

2. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine—so ordered as to be completed within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice.

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will be made prisoners of war.

Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with the evacuation in these areas.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

3. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or condemned).

4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment:

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field)

25,000 machine guns

3,000 Minenwerfer

1,700 aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly D.7's—and night-bombing machines)

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

5. Evacuation by the German armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation.

The occupation of these territories by Allied and United States troops will be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridge-heads at these points of a 30-kilometre (about 19-mile) radius on the

right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the area.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine, between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometres ($6\frac{1}{4}$ miles) distant from them between the Dutch frontier and the Swiss frontier.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (right and left bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all, 31 days after the signing of the Armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

6. In all territories evacuated by the enemy, evacuation of the inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

In the case of inhabitants no person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the Armistice.

No destruction of any kind shall be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of foods, munitions, and equipment, which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have, as a consequence, the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

7. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in Annexe II (not exceeding 31 days in all).

Five thousand motor trucks are also to be delivered in good order within 36 days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of the system.

Further, working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for upkeep of permanent way, signals, and repair shops shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany, so far as the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine are concerned.

All lighters taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The Note attached as Annexe II defines the details of these measures.

8. The German Command shall be responsible for revealing, within 48 hours of the signing of the Armistice, all mines or delay-action fuses disposed on territories evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.

The German Command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of wells, springs, etc.) under penalty of reprisals.

9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States Armies in all occupied territories, save for settlement of accounts with authorized persons.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

10. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including those under trial and condemned. The Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners of war as they think fit. This condition annuls all other conventions regarding prisoners of war, including that of July, 1918, now being ratified. However, the return of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries.

11. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces will be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the material required.

We shall not quote verbatim the clauses relating to the eastern frontiers of Germany or to East Africa, or the general clauses, the financial clauses, and the naval clauses. In general, all German troops were obliged to withdraw from any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, Russia, and East Africa. All interned civilians, including hostages and persons under trial and condemned, were to be repatriated. With wide reservations for future claims, Germany was to pay reparation for damage done, remove nothing that might serve as a pledge, return all the cash, stock, and other documents taken from any of the invaded countries, cease all hostilities at sea, open up all territorial waters for navigation, return all naval and merchant marine prisoners of war, surrender all submarines with armament and equipment complete, and surrender and deliver 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, including 2 mine layers, and 50 destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface warships were to be disarmed; the position of mines to be indicated so that the Allies could sweep them up. Access was to be given to the Baltic and secured by occupation of the German forts. The blockade was to continue, but Germany was to be fed by the Allies during the Armistice. All air forces were to be concentrated and immobilized. All Black Sea ports were to be evacuated, all captured merchant ships to be restored, and all restrictions on neutral governments to be lifted.

The Armistice was to last 36 days, with an option to extend. As a matter of fact, there were several 30-day exten-

sions until finally it was continued without an expiration date until the declaration of peace.

In the twenty-one years that elapsed between the signing of the Armistice in 1918 and the invasion of Poland in 1939, a curious distortion of historical fact took place all over the world. In America it became customary to state that the Germans really won the war. Initially, what was meant by this was that the Germans, by eventually refusing to pay the reparations, started a fashion of repudiation of war debts among all the nations of the world except Finland. The United States paid for the war, financially. But this expression, that Germany really won the war, has been interpreted to mean that Germany won the war in a military sense. In Germany this distortion of the facts has been taught systematically to the generation fighting the present war, which was not born or was very young in 1918. Nothing could be farther from the truth, and no misteaching of history could have had such dire consequences.

The German youth of today believes that the German army won the war of 1914-'18; that because of a political stab in the back, caused largely by American propaganda, the home front forced the army to sign the Armistice; that the wicked Treaty of Versailles robbed the victorious Germans of their rightful spoils. In America we look back to the Armistice of 1918 with regret. We are convinced that we stopped the war too soon; that we should have pressed on into Germany, taught the Germans a lesson they would never have forgotten and, instead of ceasing hostilities when the war was half won, carried on to a real conclusion and a definite victory.

Both these ideas are distortions of the facts and an unwarranted indictment of the men who decided to sign the

Armistice. It is easy, however, to see how they have arisen. The idea of peace without victory is one which died hard. There was no thought in the Allies' minds in 1918 of anything but victory, a crushing victory, and a victory that would prevent the war from ever starting again. The idea of a war to end wars was predominant. The thought of peace without victory was discarded finally and for all time as soon as victory became probable.

Also, in World War I, perhaps more than in any other war in history, we measured success on the map. Never before has such a price been paid in death, wounds, and expenditure of materiel for a few yards of barren, stinking, shell-torn and blood-soaked mud. No sacrifice was deemed too great to advance part of the line on the western front a few hundred yards. The imagination of the generals and their staffs was strictly limited to that measure of achievement. Europe was like a football field measured off by imaginary white chalk lines. The goal line was Paris. Two or three times the Germans would make great gains by forward passes, but for the most part both teams simply bucked the line for infinitesimal gains.

In a war of movement the conquering of territory is important primarily because it cuts communications and deprives the enemy of resources, but on the western front territory meant nothing. Attrition of the enemy's force and destruction of its power to resist was the only logical objective.

If we apply the stupid and meaningless measure of success by the number of square yards of mud held and occupied, then, and in that sense only, Germany might be said to have won the war. For the four years of its duration the

battles were fought in Belgium, Flanders, France, and Luxembourg. It was not fought in Germany. When the Armistice was signed there was still no invasion of German soil. But except in the purely territorial sense, Germany did not win the war.

Let us examine the wisdom of the Armistice from the viewpoint of both the Allies and the Germans. The Allies did not know whether or not the Germans would be able to resist further. While the character of the German resistance changed entirely and progressively from July to November, it was still powerful up to the last day. The Allies believed that it would be necessary to fight another campaign in 1919, and full preparations were made. At the very time the Armistice commission was in session, British, French, American, and Italian munitions authorities were in conference in Paris providing for the campaign for the following year. Steel, coal, nitrates, artillery, shells, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, and poison gas were provided for on the most elaborate scale.

The Allies were able to go on with the war. They were not exhausted. But they faced continuation at a tremendous price. From a purely strategical point of view the next big obstacle was the Rhine. By signing the Armistice they were able at once, without cost in men and munitions, to move up to the Rhine, cross it, establish the bridgeheads on the opposite bank, establish their communications, save the railroads and other facilities that would otherwise be destroyed, and push on to ultimate victory in Germany at any reopening of hostilities.

If peace had not been declared, the Armistice of 1918 would have gone down in history as the most brilliant mili-

tary gain of the entire war. Even if the Germans had been able to recuperate so far as to resume the offensive, the Allies could have held the Rhine until the blockade finished the war. If the Armistice had not been signed and if the Germans had been able to continue resistance, the barrier of the Rhine could have been won by the Allies only at a staggering price. The Rhine concerned Foch. To Ludendorff, however, it was a secondary line of defense. He planned his first retreat only to the Meuse. If he had held at both rivers, the cost would have been high indeed.

So let us look at the Armistice the way the Allied military leaders looked at it in 1918. It was not a peace treaty. It was merely a cessation of hostilities. Hostilities might be resumed or might not be resumed. Now, there was only one basis on which hostilities might possibly be resumed, and that was if the Allied peace terms would not be acceptable to the Germans. If that were the case, the Armistice gave the Allies a great military victory at no cost. If hostilities were not resumed, the Peace Treaty would secure for the Allies the fulfillment of all their war aims. If that were the case, what was the sense of further fighting? As a matter of fact, the Germans accepted the terms of the Armistice and the terms of the Peace Treaty without question. After the number of machine guns to be surrendered was cut down to 25,000, thus leaving 5,000 machine guns for the scientific and wholesale slaughter of the folks back home, the only German objection to the Armistice terms was about the matter of the blockade. The negotiators did not trust the generosity and the ability of the Allies and the United States to feed starving Germany. As a matter of fact, that phase of the peace was amazingly well performed.

Now let us look at the Armistice from the point of view of Germany. Could Germany have continued? Practically no war is ever fought to the last ditch or to the last man. Germany was ready for surrender on September 28, when Ludendorff recognized the complete hopelessness of ever attaining Germany's war aims. Almost always such recognition marks the conclusion of the war effort on the part of the aggressor belligerent. The war is fought for a definite purpose. If that purpose cannot be achieved, there is no sense in fighting on. It was not a question of costs with Germany. Many wars end because the aggressor can attain his ends only by paying too big a price for them. Germany did not hesitate at the cost.

After the Armistice, two broken and bitterly disappointed old men, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, wrote their memoirs. The following were their explanations of their failure: It was not the fault of their leadership, not the fault of the splendid armies they commanded; it was the stab in the back and the collapse of the home front, the villainy of the Allied politicians that had turned their brilliant victories into disgraceful defeats. They could have retired to the Meuse, shortened their lines, and held on forever. The Allies were ready to quit, but they did not know it. The thousands of weak, unpatriotic troops who threw away their arms and surrendered made the German armies not weaker but stronger, for they left a tight, united corps of patriotic heroes who could have defeated anything the Allies could turn against them.

It is strange that German generals, reared on the doctrines of von Clausewitz, could fail so signally to realize the fundamental truth that when the war will is broken, the country

is defeated. And the war will of Germany had cracked as completely as that of any defeated nation in history. It was demonstrated not only in the revolution, but in the armed forces; not merely in the navy, but in the fighting front as well; not merely among the enlisted men, but in the officer personnel. And the first man to suggest surrender was Ludendorff himself. Yet the apologia of Ludendorff and that of Hindenburg gave rise in Germany to the nonsense that Germany won the war but was cheated by the Treaty of Versailles.

That lesson has been taught to German youth. That lesson became the rallying cry of Hitler and his gangsters. It is utterly without foundation in fact. The Allies won the war by cracking the German will to resist. The Allies won a great military victory. By signing the Armistice in 1918 they achieved everything they could have achieved if they had marched into Berlin.

Why, then, did the war of 1914-'18 break out again in 1939? Why did not the Treaty of Versailles, which was to have ended all wars, succeed in its main purpose? It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the making of peace treaties, and particularly the most elaborate, the most stupid, and the most futile treaty the world has ever known. But this much we can say. Woodrow Wilson announced in his Fourteen Points a League of Nations to enforce perpetual peace. He did not think through that proposition. He went to the peace conference with the proposal but without a plan, and he failed, most signally, to sell the idea to his own country before he left.

In its international politics the United States has been strongly isolationist from the day when George Washington

advised against entangling foreign alliances. But Wilson's colossal egotism made him believe he was the United States and that whatever he thought and said and did would be ratified without question by the Senate and by the people at large. The United States never joined the League of Nations. The organization that was to enforce the Treaty of Versailles, prevent the recurrence of war, and guarantee the future of the world, turned into a pompous, ridiculous, and utterly powerless debating society which gained no more respect than its futility deserved.

Thus, peace was made in the form of a treaty with a country whose entire history was characterized by flagrant disregard of all treaties, and this treaty was left without any means to enforce it. Germany's violations were made at first cautiously and gingerly. Germany sank her navy. Germany got away with the Ruhr plebiscite. Germany rearmed. She built airplanes and a new navy. She marched her youth. Armed them with shovels, then with rifles, then with machine guns and tanks. She refused to pay her reparations and waited to see what would happen. Each time she dared to flout a provision of the Treaty of Versailles, she waited to see what would happen.

Nothing happened.

So Germany set out in 1939 to win the war she lost in 1918.

It is perhaps unnecessary to summarize the causes of that defeat. In the military sense, the war was lost at the end of the last great offensive in July, 1918. From then on it became increasingly clear that Germany could not attain her war aims, and when that happens an aggressor nation should make peace. She might have attained her war aims in that last push but for the grasping and ungenerous Treaty of

Brest-Litovsk. But with one-fifth of her forces compelled by her own lack of generosity to occupy the eastern front, Germany lacked the manpower to turn her failure into the success she so nearly achieved.

With that hope gone, the nation collapsed. It is a strange thing that the sufferings and privations which can be endured as long as victory is in sight become unendurable the minute hope is lost. Starvation, shortage of materials, the prospect of a worse winter following a bad summer, new ideas introduced by the Bolsheviks, the hope of salvation in the Messiah-like Woodrow Wilson, a defeated, inactive and rebellious navy, all brought about the collapse not only of the home front but of the fighting forces as well. Germany's will to war was finished.

The most conspicuous aspect of the ending of the war was its tremendous suddenness. In April, the cause of the Allies seemed more hopeless than at any time in the long conflict. In July, the start of the last offensive seemed as if it might decide the war in favor of Germany. That was how it seemed to America, fresh in the contest, not exhausted by the long years since 1914, with its manpower largely intact, its industry but slightly disrupted, and a comfortably large ocean between the enemy and ourselves. What must it have seemed to the French, the British, the Belgians? Yet from July to November was a dazzlingly short period, a period of success we could not trust, a period of rumors of German collapse which we had heard a thousand times before. We did not realize that hardness and brittleness are somehow related, and that Germany would crack with resounding suddenness at an end that was unbelievably near. The revolution swept through Germany like wildfire. The overwhelming

desire to end the war was universal. The situation changed day by day, hour by hour, in a mad scurry to get it over with.

We have avoided predictions in this book but we will dare to make this one. When Germany collapses this time, it will be sudden and unexpected, for Germany is still hard, and hardness and brittleness somehow go together.

E L E V E N

The Way of the Aggressor

THIS BOOK IS NOT CONCERNED with the rights and wrongs of war. It does not discuss the question of blame. So, in making use of the term "aggressor," we do not imply anything about the righteousness of that party's cause. This explanation is necessary because the pacifists use the same term to designate the party on whom they place the blame of war. The term requires definition; and, for our purposes we define it as follows: The aggressor in war is the belligerent that aims to change the *status quo*.

The Colonies were the aggressors in the American Revolution. The South was the aggressor in our Civil War. The Boers were the aggressors in South Africa. It does not matter who struck first. All these parties wished independence, or an overthrow of the existing government. They wanted to change the *status quo*.

In many wars, such as the two World Wars, the Crimean,

the wars of Frederick the Great, the wars for the unification of Germany, territory was the aim—something to seize, capture, annex—a change in the *status quo*.

We shall coin another word—the aggressee. For our purposes the aggressee is defined as the opponent of the aggressor, the belligerent whose aim in the war is to maintain the *status quo*.

We think these definitions are valid and useful. The war aims of the belligerents place them in one category or the other, and their attitude toward peace, or the ending of the war, may be predicted pretty accurately by the category into which they fall.

There are just two possible situations in any war fought to a conclusion—the aggressor wins or the aggressor loses. The attitude toward peace on the part of both belligerents changes materially with these two situations. Also, the question of victory is difficult to define, as its concept differs widely from war to war.

Let us assume first the clearest possible case. The aggressor wins the military victory so decisively that the aggressee has no further power to resist. As we have seen, this happens occasionally in warfare, but not very often. The aggressor imposes his will upon the aggressee and attains the fulfillment of all his war aims. Sometimes he goes farther than his expressed aims, occupies or reduces the conquered state to vassalage, or imposes a penalty or indemnity to make the aggressee pay for the war or otherwise enrich the aggressor. Sometimes the aggressor is generous, pays for the territory taken by conquest, and is satisfied with the mere attainment of the war aims.

Such a case is simple, and simple cases are rare.

Now suppose a case where the aggressor wins, but the aggressee still has power to resist. Can a nation be defeated and still have power to resist? Yes. As you have seen from the review of the wars we have covered, this is the usual case. The aggressee is definitely vanquished, wants to stop, finds peace now more agreeable than possible victory later. Still more frequently, the aggressee can see no hope of victory and sues for peace before he is definitely defeated.

In such a case, peace will come or not according to the acceptability of the terms to each belligerent. Usually the victorious aggressor attains most of his objectives, but abates some of them as the price for the cessation of resistance. No war is ever won except at staggering cost. The last phases of a war, the stamping out of each lingering ember of resistance, is often the most costly phase of it. It comes when the victor is war-wearied, impoverished, and almost as ready to quit as the vanquished. When this cost is weighed against the abatement of some objectives, it makes sense to give up the objectives and save the cost.

So we may conclude that the victorious aggressor is willing to make peace as soon as all, or most of, his objectives are attained. Hitler asked for and expected peace after the fall of Poland and again after the fall of France. Doubtless Japan has been ready for peace ever since the fall of Singapore. But the remaining aggressees in this war have a failing incomprehensible to German and Japanese minds. They do not know when they are licked. As a consequence, peace, when it comes, will illustrate the other situation, in which the aggressor is the vanquished.

Usually when this situation occurs, the aggressor simply abandons his war aims and accepts the *status quo*. Then the

war is over. Since the war aim of the aggressee was simply to maintain the *status quo*, there is no point in his fighting on.

The decision of the aggressor to abandon his war aims may be based upon the fact that he can fight no longer. But this is rarely the case. Usually he reaches the decision because his costs are mounting to the point where the gains, still attainable, will not be worth the price.

This does not always happen. The aggressor has his face to save. The war develops new objectives. The aggressor fights on for the sake of fighting. Quite obviously this is what happened in World War I. When Von Kluck was turned back at the first battle of the Marne, the Germans should have realized that whatever they could win would be at too great a price. Neither side had won a victory. The idea of "peace without victory" should have had a real appeal to Germany at that time.

In the wars we have studied in this book, the Crimean War is most typical of the case of the vanquished aggressor. The defeat of the Russians led to the abandonment of the war aim of seizing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The accession of Alexander to the throne made it unnecessary even to save face. For Alexander had not started the war, was unsympathetic with it, had always wanted peace. The peace terms, which denied him fulfillment of his predecessor's ambitions, were perfectly acceptable to him because they were not his ambitions. There was no question of Russia's being able to continue the war. The loss of the Crimea was not fatal to her. She had the means and the manpower for fighting total war.

In World War I, Ludendorff suggested suing for peace because he saw that Germany could not win. On September

28, 1918, he did not realize that the country was crumbling behind him, that the entire German nation not only could not win but could not fight any longer. Ludendorff's reasoning was entirely in accordance with the aggressor's doctrine—when you can't win, make peace as soon as possible.

In a war for independence the action usually continues until the aggressor wins or is able to fight no longer. Perhaps that is because independence is worth anything that it may cost. It is not like a war for the acquisition of territory because territory usually has its price, a fairly definite price and usually not too steep. Thus the Confederate States fought until they could fight no longer although it must have been evident sometime in 1864 that the Confederacy could not win. With the perspective of history, we can see that that should have been obvious after Gettysburg in 1863, but it surely was not clear to the South at that time. They continued to win brilliant victories almost to the last.

In the Boer War, also a war for independence, it should have been obvious to the Boers after Paardeberg that victory was impossible. The Boers were the aggressors.* They

* Classification of the Boers as aggressors or aggresses is admittedly controversial, even under our limited definitions. Both parties had war aims to change the *status quo*. The changes the British desired were to gain an adequate franchise for the Uitlanders (mainly British subjects resident in the Transvaal) and to abolish certain monopolies that discriminated against them. To that extent they were aggressors. The avowed purpose of the Boers was to "sweep the British into the sea"—in other words, out of all their colonies in South Africa.

Britain had annexed the Transvaal in 1877 on the invitation of President Burgers to straighten out the debt of the state and to protect it from the Zulus in the forthcoming Zulu War. A taxation question led to the first Boer War in 1880, in which the British were defeated. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 granted self-government to the Boers but *subject to British suzerainty*. The London Convention of 1884 specifically cancelled certain clauses of the 1881 Convention but did not raise the question of suzerainty. The Boers claimed

wished to change the *status quo*. But somehow they made the British appear to be the aggressors and from that time on they fought merely defensive action. The war became a habit in the third year, and the Boers obviously enjoyed the minor successes of their guerrilla warfare. They fought until they could fight no longer. They did not stop when it was obvious they could not attain their war aims.

In anything approaching rebellion, revolution, or civil war, however, there always enters into consideration the personal risk of the combatants. They are rebelling against a lawfully constituted authority. They are personally guilty of treason, and it has been the long and sad history of treason that the guilty party pays for his defeat by the loss of his life. If he wins independence, he is safe. If he does not attain his independence, he is hunted down like a mad dog and is executed. Thus, in any war of this nature, the defeated party fights on long after all hope of winning has been abandoned because he hopes by prolonged resistance to win a personal pardon for his activities, although he has given up all hope of attaining the war aims.

It is interesting to compare the fate of the aggressor in the American Revolution and in the Russo-Japanese War.

independence as a result of this, and one of their aims was to gain the complete independence they claimed.

A broad view of the whole controversy would seem to show that the *status quo* in 1899 was that the Transvaal was self-governing, subject to British suzerainty. The Boers' war aim was to change that *status quo* to complete independence. The British wished to maintain that *status quo*, and the first clause of their peace terms granted amnesty and repatriation only to Boers duly declaring themselves subjects of King Edward VII. Since this issue outweighs all others, we think it fair to list the Boers as the aggressors. The fact that the Jameson Raid six months before hostilities started was the first breach of the peace, or that the Boers fired the first shot of the actual war, or that the Boers sent the British an ultimatum, or that they invaded Natal has no bearing on the case if we stick to our definition of aggressor.

In the first case the aggressor was utterly exhausted. The American patriots were unable to do anything further, yet they sent their ablest men to the peace conference and attained their sole objective as a condition in advance of the negotiations. Then, with the main issue granted without question, they disputed the less important details of boundaries, fishing rights, and matters of that sort. The Japanese, on the other hand, were not exhausted. They may have thought they were, but by comparison with the present war they could have had no conception of what exhaustion means. Above all, they wanted an indemnity, but they emerged from the peace conference with no indemnity and without even exacting payment for part of Sakhalin Island, a concession they could easily have obtained.

Napoleon should have realized that the attainment of his war aims against Russia was impossible long before he reached Moscow. The "scorched earth" policy of the Russians did not even appear as a policy to Napoleon until two weeks after his staff officers had noted it. He was blindly anxious to push on to engage the Russian main forces in the manner of the other wars he had fought, and he was certain that when he took Moscow, the "second capital" of Russia, he could bring Russia to her knees. He failed to consider that the Russians might have a different attitude toward their capital than the Paris-worshipping French toward theirs. But Napoleon revealed to us the sometimes blind hope of the aggressor belligerent who, although beaten, somehow believes that further fighting, even though unsuccessful, may attain the end. War becomes a habit, and nations who once start fight for the sake of fighting. They do not see the other fellow's point of view. They refuse to believe they cannot

achieve with weakened forces and a war-weary country what they failed to achieve in the full flush of their unabated might and power.

Let us inquire into the situation in the present war at the time this is being written. Both Germany and Japan are the aggressors within the meaning of our definition. Both Germany and Japan have probably attained all their major objectives, and would doubtless be willing to make peace as victor nations if such terms were offered by the Allies. It must be obvious to both Germany and Japan that if any further war aims are realized it would have to be at a price neither nation could afford to pay. We are, however, rapidly reaching the situation in which both Germany and Japan will be viewed as vanquished nations, not as victor nations. The bombing of Germany has undoubtedly hurt the morale of that country almost to the breaking point. The invasion of the Continent should have a profound effect, for it must be obvious to any thinking German that if Germany cannot beat Russia alone, she cannot beat Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and the minor Allies in combination. Germany's war aims have not been merely to attack and put out of action the countries she has reduced to vassalage. These aims must have included not merely defeating these countries but holding them in the peace to come. It will not take a complete defeat or an absolute destruction of the power to resist to convince Germany that her war aims cannot be attained. A few major defeats on the Continent, an obvious demonstration of Allied superiority, will make peace terms acceptable.

Japan is in almost the same state as Germany, but not quite. Neither Japan nor Germany has won a major victory

for a long time. Japan's island empire has been pushed back appreciably since the American stand at Guadalcanal. But her loss of these outposts and her loss of command of the sea have been merely strategically important. They have not hurt the Japanese homeland. Except for two bombing raids Japan has not yet felt war at home. But both Japan and Germany have overextended themselves and cannot hope to hold such vast territorial acquisitions in the face of powerful pressure. Japan will soon learn that she cannot attain her war ends. As is the case of all aggressor nations except rebels, that recognition usually makes peace terms acceptable.

But we cannot understand the ending of this war by a study of aggressor nations alone. We must study the aggressee.

T W E L V E

. . . and the Aggressee

YOU WON'T FIND "AGGRESSEE" in any dictionary. We repeat our definitions of what is meant in this book by an accepted and a coined word. The aggressor is the belligerent whose war aim is to change the *status quo*. The aggressee is the opponent of the aggressor—the belligerent whose war aim is to maintain the *status quo*.

In Chapter Eleven we stated that if the aggressor believes he cannot attain his war aims or can attain them only at a price he is unwilling to pay, he is ready to make peace.

It would seem logical in such an instance that the aggressor would thus attain his war aims and would also be willing to make peace, without further hostilities or exactions. In the wars we have examined only the American Civil War and the Boer War ended this way. But in both these cases the victorious aggressor was in a position to work his will upon the aggressor, not in a peace treaty, but by a continuous process. Nevertheless, this has been the way in which many wars have ended. The Persian invasion of Greece under Darius is a perfect example. The invasion failed at Marathon. Darius returned to Persia. The war was over. The next Persian invasion of Greece under Xerxes was almost a repetition of the first. After the battles of Salamis and Plataea, Xerxes went home, and the war was over. True, it dragged on for a time in spots, and a century later Alexander invaded Persia in turn. But that was another war. In each case of Persia's invasions of Greece the aggressor was satisfied by maintaining the *status quo*.

But in more modern times, the solution usually has not been quite so simple. And this is as it should be. Were it not so, aggressor nations could try their luck in even more wars than this unhappy world has suffered. If they won cheaply, well and good. If they lost, they would merely stop and try again when fortune seemed more favorable.

To prevent such irresponsible war-making, the aggressor usually adds to his war aim of maintaining the *status quo* two other concepts: First, the defeated aggressor must pay a penalty for his aggression. Second, he must be prevented from ever repeating his offence.

The penalty is known by various names—reparations, indemnity—but it is always a penalty for wrong done and, as

nearly as may be, a restoration of the damages caused. Of course, money cannot pay for lives and nothing can restore the waste and irreparable loss of material things destroyed forever in war. But reparations and indemnities are merely the best, if clumsy, approach we can make to balancing the disturbed scales of international justice.

In the wars we have reviewed, we have seen Prussia demand an indemnity from France and make France maintain the German army of occupation until the indemnity was paid. We have seen the Allies impose reparations on Germany in World War I, and then fail to collect. We have seen Japan, an aggressor, try to impose an indemnity on Russia at the peace of Portsmouth; but an indemnity is properly a penalty to be imposed not on the loser but on the vanquished aggressor, and Russia's staunch and successful refusal was at least right in theory.

The problem of preventing the aggressor from repeating his attempt has been met in many ways. In the American Civil War the Union amended the Constitution and abolished slavery, the underlying cause of the war. Then the army and the carpetbaggers moved in and saw to it that slavery could never be re-established. When the "Reconstruction" was completed, no war, however successful, could again restore that institution. So, with the cause removed, there was no danger of any fresh outbreak.

When the Allies emerged victorious from the Napoleonic wars, it was a very simple matter to guarantee peace. For war depended upon just one man—Napoleon himself. Secure him, and Europe would be secure. Without him, France was impotent, and France desired peace as sincerely as her enemies. But the Allies bungled that job. They should not

have restored the Bourbons. And they should have been more realistic than to have thought that Elba could hold the man all Europe had been trying without success to hold for twenty years. The second solution was the same as the first, with a few more miles intervening. It worked, because the flame in the man had burned out—not because St. Helena was farther away than Elba.

The rather fatuous guarantee of World War I—the “War to End Wars”—was the disarmament of Germany. The world saw Germany rearm, and did nothing about it. Nay, worse. While Germany built battleships, planes, and tanks, the rest of the world limited its armaments, sank its navies, and devoted its attention to making money and then causing a tremendous financial depression that called for its undivided attention. Germany, crushed by its defeat, ceased to be an important market for the goods of the rest of the money-mad world. So it behooved us all to get Germany back on her feet in order that she might buy our goods. Disarmament means nothing if we permit a nation to re-establish the industries that can produce arms. Treaties mean nothing without a force to pounce upon every violation and punish it ruthlessly and terribly.

It matters little what guarantees we exact of Germany and Japan in the treaties that will end the present war. What does matter is the force we maintain to see that the provisions of the treaties are observed. What does matter is the unsparing, terrific use we make of that force to punish the slightest violation. What does matter is that vigilance shall not be relaxed for at least fifty years.

The next war must never get a start. Innocent marching youth, an innocuous flying field on a coral atoll, an out-

burst of uniforms, of black shirts or brown, commercial machinery that can be turned into war machinery, regimentation, flamboyant patriotism—we know what they mean now. But we knew what they meant right along.

God grant us a realistic point of view. Send us strong leaders. Give us the courage to start small wars that we may prevent great ones.

We have considered what happens when the aggressee wins—the maintenance of the *status quo*, the imposition of indemnities, the establishment of measures to prevent a recurrence. Now, what happens when the aggressee loses?

We saw Spain grant all the demands of the United States in 1898. Doubtless we could have demanded the Philippines without paying \$20,000,000 for them. But, though the purchase of those islands was unwise, it was wiser and cheaper to pay for them in money than in money and blood. And that payment was a face-saver for Spain which made the peace negotiations easy. There was a nice bit of international morality in the Philippine business. We had not fought the war for the Philippines. Our avowed purpose was to free Cuba. It was easy to deduce from this purpose that we wanted to get Spain out of our hemisphere entirely, and so we took Porto Rico. But acquisition of the Philippines was not even remotely a corollary of our war aims, and if we wanted them, it was right that we should pay for them.

But what was the attitude of Spain? It would seem that she was well rid of her colonies. She had milked them since the days of Columbus. For a time they had made her great, powerful, rich. Now they were liabilities. It was humiliating to have the war aims of the enemy forced upon her, but with her navy destroyed, her army in Cuba defeated, fur-

ther effort was likely to be even more disastrous, and those colonies were not worth the price.

Similarly, Russia knew that Port Arthur and the financial success of the Trans-Siberian Railway were not worth the price of further hostilities against Japan. She had more pressing troubles at home.

We have thus considered the end of a war from the point of view of the aggressor and the aggressee, when each is victorious and when each is vanquished. The differences are perhaps a bit subtle, but the distinctions are valid because the war aims in each case depend upon changing or maintaining the *status quo*. With this fundamental distinction in mind we can apply the analogies of past wars to the present conflict.

The strange thing about the present war is that both aggressor nations have identical but irreconcilable war aims. Each wants to conquer the world. And there is only one world to conquer. It is idle to discuss what would happen if either came close to succeeding.

Hitler's ambitions (his war aims) are too well known to warrant exposition here. But somehow Japan's declaration of ambition, the Tanaka Memorial, is less well known.

In 1927, there appeared a document which revealed unmistakably Japan's attitude toward the United States, and which is generally called the "Tanaka Memorial." It appeared in a Japanese newspaper and was ascribed to General Gūchi Tanaka, then Prime Minister of Japan. Let us quote from it:

"For settling difficulties in Eastern Asia, Japan must adopt a policy of Blood and Iron. . . . In order to conquer

the world, Japan must conquer Europe and Asia; in order to conquer Europe and Asia, Japan must first conquer China, and in order to conquer China, Japan must conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. Japan expects to fulfil the above program in ten years.”

Another line in the Memorial is pointed specifically at us. “In the future, if we wish to control China the primary move is to crush the United States.”

The Tanaka Memorial was badly timed. It showed Japan's hand at a time when she was not ready to play it. So its authenticity was denied. Today it is generally believed to be genuine. Note its ambitions: Crush the United States! Conquer Manchuria and Mongolia! Conquer China! Conquer Europe and Asia! Conquer the world!

Such ambition out-Hitlers Hitler. Sixteen years have passed instead of ten; the United States is still a long way from being crushed. China is still unconquered. And Europe seems reasonably safe from Japan, although it has enough other troubles. The world is a long way from being conquered. It is a big world nowadays. But the Tanaka Memorial is clearly the *Mein Kampf* of Japan—the expression of her national dream of world conquest.

With such sweeping ambitions, it will be difficult to determine just when the aggressor nations will feel that their war aims have been sufficiently fulfilled, or just when further aggressions will not be worth the price, or just when they will lose hope of fulfilling any of their war aims by consolidating their gains at the peace table.

But we believe that all considerations based upon Japan and Germany winning are purely academic. The wish is

not father to that thought. Until recently no honest observer could have an absolute conviction of our ultimate victory. We have been perilously close to defeat. But now it seems unnecessary to consider the end of this war from any point of view other than that of an Allied victory.

Right now, Germany and Japan are probably ready to sit at a peace table and swap some of their immense gains for permanent and acknowledged retention of other gains and a cessation of hostilities. They would sit as victors.

The Allies are not having any, thank you. They will sit at the peace table as victors, or not at all. If they sit as victors, Germany and Japan will sit as the vanquished.

The Allies will dictate the terms. They probably will be: Maintenance of the *status quo* in Europe as prior to the Munich Pact. Maintenance of the *status quo* in Asia as prior to the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Possibly inequities to other European countries will be remedied. Possibly old wrongs will be righted, Korea freed, the Liaotung Peninsula and Sakhalin Island restored to Russia, Formosa restored to China, the mandated islands amputated from Japan.

Then the Allies will insist upon reparations and indemnities and punishment (they mean it this time) of war criminals. Probably the reparations and indemnities will be in the form of territory. Then we shall insist upon safeguards for the future.

That picture is not far from the unconditional surrender terms officially announced.

Will Hitler, and Hirohito's hot-heads listen to such terms? Probably not. Not even when they realize that their war aims can never be achieved even in part.

But we shall not be dealing with Hitler, nor with Hirohito's hot-heads. The men who will make the peace will not be the men who made the war.

T H I R T E E N

The Revolution

IT IS STRANGE that in the majority of the wars we have reviewed the party that made the peace was not the party that made the war.

In the American Revolution, the overthrow of the Tories and the rise of the Whigs had a very material effect upon our victory. The Tories made the war. The Whigs made the peace.

Czar Nicholas started the Crimean War; Czar Alexander finished it.

In the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon III was a prisoner and, long before the end, no longer Emperor. The provisional government made the peace that closed the war he started. Even this new government faced an incipient revolution.

The Germans deposed the Kaiser in 1918 because Wilson would not treat with him. The French deposed Napoleon I twice because the victorious Allies demanded it. Jefferson Davis fled at the end of the Civil War, leaving no Confederate

government at all. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed with the revolutionists, not with the Czar.

These wars were selected for a variety of reasons, but with no thought of the aspect of internal change. So it is rather significant that in the ten treaties of peace studied, seven were made with a power or party that did not start the war. In each of these seven cases, the change of power occurred in the vanquished belligerent.

Let us examine the three remaining wars of our study—the Spanish-American, the Russo-Japanese, and the Boer wars. The Spanish-American War lasted only four months. It can scarcely be considered typical. Its short duration barely disturbed Spain, caused no strain on her population, no excessive drain on her manpower, no disturbance of her economic life. It was over before the seeds of revolution could take root. There was a revolution later, when Alfonso was overthrown and the republic established. But Alfonso was a boy in 1898. Any attempt to prove that the war was instrumental in establishing the new regime would seem to be special pleading.

In the Russo-Japanese War, there was no overthrow of the Czar. The man who started the war also finished it. But the unsuccessful rebellion in Russia was definitely a factor in the making of the peace. If we could afford the space, we could establish a very sound case for the thesis that the Treaty of Portsmouth postponed until 1917 the revolution that started in 1905. Russia was forced to treat with Japan, not by Japan's victories alone but by her own very serious troubles at home.

Only in the Boer War did the same general group of leaders who made the war also make the peace. They were

not identical. But they were men of the same political ideology. They could not honestly be represented as a different regime.

In each case the change of regime was definitely caused by the war, unless we except the Crimean War. It is not definitely known that Nicholas committed suicide, or that his suicide was caused, as alleged, by despondency over his military defeat. But if that theory be accepted, the chain is complete.

Surely the triumph of the Whigs over the Tories was due to the Tories' unsuccessful conduct of Britain's numerous and expensive wars. Napoleon III was captured—a direct act of war. In 1918, Wilson advanced an acceptable basis for peace, but excluded dealings with the Kaiser. The Germans could have peace without the Kaiser or war with him. They chose peace. In precisely the same way, the French could have peace without Napoleon I or war with him. They, too, chose peace.

In the present war, we saw Daladier begin it for France and Petain finish it; we saw Mussolini begin it for Italy and Badoglio finish it.

The change of regime was not only caused by the war. It was also instrumental in the ensuing peace. In each case almost the very first act of the new regime was to open peace negotiations. In each case the enemy was willing and anxious to deal with the new regime.

It seems fair to conclude that a change of regime for the vanquished comes close to being a condition precedent for the making of peace. At any rate, we may state without fear of contradiction that it helps.

What are the necessary characteristics of the new regime

to make it function as an instrument of peace? There would seem to be no common denominator other than political opposition to the old. It is certainly not necessary that it be a republic, that it represent the common people, or that it be based upon any of the other ideals dear to the American heart. Louis was no more republican than Napoleon; but his restoration established a perfectly satisfactory basis for peace. Alexander was as absolute a monarch as Nicholas, but when he came to the throne, peace followed.

All that seems to be necessary is to have a fresh party in the picture—one that did not start the war and would be glad to open negotiations for peace.

If this is the case, if a new regime for the vanquished is a useful and almost a necessary instrument for peace, then it would seem logical to make a change of regime for our opponents one of our fundamental war aims. Wilson saw this clearly, directed his propaganda toward it, distinguished between the German Kaiser and the German people, demanded the overthrow of the Kaiser before he would consent to an armistice.

In the present war we are making a similar effort in the encouragement of the German Underground. We know that the Nazis have as many enemies in Germany as they have outside, and we are hoping for the uprising that thus far has given little evidence of succeeding. The Gestapo is ruling with too strong a hand. Of course, every bomb that falls on Germany can be blamed on the Allies and equally on the Nazis who gave solemn promises such a short time ago that the Fatherland could never be bombed. It is important that the Germans should be taught that if they want

the bombing to stop it is in their own power to stop it. Kick out Hitler and his gang. That's all.

It should be no more difficult to produce a change of regime in Japan than in Germany. Most of Japan's god-emperors have been figureheads. A change of ministry in Japan amounts to a change of regime. It is not necessary to dispose of the charming Hirohito, though that is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

Since the disestablishment of the Samurai in 1871 the domestic history of Japan has been a tale of frequent revolutions. Since 1921, the beginning of the Showa period in Japanese chronology, when Hirohito first became regent, there has been a series of assassinations, revolts, and political reversals unmatched even in Europe. Of the eighteen prime ministers who have held office since the first World War, five have been assassinated.

In the dreadful affair known as the "two-twenty-six"—because it occurred on the twenty-sixth of February, 1936—mutineers of the army murdered Admiral Viscount Saito, Lord Privy Seal and prime minister; General Jotaro Watanabe, Inspector General of Military Education; and Kori-kiyo Takahashi, the Finance Minister. They seriously wounded Admiral Suzuki, the Grand Chamberlain; and in attempting to kill the prime minister, Kensuke Okada, they killed his brother-in-law by mistake. In all, they marked for assassination twenty-four eminent Japanese.

No Nazi Putsch could beat that.

In July, 1941, just four months before Pearl Harbor, Yonai was ousted as premier and Konoye succeeded him, backed by a new cabinet of hot-heads. This is the Japanese war-party we are fighting. Can we believe that the old peace

party, pushed out by the strong-arm methods which Hitler and Mussolini taught, is entirely without a following? Can we feel that the great commercial houses of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, Suminoto, and Yasuda, with their great wealth and influence, and with ruination facing them because of the war, are not ready for a Putsch of their own?

Make no mistake, revolution is as imminent a possibility in Japan as in Germany.

But we can expect no revolution in either country until the economic strain and the military pressure become severe. Except for the bombing of Germany, which is probably more effective than our public believes and less effective than the air enthusiasts hope, there has been no appreciable military pressure on either country up to the time of this writing. By "appreciable military pressure" we mean the sort of pressure that brings about a revolution. Right now it looks nearer in Germany than in Japan. But perhaps the control of the Gestapo will make more pressure necessary in Germany.

At any rate, it would appear that our prime objective is to foment in both countries a change of regime as a helpful and probably necessary instrument of peace.

It will take rare political perspicacity to determine whether the peace party, the new regime, really represents the people, whether it is a true or a false front, whether it will remain in power long enough to make a treaty binding. These things seem beyond the power of determination.

F O U R T E E N

Full Faith and Credit

WHEN TWO PARTIES MAKE AN AGREEMENT, they have to trust each other. It is strange that the moral standards that govern ordinary people are rarely observed by those who govern them. Chicanery in high places is applauded as statesmanship. Breaking a solemn promise is regarded as an achievement of note.

But the dishonest individual soon finds himself handicapped by loss of credit, and the dishonest nation pays the same penalty in international affairs. Sooner or later the powers that break treaties find they are unable to make them. When Hitler conquered Poland, he brazenly offered to cease hostilities and make a treaty of peace. He actually seemed surprised that Britain refused to negotiate. This refusal, he declared, put the blame for the war on the enemy. It is almost unbelievable, but true, that the Germans accept this fiction. The entire German nation is so warped in its political morality that it feels that it can break treaties with impunity and with the full expectation that it can go right on making fresh treaties to be broken in turn. The Germans cannot understand that their Fuehrer is an outlaw, without credit, that he has forfeited forever the privilege of solving international problems by this peaceful means.

The treacherous Japanese have earned this same inglorious discredit. You can't do business with either nation. And therein lies the single greatest handicap to an early peace. Yet the problem is not new. When the peace is of the character known as a "dictated" peace, it would seem particularly difficult, while a "negotiated" peace would seem to be relatively simple. We think that if two warring parties agree, the peace will be acceptable to both, and it will therefore last. On the other hand, if the promises and agreements of the defeated belligerent are exacted at the point of a gun, we can expect them to be broken. Unfortunately the line of demarcation between a dictated and a negotiated peace is not very sharp. Seldom are both sides equally anxious to break off hostilities. The side that is more anxious is capable of only a small residue of resistance, and the other side is pretty well able to evaluate it accurately. It is willing to pay a small price, usually in the form of some concession or some small abatement of its war aims, to buy off this residue of resistance. The defeated, or more anxious, side realizes that it cannot win, that sooner or later capitulation is inevitable, and that its best time to make peace is while there is a modicum of resistance left to bargain with.

You can call such a peace a negotiated peace if you like. It does not differ in any real essential from a dictated peace. The promises exacted by the victor are like those exacted by a burglar when he demands the solemn word of his victim not to call the police for half an hour after his departure. The man who makes such a promise to a burglar does not intend to keep it, and if he should, he would probably lose what little respect the burglar ever had for him. In the case of nations, the individuals who sign the treaties may do so

in full faith, but the folks back home do not feel that *they* are bound by what a pusillanimous negotiator signed for them. It may be expected that they will discredit the negotiator and repudiate those parts of the treaty that are not agreeable.

If you can expect that attitude from a nation in defeat, you excuse it only on the ground of the nature of the promise—the fact that it was exacted at the point of a gun. But when a nation is not exhausted, when it is fully capable of waging war, and is actually threatening to do so against another nation that does not want war, the gun is held by the first party. Hitler held a gun at Chamberlain. Japan held a gun at us. In return for enormous and humiliating concessions, Hitler promised peace and straightway broke his word. Japan attacked us while negotiations were under way. If you cannot trust people like that when they hold the gun, how will it be possible to trust them to carry out terms forced upon them?

True, we will not deal with Hitler nor with the faction at present in power in Japan. But it is fatuous to suppose that a people is fundamentally different from its masters. We like to think that Hitler is imposed upon the Germans by his gangster methods; and there is certainly ample evidence to support this contention. But if he does not owe his power to the German will, at least he owes it to German complacency. Because of this complacency, Germany is equally guilty with Hitler.

We cannot honestly maintain that Hitler is the only treaty breaker. We can no more deal with the politically dishonest German people than with their politically dishonest leader. So, when the revolution comes, it will not bring with it a

ready solution to this problem. Any German must be presumed to be politically treacherous, for that is the diplomatic tradition and the moral heritage of the German people.

With Japan, we cannot be quite so sure. Japan's disregard of treaties and her characteristic treachery in warfare incline us to believe that no Japanese can ever be trusted. Yet there are dependable men of good will in Japan, men who kept amicable, trustful relationships with us for many years. If these men could be returned to power, and if there were any assurance that they would be kept in power, we could possibly do business with them. It is not recommended that we try. It is mentioned merely as a possibility. If this war follows the precedent of other wars, these men will be in power at the end.

Of all the wars we have studied, one is unique in that there was no peace treaty—the American Civil War. Yet no war could have been terminated more completely. Nearly eighty years have passed since Appomattox, and, except for some futile local threats of rebellion, not a cloud has appeared on the horizon. The North and the South are as united today as if the Civil War had never been fought. Of course, this was a civil war—not a war between nations. The winner stepped right in and governed the loser. It did not go away with its job half finished. The real peace terms, the three postwar amendments to the Constitution, were written right into the fundamental law of both the winner and the loser, and the courts and the whole power of the combined nation enforced that law.

Let us not overlook that very important point. The machinery had been set up and operating for a long time to interpret the law that was in fact the peace treaty. No treaty

has ever had anything like that behind it—power to interpret, power to enforce. Nations that observe international law accept it as the law of the land, but they do their own interpreting. The one body that approached the ideal of international interpretation of international law was The League of Nations, but it had no powers of enforcement.

The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution struck at the roots of the cause of the war that had just ended. They wiped out slavery. Somehow in our warped and twisted teaching of American history there has arisen a fantastic theory that slavery was not the cause of the Civil War. It was State's Rights, or Secession, or some other rationalized nonsense. Let us be simple and realistic about it. If there had been no slavery, there would have been no Civil War. There is no slavery today. There is no chance of another Civil War.

Here, then, was a war that ended without a treaty. Here was a peace that has lasted and that will certainly last in the future. Here is a nation that once engaged in the bloodiest war ever known up to that time now completely united, with the former belligerents working in absolute harmony. Can we not seek out and apply to our present problem the principles that here worked out so happily?

Toward the belligerents themselves, there was generosity and forgiveness. "With malice toward none, with charity for all." Toward the defeated nation there was nothing but unconditional surrender, no peace terms, no peace treaty, but a fundamental law binding upon conqueror and conquered alike, interpreted by an able court and enforced strictly by the conqueror. The conquered also had a voice. The interpretation of that law has extended to corporations

in the North as well as to slavery and peonage in the South. It has found expression in labor disputes and in taxation, and has been applied in thousands of cases never contemplated when the laws were written. But the principles are sound. Our adherence to them is part of the safeguards of our liberty and our internal peace.

It is difficult to conceive of all the changes that have come over our nation since the days of the Civil War, yet the principles of the amendments apply as well today as they did when they were written. No peace treaty the world has ever known could stand the changes of eighty years and still be as good as when it was written. Peace treaties do not state principles. They freeze a temporary and disordered situation and attempt to make it last forever, without any machinery to adapt it to changing conditions.

This raises the question: Is a treaty of peace really necessary to end a war? If you are dealing with a people whom you cannot trust, why place your faith in a treaty?

Let us examine the nature of a peace treaty. It is obviously an agreement, a meeting of minds of two parties who have heretofore been in disagreement to the point of maximum violence. Now one has imposed his will upon the other.

It is like two small boys in a fight. A says to B, "Give me your candy!"

B replies, "I won't!" A beats up B. B decides that the candy is not worth the beating. B gives A the candy and the fight is over. They do not need a treaty. But A's nose is bleeding. He feels that he has paid too much for his candy. He demands that B bring him a piece of candy every day. B agrees. They have made a treaty. B gives A candy every day for a while because of his memory of that beating. Soon he

realizes that A is remembering his bloody nose. A does not want another. The daily piece of candy is not worth it. So B tells A he isn't going to get any more candy and what is A going to do about it? Or, if B is less daring, he just doesn't appear at the rendezvous some day. Or he appears without candy and promises to make good the next day. Very gradually, he stops his daily tribute. The treaty is broken. It was made under duress. As the duress grows remote, the treaty breaks down.

Treaties bind honest nations; they do not bind dishonest ones. Therefore they always benefit the dishonest.

Treaties are substitutes for the use of force. If the treaty is valueless without force, it is the force and not the treaty that gets the desired results for the victor.

Usually treaties are made with a new government representing the vanquished. The new government may not last. It may not truly represent the people. Its only authority may be what it has seized. It has no credit standing, no reputation for observing treaties, no record for keeping its word.

Why, then, should any victorious belligerent *ever* be willing to sign a treaty of peace? Partly because it is a habit, a custom, a formality of international law. It marks the end of a war in the same definite way in which the "declaration of war" marks the beginning. But in these degenerate times we fight undeclared wars, and it would seem logical to enjoy undeclared peace. It would seem possible also to make peace by declaring that a state of peace exists, without resorting to the formality of a treaty.

The second reason is that a treaty is a means of stopping hostilities. Every nation, winner or loser, wants to see every war stopped. No one likes a war. However ineffective a

treaty may be in securing the fulfilment of its terms, it is always effective as a means of stopping the fighting.

Finally, treaties have often been successful in bringing to pass the war aims of the victor. Given the right parties, the right terms, the right conditions, there is good reason why they should work. Our objection to treaties as the sole means of ending wars is their application in circumstances when we know they *won't* work.

There is one other fundamental trouble with peace treaties. They are always applied as a remedy to a very sick world. The doctors gather around the peace table. They amputate a province here and a colony there. They prescribe bleeding where blood transfusions are necessary. They sweat to lower fever and they starve as a cure for emaciation. A few weeks of stupid prescription and they peel off their white coats, get into their diplomatic glad rags, and sit down to a banquet to celebrate the cure of this still sick world. The critics complain that we send unwise doctors to the task, but the truth is that there are no doctors wise enough.

The illness of a war-sick world has been of very long development. The war is the acute stage. Wars take a long time gestating. What is needed is not surgery but nursing—long, intelligent, watchful, sympathetic nursing. A sick nation cannot administer to itself the medicines prescribed by another. Treaties prevent proper nursing. They get the thing over and out of the way. There is something of the “wise guy” in the make-up of every peace negotiator. John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Lord Kitchener, Lord Milner were probably the estimable people we have been taught to believe they were, but read the minutes of the treaty negotiations in which they

sat and you cannot but marvel at their narrowness, their nastiness, their lack of vision.

To draw up the perfect peace treaty is too big a job for the world's most able men. And the imperfect treaty is our greatest known trouble maker.

F I F T E E N

It Takes More Than a War to End Wars

BISMARCK IMPOSED ON FRANCE the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and an indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs. The Germans just walked in and took the provinces, but they sat down with an army of occupation until the indemnity was paid. France did not like that army of occupation. She had to support it as well as suffer its indignities, and so the indemnity was paid in a hurry.

In the Civil War, the Union army occupied the South until it was clear that slavery was wiped out forever.

At the end of World War I, the Allies occupied part of Germany until the peace treaty was signed.

After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany occupied parts of Russia. As has been pointed out, this took more men than Germany could spare from the grim business of the western front. It is obvious that Hitler cannot occupy all the countries he has conquered and fight the Allies, too.

Occupation is a necessary part of the job of nursing the

world back to health. It is unpleasant, dangerous, expensive, but there seems to be no other way to do it. Wilson tried it by setting up machinery for enforcing the Treaty of Versailles and maintaining world peace. In his Fourteen Points, he called it a league of nations—without capitals—a purely descriptive term.

That seemed generally acceptable. But when he applied the definite article and capital letters—when it ceased to be a league of nations and became The League of Nations, it was not. It appeared to the men in the street as a means of gratifying the overweening ambitions of a conceited president. Facing retirement to civil life, Woodrow Wilson wanted a bigger job than President of the United States. He wanted to make the United States an unimportant unit in a bigger country of which Wilson would be the ruler.

Of course this was absurd. Whatever Wilson's ambitions, The League of Nations was not inspired by any such Machiavellian plot, but was really necessary for its two avowed purposes. But it was never properly explained, and never properly "sold" to the American people. What is more, it was never properly thought through. It was an invention without a perfected and developed working model.

We can see now that it was improperly named. When the descriptive words of the Fourteen Points became its imposing title, they implied a subordination of its members which its members would not accept.

Americans especially, long indoctrinated by the dictum of George Washington to avoid foreign entanglements, refused to make their nation part of a larger and seemingly sovereign organization.

So the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles broke down

through the impotence of the enforcers' instrument. It is strange that so small a thing as an unfortunate name and the use of some capital letters would break down the achievements of the war to end wars. But little things often do. Of course, when The League of Nations finally emerged from Versailles after the self-seeking European nations had wrought their will upon it, it was a pretty complete hodge-podge of compromises and inconsistencies. It was not the noble but rather indefinite instrument that Wilson had conceived. When he brought back the treaty (into which The League had been incorporated) for the Senate's ratification, his political enemies found it rather easy to defeat. Wilson was then a burned-out and very sick old man. A paralytic stroke brought him to death's door, and after that the only remnant of his hitherto great powers was his obstinacy.

Perhaps the Senate was right in refusing to ratify the treaty in the form in which it came to them. Perhaps the country was right in remaining out of The League of Nations as it was constituted. But Wilson's political enemies could not have defeated The League if it had been "sold" to the country. That had never been done. The man in the street was afraid of it, not because he recognized its inadequacy but because he feared its strength. He distrusted European politicians (and with good cause). Those capital letters and the unfortunate title were really more instrumental in its failure than they have been credited.

We are talking now of an international police force to be used after the present war. That is a perfectly good description but it is hard to conceive of a worse title. It will be resented by its members and by the policed countries and will probably have a sinister effect upon its character and oper-

ations. A good title that does not imply sovereignty nor malice nor oppression, that will give pride and honor to its members is not easy to find. The best way to begin the search is to eliminate every term that might be descriptive. Here is a chance for the neologists of the advertising fraternity.

It must be obvious by now that it takes more than a war to end wars. Obviously, too, no treaty will do it. But there is one thing that will: complete disarmament, kept perpetual by prohibiting the means of rearming, and enforcing that prohibition regardless of cost and in spite of changing sentiment for not less than fifty years. That means the thorough indoctrination of our youth for a long time to come, for the police force fifty years from now will be the grandchildren of the first international police. Yet such things are not impossible. We have seen how the lingering echo of George Washington's words wrecked The League of Nations; how the Monroe Doctrine is still the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Let us be realistic about this policing job. We will probably feel that we must maintain a large, strong force at first and gradually taper it off. The reverse will be true. Germany and Japan will be heartily sick of war when "peace is declared." If we disarm them thoroughly, we shall have no immediate need for any police force at all. Spies, inspectors, and accountants to keep track of means of production are all that will be necessary. When these forces discover an airplane plant being built, a tremendous air-raid to wreck it, an invasion by paratroopers to punish the offenders, some public executions, and a mighty army of invasion mobilized swiftly and without a lot of threatening talk, will nip the next war in the bud.

Today no nation can prepare for war without showing ample signs. The first sign should open hostilities. If at any indication of war we are as ruthless as the Germans themselves, and on the other hand, tolerant and co-operative on every other count, Germany and Japan can never wage another war.

If no airplanes, air lines, gliders, were ever permitted in Germany or Japan, if no German or Japanese were ever permitted to fly in the planes of any other country, and if means for making planes in those countries were to be destroyed and never permitted to be re-established, that alone would prevent any war of the type being fought today.

Our war aims are the maintenance of the *status quo*, punishment for the war, and a guaranty that it will never start again. The rigid denial of the air to our enemies will punish them and prevent future wars until such time as some new weapon may prevent planes from operating.

Does this mean that we must start wars to prevent wars? Yes. There is no other way. Just as a surgeon cuts off a badly infected finger to prevent the necessity for cutting off an arm, so the nations who do not desire wars must fight little ones to avoid fighting big ones. Such a doctrine is directly opposed to the teachings of the pacifists. The peace-mongers, if we may use such a word without implying a disrespect we do not intend, can support their doctrines by the same sort of historical evidence we have employed in this book. They can show that little wars rapidly grow into big ones, and starting hostilities anywhere on a small scale is likely to light the conflagration. But it must be remembered that while war has not changed in all the course of history, the means of making it have. No nation can hope to win a war today

without an immense store of costly material, difficult to manufacture, impossible to conceal, and useless without a large staff of highly trained personnel. To prepare for a modern war takes time. If one nation is armed and ready, and another is not, the armed nation can impose its will on the unarmed without fail, provided only that it makes good use of that time differential.

If the armed nation strikes immediately and ruthlessly, and does not waste time in diplomatic talk, there may be a few sporadic raids, but there will be no war.

Of course, such a set-up means that in postwar prosperity Germany and Japan will have an immense advantage over the rest of the world. Their entire populations can devote themselves to the arts of peace without the burden of military establishments. But do we care? Their prosperity will help make the rest of the world prosperous. No country profits by the commercial ruination of another. Their overweening political and military ambitions must be crushed completely. They must never again be permitted to make the slightest start toward renewing what they have done to the rest of the world. Beyond that, what do we care if their rice bowls are full and they have their beer?

Of course we are talking about the ending of this war and the achievement of that most difficult of our war aims—the prevention of renewal of war with the same belligerents. To discuss the preventive measures necessary to avoid all wars is beyond the scope of this book. In general, however, there seems to be no better formula for a nation of good will, a nation that does not desire war, than to follow Theodore Roosevelt's much cartooned dictum, "Speak softly—and carry a big stick." If that stick is big enough—and we look

tough enough—no nation will dare provoke a war with us. And if our present enemies have no stick at all—not even a tooth-pick—we need never fear them again. But we must watch, pry, and stay alert. At the first sign of their reaching out for a shingle, we must swing that big stick hard. No love pats, no threats, no talk. We must hit them so that they will “stay hit” long enough to discourage any future attempt.

All the military textbooks warn against bluffing. If a disciplined armed force tries to disperse an angry mob, the officer in command must never threaten to open fire unless he means it. He must never shoot above the heads of the mob. That brings on the ugliest and bloodiest kind of fight. Let him shoot his first volley and aim to kill. In that way he disperses the mob with least bloodshed. The Chamberlains and other appeasers of 1939 tried to outbluff the best little bluffer the world has seen. We know part of what followed. And the end is not yet.

Our two oceans may not protect us in the next war. The world has shrunk in terms of time and space. But let us think not only in terms of defense but in terms of peace. Let us be prepared to strike early, hard, and without warning at any nation that threatens the peace of the world. It will cost a lot—but a lot less than war and an immeasurable lot less than defeat. Whatever it costs, peace will be worth the price.

S I X T E E N

What Makes the Loser Quit?

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, it is the vanquished who ends the war. Until he cries "Enough!" the war will go on. In the last stages, he is nearly always on the defensive. We have studied the difference in attitude between the aggressor and the aggressee. We have seen that many wars end because the war aims cannot be attained, or can be attained only at too great a price. Others end only when further resistance is impossible. Let us separate into these two classes the nine wars we have reviewed. We must approach them, of course, from the point of view of the vanquished.

The American Revolution, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Crimean War all ended because the attainment of the vanquished's war aims was not worth the price. The American Civil War, the Boer War, and the Franco-Prussian War all ended because further resistance was impossible. World War I may fairly be considered in both classifications. As a matter of fact, further resistance was impossible; but from the point of view of Ludendorff, who initiated the movement for peace, it was a war the aims of which could not be attained. The Spanish-American War might also be considered either way. Cuba was taken. Spain could do nothing to change that situation. Yet the war never touched Spain itself,

and, from that point of view, further resistance for a long time was certainly possible. The Napoleonic Wars are also controversial. They probably belong in the class of wars where further resistance was impossible.

The difficulty of thus classifying nearly thirty per cent of the wars studied lies in the fact that, literally, further resistance is always possible until the last man is dead. But the classification has a value, nevertheless. There is a fundamental difference of attitude between those who stop because they are getting hurt, and those who stop because they simply cannot go on fighting. In this analysis we shall devote our attention first to the wars in which further resistance is impossible.

In these cases, the decision to quit is always brought about by military pressure. Other elements may contribute to it, but these could never bring surrender without battles, defeats, attrition, and an overwhelming enemy force.

The first task of the fighting forces is to destroy the enemy forces—to eliminate the military power to resist. The simplest example was the complete loss of the two Spanish fleets in the Spanish-American War. Men-of-war were necessary for further action by Spain in Cuba. Spain had nothing left but a few minor and inferior vessels. If she could do nothing with her best vessels, she certainly could not succeed with what she had left. Her loss of her sea arm compelled surrender.

All that is usually necessary is to destroy the enemy's force *as a force*. De Grasse's fleet was not all sunk. Most of the ships were scattered. To scatter and dissipate an organized force is equivalent to destroying it.

Attrition was a major factor in the Napoleonic Wars. The

loss of an entire army of 600,000 men in Russia was more than Napoleon or France could stand. But it did not, of itself, bring about the end.

In World War I, attrition must be considered relatively. The German losses were offset by the Allied losses until the entrance of the United States disturbed the scales that had hitherto been weighted in Germany's favor. Men! men! men! That was the cry on both sides. "Send us infantry, nothing but infantry!" cried France and Britain to their new ally. Of course, there has never been a war in which men were wasted so recklessly and to such slight purpose as on the western front. (And never a war with more stubborn stupidity among its brass hats.) But it was this relative attrition, with Germany wasting a fifth of her land forces policing Russia, and the Allies gaining the two million men of the American army that turned the tide of the military end of the war.

In the Civil War, the loss of Lee's and Johnston's armies brought about the end. The military force was destroyed just as the Spanish navy was destroyed in 1898.

In the Franco-Prussian War, the loss of MacMahon's army, the bottling up of Bazaine's force in Metz, and their surrender, which released 200,000 more Prussians to march on Paris, left that city at the mercy of the invaders.

Of course, there can be no war without attrition. But for attrition to bring about the end of resistance, the balance of forces must be suddenly and overwhelmingly disturbed. It is nearly always relative, seldom absolute, attrition that counts. France lost 600,000 men at Verdun and held that fortress. But in the Battle of France in World War II, she lost 50,000 men and gave up her entire country. In one case

the attrition was tremendous but indecisive. In the other, it was relatively small, but it brought about the end. Perhaps it was the suddenness of it, the bewilderment of complete defeat, the despair of fighting against the new type of warfare typified by the Blitzkrieg. And perhaps it was the loss of Paris. It seems fair, however, to question the French excuse that her great losses led to her surrender. In the light of Verdun, the loss of fifty thousand was trifling.

When large armies surrender, it is often decisive. Especially is this so when, before the loss, the war has not been going too well. If a belligerent is losing steadily with the best forces she can put in the field, the surrender of any large part of that force puts an extra burden on the remainder, already overburdened.

Steady attrition is not so effective. Losses can be replaced. Also, they are usually offset by equal losses on the other side. Even when this is not the case, strategic retreats, shortening lines, assuming the defensive, and similar measures can prevent the attrition from becoming fatal. But steady attrition, especially when administered by a foe that conserves his own forces, tells in the long run.

Consider next the destruction of war materials. In the old battles, success was measured largely by the capture of cannon. There were not many cannon in any army. They counted heavily. They were hard to replace and particularly hard to transport to an army in the field, especially over difficult terrain. The loss of guns counted heavily against Germany in World War I, not only through capture, but because they wore out. With the shortage of steel-hardening alloys, the German guns were used long after they should have been surveyed, with resulting poor marksmanship; and the Ger-

mans could not build gun for gun with the rapidly increasing Allied artillery.

In the Boer War, the destruction of horses was probably the major factor leading to the end. Bad grass and overwork killed more horses than British bullets, and the nature of the terrain, the nature of the war, and particularly the nature of the Boers made horses absolutely necessary. To understand this, compare the situation with our Indian wars in the Northwest. Only cavalry could hunt down or fight the swift-moving and universally mounted Indians. If some disease had swept off our cavalry mounts and left the Indian ponies unscathed, we might eventually have won the war, but the Indians would have won all the battles.

In our present war, the airplane is to the combatants what the horses were in South Africa. In the Battle of Britain, Hitler hoped to wipe out the Royal Air Force, even if he had to lose an equal number of planes to do so. Then his surplus would give him command of the air for the invasion to follow. But the British conserved their planes and submitted to the bombings. They wasted no more planes than they could replace. As a result Hitler had air superiority but never air command.

The feeble resistance the Germans are offering to the Allied air attacks is probably indicative of the same tactics. Germany must submit to the bombings in order to conserve planes for her final defense. But we are bombing with such incomparably greater force than the mightiest German raid, we are keeping it up so steadily and with such volume of bombs that it is doubtful if these imitative tactics will succeed. If, as we believe, we have materially cut down Germany's power to build planes, then the end is in sight.

Things wear out with astounding rapidity in war. The average life of a shovel, for instance, is about one day. On a farm in peacetime a shovel lasts three generations. The quantities of war materials left behind in a swift retreat are simply unbelievable. And when the retreat resembles that of Dunkirk, an entire nation is left without means of defense.

So we find that the ability to replace expended materials is always essential to victory. In our Civil War, the failure of the South as an industrial unit was certainly a major cause of defeat. The capture of Lee's baggage train compelled his surrender, just as Sherman's constant threat to Johnston's line of communications carried him right to Atlanta and the capture of the industrial center of the Confederacy.

Shortage of war materials must always be considered in connection with command of the sea. You will have observed, perhaps, how, in nearly every war we have studied, command of the sea has played a vital part. In one war, it did not count either way. In all the others but one, the victor has had command of the sea, and in that war, the victor had it in the campaign that is usually considered decisive.

That war was our revolution. We had command of the sea at Yorktown. Because we lost it when De Grasse surrendered to Rodney, England could have won the war.

In our Civil War, the Union command of the sea made possible the blockade that made food, necessities, and materials of war so scarce and irreplaceable, that wrecked the South financially, that made resistance impossible.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the sneak attack on Port Arthur gave Japan command of the sea, freedom of action to move her land forces, and interior lines of communications. Russia's only hope was to dispute this command. When

Rozhdestvenski's Baltic Fleet was destroyed at Tsushima, it spelled the end.

In the Boer War, command of the sea enabled Britain to pour troops and supplies into South Africa absolutely unimpeded and without danger. The Boers had no navy.

In the Crimean War, Russia very foolishly tried to take Turkey by land alone. Turkey held the gateway to the Black Sea. France got her ships through before Russia could stop her. The Allies' command of the sea pushed the theater of war up to the Crimea. The logical place for it from Russia's point of view was the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Those straits were what she was fighting for. With the Allies' command of the sea, they were never in danger for a minute.

In World War I, the Allies' command of the sea made possible the supply of their armies, the astoundingly successful transportation of the American army that brought the final military success, saved England from impending starvation, and starved and crippled Germany into revolution and surrender. For a time the submarines' challenge nearly took command of the sea away from the Allies. Victory hung in the balance. It followed the command of the sea.

In the Napoleonic Wars, the great victories of the Nile and Trafalgar were so crippling to Napoleon that he carefully concealed the news of them from France. France's geography makes her one of the most difficult countries in the world to defend upon the sea. She has two fronts—one on the Atlantic and one on the Mediterranean. They are separated from each other by all of Spain and all of Portugal and by England's rock of Gibraltar, which can deny access to the Atlantic to enemy ships in the Mediterranean and vice versa. We are in a similar position today—not so bad as

when all of South America lay between our coasts, but bad enough.

France's bad situation, England's superior sea power, her victories and attrition of French ships, enabled England to blockade France, to move her men and supplies with complete freedom of action, to carry on the victorious and seriously damaging Peninsula campaign, and, to top all, prevented Napoleon from invading England. Napoleon was tolerated by his own country only because he was successful; but he was never successful on the sea.

The Franco-Prussian War is the only one of all we have reviewed in which sea power does not appear to have mattered. At first glance it would seem to be a question of terrain—two states, bordering on each other, grappling on the border, and then one pushing forward to victory.

But on further study we will see that this was not the case. Both World Wars, in which command of the sea has played a most important part, have been fought over the same terrain. The American Civil War presented precisely the same situation, and there the blockade resulting from command of the sea was vital.

One factor, except in a naval war like the Spanish-American, seems to be necessary for command of the sea to be effective—time. Command of the sea permits freedom of action to the merchant shipping of one belligerent and denies it to the other. That effect does not become vital until the lowered stock-piles of the denied belligerent demand replenishment from sea-borne sources. That takes time. The matter of terrain, however, does enter the picture, as in the Russo-Japanese War when command of the sea affected the mobility of troop movements. We have also seen this result

in the Crimean, Napoleonic, American Civil, Spanish-American and Boer Wars, in World War I and in the American Revolution.

In the Franco-Prussian War, troop movement by sea did not seem necessary at any time and the short duration of the war rendered the blockade effect unimportant.

In the current war, we have seen a good deal of muddled thinking about what we call "Command of the Air." The term is obviously borrowed from the older term, "Command of the Sea," but it is obvious that we are groping toward a distinction that has thus far been badly expressed and quite generally misunderstood. Perhaps the difficulty lies in the fact that no nation has ever had command of the air in the sense that we use the term command of the sea, and it is impossible to study accurately a situation that exists only in theory. When a nation has command of the sea, her sea-borne traffic can be moved without serious interference from the enemy, and the enemy's ships can scarcely move at all. We have seen overwhelming air superiority in this war, and have seen it pass from one side to the other, but there has never been a time when the weaker side's planes could not fly.

There has been much talk about command of the sea being neutralized by command of the air. The proponents of this theory say, in effect, the following: "If you have command of the sea, and I have command of the air, I will defeat you because command of the air is superior to command of the sea." What they really mean is this: "If you have an immense superiority of battleships, and I have immense superiority of planes where they can strike the battleships, I will have command, not of the air, but of the sea." In other

words, command of the sea is a question of results, and not of the means of attaining those results.

It is well, however, not to jump to conclusions too hastily as to the superiority of planes over ships. The situation has changed dramatically since the first days of the war, and still is changing from day to day. Defense of ships against planes has been a bit slow in developing, but the delay is not due, as has often been declared, to the stupidity or the stubbornness of the much-maligned brass hats. Every naval officer has been terribly aware of the vulnerability of his ship to air attack. No one could possibly stand on the bridge with the knowledge that attacking planes are on their way without a helpless "sitting duck" sensation. To find the answer demanded invention in fields practically unexplored. Luck has played its usual important rôle. But there has been no lack of diligence, no failure to appreciate the problem. It has been the old story of the occasional leaping ahead of attack methods with defense methods lagging behind. But it is revealing no secret to say that one of our battleships shot down thirty-nine out of eighty attacking Japanese planes and drove back the rest, completely reversing the theories that had been based on the destruction of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*.

It is safe to say now that immense superiority in the air above the sea does not necessarily give command of the sea. Defense is catching up.

Now we come to the question of "decisive battles." Most historians and military analysts stress this concept to the limit. Yorktown, Gettysburg, the storming of Sevastopol, Sedan, Paardeberg, Tsushima, Santiago, and Waterloo are famous as "decisive battles."

We'll grant Waterloo. And possibly Santiago. When all the eggs are in one basket, and the other fellow wrecks the basket, you have a decisive battle. But they are pretty rare. Ludendorff was so obsessed with the notion that, in his search for the decisive battle of World War I, he nominated Amiens—which was just another battle to Foch. No—disabuse your mind of any notion that every war has its decisive battle, that it is a single important engagement that ends a war. We have seen that the ending of a war is an immensely complicated business, compounded of many elements of which the entire military situation is just one.

The so-called decisive battle usually changes the military situation dramatically, but the same results would probably be achieved in the end without it. The costs might differ, the time table might be changed.

Winning battles does win wars; but the popular notion that one battle, by the Grace of God, is the decisive one does not seem to be borne out by the facts.

We have not yet mentioned the other criterion of military success—the conquest of territory. It may mean everything or nothing. If the conquest and occupation of enemy territory denies to the enemy sources of supply necessary to the military effort and to the life of the nation, it is very important indeed. Or, conversely, if the conquest adds food-producing lands, oils, coal, metals which the conqueror requires for its own national life and military effort, it is important to the extent that those supplies can be exploited.

The strategic picture, however, is usually more important than the economic picture. Japan's great initial gains in the first part of the current war gave her needed oil, rubber, tin, aluminum, chromium, copper, molybdenum, mercury, man-

ganese, and nickel in abundance. But her exploitation of those materials is apparently seriously crippled by her loss of shipping. She is still most seriously handicapped by her shortage of cotton and wool.

But the island empire she has acquired is of the utmost strategic importance. It protects Japan by its "non-sinkable airplane carriers," and forces us to resort to a most costly and profitless campaign of island-hopping.

In World War I, Germany took and exploited coal and iron mines in the north of France. But, save for that, what did she gain, and what did the Allies gain in the long, bloody, costly struggle for a few hundred yards of shell-torn mud? Trenches might be taken, but always behind lay more trenches. Four years of it! And we measured gains by worthless territory, not by the factors that won the war.

There have been few more dramatic gains of territory than Napoleon's march to Moscow. He conquered the city—the "second capital" of Russia—and thought the war was won. But Alexander did not attach the same value to territory Napoleon did. He willingly burned his own "capital." He let the weather and the distance and the scorched earth fight for him and he destroyed an army of 600,000 without fighting a single pitched battle after Borodino.

If you can take a bridgehead across a river, a commanding height, an important seaport, a railroad, an air base, a strong position with which to protect a flank, these things are tactically important. If you can cut a force or a country in two as Grant, Porter, and Farragut did when they got control of the Mississippi, that is strategically important. Such a policy, carried out on a grand scale, was followed in South Africa when Kitchener cut up the whole countryside with

barbed-wire fences supported by blockhouses. He made his own Mississippi River. There the taking of territory was important because it restricted the freedom of action of the guerillas, bottled them up where they could be destroyed. But the territory itself was of no value.

Montgomery's retreat before Rommel in North Africa shows a masterly disregard of the value of desert sands. He simply played Alexander's game and Wellington's game all over again. Supplied through the back door via the Arabian Sea, he drew Rommel to the point where he could crush him beautifully. It is hard to see where Rommel got his reputation as Germany's greatest general. German generals are supposed to study Hitler's model, Napoleon.

The conquest of perfectly worthless territory, however, may have an important psychological effect. This silly business of showing lines on a map can upset an entire nation. We were terribly discouraged a month before this was written by our failure to take Cassino. Today America is overjoyed with the news that it has fallen.

It is well to inquire of what strategic or other value is the conquest of Italian territory. We have put Italy, as a power, out of the war. We owe her no debt. To hold Italy will be a burden we can ill afford with the task ahead of us. It is important that we have air fields in Italy; but we have them already. It is important that we engage a large German force as a diversion for Russia, but, win or lose, we are doing that. It is important, psychologically, that we gain consistent victories, but German propaganda will prevent those victories from having the desired and expected effect.

But the taking of Italian territory, *per se*, is quite another

matter. To take it will do us no good. To fail to take it will do us no harm.

The taking of a capital is psychologically important. In the Franco-Prussian War, in the Napoleonic Wars, and in the present war, the fall of Paris has meant the fall of France. In World War I, the Germans aimed for Paris because they knew that its capture would put France out of the war. Such a concept is without military foundation. In the present war, the Germans have ~~probably~~ already been bombed out of Berlin; but the war goes on.

When the capture of territory has neither economic nor strategic significance, but convinces the enemy that they are licked, it is tremendously important.

Territory apart, it is hard to overestimate the importance of continued, consistent victories. Germany and Japan have not won any important major engagement in two years. This does not have the effect it should in those countries because of their lying propaganda. As long as the Germans believe that New York has been heavily bombed, as long as the Japanese believe that their forces are holding Los Angeles, our minor but continued successes will be effective only against the higher command which, supposedly, is correctly informed.

But the truth does have a way of getting out. Wounded men back from the front, exchanged prisoners, our radio broadcasts, listened to illegally, all have their effect.

The matter of territorial gains can count most if we can gain and maintain a sane attitude toward them and let the enemy go crazy on the subject in the orthodox way.

Territory taken in war does not stay taken unless the con-

queror wins the war or is awarded the territory at the peace table. Of course, when the war aim is to take the territory, possession is nine points of the law. The conquest of the Crimea was an instance of the capture of territory that did not stay captured. The Allies did not want it. They returned it to Russia. It was probably not even a bargaining foil in the peace. Russia conceded all the Allies' demands anyway.

Sometimes territory is taken just for the purpose of peace-table bargaining. The capture of Manila in the Spanish-American War certainly could have been justified on this basis. If we had failed to achieve so complete a victory in Cuba, or if the Cuban campaign had dragged out to a costly length, our domination in the Philippines—in which we really had no interest—could be exchanged for Spain's vestigial control in Cuba. We could say:

"You evacuate the rest of Cuba. That is our war aim. When you do that, we'll give the Philippines back. If you won't make that deal, we'll take the rest of Cuba and keep the Philippines."

There is no rule governing this situation. If the vanquished is so thoroughly defeated that the victor can dictate all the terms, the territory captured by either side is disposed of in accordance with the victor's wishes. If it is a negotiated peace, everything taken and held at the close of hostilities becomes a poker chip in the peace-table game.

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, all France's conquests were stripped from her and her boundaries were established as they had been in 1790. A few years before, her boundaries seemed vastly stretched by conquest. Japan knows she must win this war to hold not only her island empire but also

Manchukuo and Mongolia. In an all-out defeat she will lose all she has taken. In a negotiated peace she will hang onto whatever she wants most and the Allies desire least.

So it goes. The physical objectives of war are usually selected on the following considerations in the order listed: strategic, economic, psychological, as peace-table counters, and finally for permanent conquest—to have and to hold.

Thus far we have discussed military action as directed primarily against military resistance. But military action may be directed against national life as well. Through blockade, destruction of commerce, and cutting communications by land and sea, the civilian population of the enemy may be starved into submission. It is difficult to starve a country, easy to starve a besieged city. But starvation, however cruel and regrettable, is an implement of warfare which even the most civilized countries employ. It may be more deadly and more painful than bombardment and poison gas, but nations that would be horrified at bombing and gassing women and children do not hesitate to starve them. Perhaps the reason behind this is that they may not be able to dodge the bombs, shells, and gas, but they can avoid starvation by surrendering. They usually do. War is not a gentle and considerate art.

Another military means of starvation (the destruction of national life) is to lay waste the country. An advancing army rarely does this. It wants to use and enjoy the supplies, buildings, roads, wells, and other facilities it captures. But an army in retreat destroys the crops and animals it cannot carry off, burns buildings, pollutes wells, lays land mines, tears up roads, and generally makes the country unin-

habitable. Sometimes this can be justified on the ground of military necessity. Often it is pure wantonness or malice. On the whole, however, it is of a piece with blockades and destruction of commerce—a type of warfare directed against the national life rather than against the armed forces. Bombing from the air is partly a means of destroying production of war materials and partly a matter of laying waste the country. It is hard to draw the line. The selection of, and concentration on, purely military objectives is not entirely feasible. Whenever you drop a bomb from the air, non-combatants are likely to be hurt.

But we are less concerned with non-combatants than we used to be. More and more, warfare is directed against the national life, and justified on that ground. Napoleon believed war should be terrible in order that it be short. There is less suffering in a short, terrible struggle than in a chivalrous war long-drawn-out. "*Schrecklichkeit*" is the word for it, a recognized part of German war policy. Japan is even worse than Germany. The theory seems to be that the more bestial you are to helpless enemies, the more readily will the unconquered yield themselves to suffer your bestiality. The strange part of this theory is that with some enemies it works. Most of the conquered, occupied, and vassal countries of Germany yielded without very much bloodshed.

War is not cricket. The very essence of it is to kick the daylights out of the other fellow, and rules and agreements are not observed when it is not convenient to do so. The chivalrous belligerent works under a serious handicap. But that is true of all virtues. The point we wish to stress is that direct military action against the national life can be justi-

fied by the same reasoning as action against a purely military objective.

So much for wars that end because further resistance is impossible. Consider now the wars that are stopped simply because they cost too much to continue. A term that is coming into wide military use is "acceptability." You see it in the newspapers, in military and naval articles. It merely means, that before any action is undertaken, it is studied pretty carefully to determine as nearly as possible what it will cost. For instance, a daylight air raid is contemplated upon a strong enemy position. From previous records carefully kept, it is estimated that the raiding force will encounter a certain number of enemy planes and a certain volume of anti-aircraft fire. In the normal course of events, it is estimated that a certain number of planes and men will be lost. That is the cost of the action. It is weighed carefully against the expected gains from the raid. But a further evaluation is necessary.

How much are those planes and men worth at the moment? In Europe where we have lots of planes and lots of men, the result may well justify the cost. In China, where both planes and men are hard to get, we may decide that we cannot pay the price for an equally great gain. If we can afford the price, the action is "acceptable."

That is the sort of reasoning which should be applied to wars as carefully as to raids. Unfortunately, it is harder to see a war as a whole, and the thinking is often not so clear as it should be.

Let us examine the three wars which obviously ended because the vanquished did not wish to risk further costs. First,

the American Revolution. It is obvious from our study that England could have fought on, could have won, could have attained her war aims of maintaining the *status quo*. But England had made up her mind on an estimate of the situation that defined the probable costs as the loss of India, the loss of her West Indian possessions, and the loss of Gibraltar. Then the situation changed. There should have been a new estimate. It was bargain day, but England did not realize it. Those losses were no longer part of the cost. Having started the peace movement, she saw it through. It was an emotional, not a logical decision.

The estimate of the situation in the Russo-Japanese War included as part of the price the Czar's throne. As was proved twelve years later, this estimate was pretty accurate. In accordance with the history of most wars, a revolution was in order. If you were the Czar, would you risk your throne of all the Russias for the sake of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula?

In the Crimean War, Alexander did not need to weigh the cost too heavily. Whatever he paid was too much. He did not want the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. He wanted exactly what his enemies wanted—maintenance of the *status quo*. So why fight further when both parties wanted the same thing?

S E V E N T E E N

When?

LET US NOW LOOK into the moral, psychological, emotional aspects of defeat. We have used three adjectives and we do not like any of them. But if you know what we mean, they'll do.

Here are two countries, standing toe to toe, slugging it out. A few rounds later, one tries to cover its face, runs to its corner of the ring, and yells to its seconds to throw in the sponge. Something in its national soul has snapped. It will give up everything for the sake of peace. Peace! Peace at any price, but quickly!

How does it get that way?

First comes war weariness. The people simply are sick of war. You can have too much of anything; but you can stand most disagreeable things because you can escape from them for a while. You can't escape from war. It invades your home, your office, your pleasures, your travels. It bombards your eyes in the newspapers, your ears on the radio. You are whipped and spurred and goaded into an inner rebellion against the whole thing.

A nation must be conditioned for war. That means a long, organized effort to create a kind of frenzy. We Americans are mere amateurs in it. Partly that is because we have been

fairly safe from any action in our own country. Even when air raids seemed imminent, it was evident that we were not likely to be subjected to prolonged and protracted bombing. Those of us responsible for defense took precautions against it, but to most Americans it seemed remote. We have faced nothing compared to what European nations have faced. There the whip-up began long before hostilities opened.

Nothing hurts at first. It is merely annoying. But it creates a smouldering resentment, not against the enemy but against one's own government. In the art of winning a war, as against the purely military activity of winning battles, nothing is more important than to guard your own people against war weariness. Make the enemy sick of the war by all means, but spare your own people from every avoidable annoyance. In World War I, there was a slogan in England, "Business as usual!" Of course, it was soon demonstrated that business and life itself could not be carried on as usual; but the attempt had a value. In the race toward national exhaustion, England's cheerful effort to live the old life gave Germany a fatal head start.

The Germans, however, can acquiesce in more regimentation, bossing, and kicking around than any other race or people. Americans can stand less than any other. The national tolerance for that sort of thing must be studied closely.

As the war grows older it ceases merely to annoy. It hurts. The loss of friends and dear ones, the breaking up of families, the terrible toll of youth, the death lists, the wounded who hobble on crutches, the rise of prices, the shortage of both necessities and luxuries, the failure of accustomed services, and the breakdown of courtesy cause immense and widespread suffering and resentment.

The government tries to regulate things and soon demonstrates its incapacity. Only the superior people realize that natural laws of supply and demand are stronger than any man-made rules. Money loses its value, and with that comes economic fear. The resentment against the government turns into distrust. With it all is a sense that government is something apart from the people who created it—something hostile and oppressive. This feeling is not realized, and because of the aura of patriotic fervor, it is not expressed; but the seeds of revolution are sown.

There is, of course, a ray of hope. All belligerents are sure they will win the war. Therein lies hope of surcease and the promise of a better day. The news is good. Good news is made to look better. Bad news is suppressed entirely. The country that makes a habit of concealing bad news is playing a very dangerous game. Sooner or later the truth will out. Survivors of disasters wander home, tell of their experiences. Nowadays radio penetrates everywhere. The enemy's news is rejected as lying propaganda; but the overtones, the confidence, the thoughts that (to use stage argot) are not "punched" but "thrown away" really carry conviction.

Government lies, broken promises, false predictions undermine faith.

If there is real, demonstrable success, the rest is tolerated. Yet if coupled with that success are more sufferings, more annoyance and no amelioration of conditions, the success itself soon palls. France grew tired of Napoleon's victories.

But if success is lacking, the sentiment against the war builds up quickly. Germany and Japan have had no genuine good news in a long time. Our victories, though minor and distinctly preparatory in nature, have been consistent—al-

most as consistent as the victories of both our enemies at the start of their hostilities. The dramatic initial successes of both Japan and Germany would be heady stuff even if reported without exaggeration. A nation fed on that kind of provender suffers a terrible letdown when this news is followed by a prolonged series of defeats or even by a protracted stalemate.

Of course, we know that the lies our enemies are told tend to offset the effect of the genuine bad news. (Skeptics may ask how we know that the news fed to us Americans is true when it differs from that fed to the enemy. Our answer is that in many of these instances we have been able to substantiate the truth of American releases and the falsity of enemy releases as of our own knowledge. This has happened often enough to carry complete conviction. Naturally no thinking person accepts blindly the conclusions drawn from the facts, especially by some of the less competent radio analysts.)

Suddenly to the losing nation comes the conviction that they cannot win. That usually occurs after great losses by their side and increased strength of the enemy.

In World War I, it occurred after the tremendous effort of the German offensive in the Spring of 1918. This was delivered with superior fighting strength, and it failed. It was the utmost possible effort, and it failed. Then came enemy superiority with the active participation of American troops.

Germany reasoned: "If we failed in an all-out offensive when we had superiority, how can we hope to win now, when we are positively and relatively weaker?"

We shall see the same thing happen when the invasion gets more than a foothold. Germany will ask, "If we cannot hold

Russia alone, how can we hope to hold Russia and Britain and the United States combined?"

When an aggressor belligerent knows it cannot win, it wants to make peace while there is a chance to negotiate it. When all resistance fails, it must accept a dictated peace—not a negotiated peace. The stronger it is at the time of the negotiations, the better the terms it can obtain.

When peace sentiment starts to run strong, there are just two things the government can do: open negotiations, or pull a rabbit out of its hat. If the war party at this crucial moment can produce a new weapon, a brilliant reversal of the way the war is going, can bring in a strong new ally, or reveal a new, successful, and diverting strategy, all may yet be well.

But let the strong, dull, unimaginative leaders make patriotic speeches about fighting to the last man and the last drop of blood, let them urge persistence in a policy that has not been succeeding, and they are doomed.

The revolution will start and, once started, will spread like wildfire. The speed with which it swept Germany at the close of World War I was one of the most amazing aspects of the whole war. Ludendorff claimed it started on the home front and spread to the army. Foch, who was certainly in a position to know how the vast hordes of voluntary German prisoners felt, claimed it started in the army and spread to the home front. As an active outbreak against the Kaiser, it almost certainly started in the Navy.

Actually there was no fundamental difference in the thinking of the armed forces and the people back home.

In the present war, many observers seem to think that the Gestapo, the political police, will exercise such control that no revolution can ever start. We admit the difficulties. But

this theory is based upon the supposition that the million or more Gestapo think and feel exactly as they are told to think and feel. That may be true. It may be equally true of all Germany—up to the present time.

But when the heat is turned on, when the conviction is reached that defeat is inevitable, when there is no further point to the sufferings, the deprivations, the losses, the stupendous bombing, and when the advance of invading armies proves that the situation can never be better and is rapidly and inevitably becoming worse, the home front, the army, the navy, the air force, and even the Gestapo will want peace. It is difficult to understand why the writers and analysts of the present scene so frequently declare that any revolution in Germany is *impossible* because of the Gestapo. Any revolution presupposes a change of heart on the part of the revolutionists. Of course, one could build a good case for the theory that members of the Gestapo have no hearts but not for the theory that what they use for hearts cannot be changed. The million or more Gestapo agents are plain, ordinary Germans beneath their uniforms. They are trained, indoctrinated, disciplined beyond all others. But their very discipline must carry them closer to the breaking point than ordinary soldiers, sailors, or civilians. If we were to venture a wager on where the revolution will start, we would bet that the first to rise will be the Gestapo.

The men who made the war will probably not be given the chance to make the peace. Suicide, escape to a neutral country, assassination, capture and imprisonment—something of that sort will dispose of them. Doubtless Hitler's plans are already laid. Doubtless ceremonial swords are already sharpened in Japan for wholesale hara-kiri.

The Allies have already announced their terms—unconditional surrender. Whatever advantages the announcement of these terms may give to the Allies—and there are several—they erect one handicap. They discourage offers for a negotiated peace. The peace must always be made to appear more attractive than a continuation of the war. Therein lay Woodrow Wilson's great skill. The peace he offered, based on the Fourteen Points, was not only acceptable to the Germans. To most of them it seemed to be the very thing they were fighting for. That peace looked better than war, better than the old peace under the Kaiser.

Thus far we have done nothing to make peace attractive to the Germans. It is easy enough to do. Here are fourteen points that might appeal:

1. No demagogues.
2. No secret police.
3. No government invasion of the home.
4. No compulsory military service.
5. No youth organizations.
6. No taxation for military purposes.
7. Freedom of enterprise.
8. Freedom of choice of occupation.
9. Freedom of the press.
10. Unrestricted radio listening.
11. Freedom of teachers to teach the truth.
12. Freedom of religious worship.
13. Abolition of concentration camps.
14. Sound money—guaranteed by the Allies.

These were written hastily with no idea of covering the whole field or expressing accurately the thoughts that are

merely hinted. They simply show, by way of example, the sort of thing we could promise the German people without doing violence to any of our conceptions of ending the war with a dictated peace.

Under the Hitler regime the German people have suffered intolerable interference with their way of life. They have accepted it because it promised glory and success. When the glory is gone and the success turned to defeat, they should welcome the guaranteed abolition of the things they have had to put up with.

Now, why should we want offers of negotiated peace when we intend a dictated peace? The primary reason is that when a country once starts peace overtures, it ceases to fight. Soldiers do not willingly risk their lives when they know it does not matter. Supply and munitions officers cease to be diligent when they feel that whatever they procure will soon be turned over to the enemy. Hoarded reserves will be used up when there is imminent promise of peace and plenty.

By all means, let us encourage negotiation if only to discourage resistance and build the revolution. The history of the wars we have studied shows that revolution or change of regime is almost certainly bred by war and defeat. In the current war we have seen this in defeated France and in defeated Italy.

How does the current war in Europe differ from World War I? In both wars Germany had initial successes, but in this war her successes were vastly greater. In this war she has had a longer and thus far more consistent record of later defeat. In the last war, her Fatherland was threatened by invasion, but it was a long way off, because the Rhine could be held for a long time. In this war the threat

is still remote while this is being written. In the last war, blockade caused widespread suffering. In this war, that seems doubtful because of Germany's slave labor from occupied countries and her complete exploitation of their resources. But in this war the Fatherland has been bombed close to the limit of endurance. The last war lasted about four years and three months. This war has lasted four years and nine months as of June 1, 1944. Add to that six previous years of Hitlerism and you have about eleven years of pretty tough going. Before that there was inflation, before that, depression, before that, defeat, before that, World War I. Germany can't stand much more.

When? Well . . . soon. At any rate, suddenly, and when we least expect it.

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Lieutenant Commander Calahan is a graduate of the U. S. Naval War College.

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